What will devo-max mean?

One of the unfortunate things about the independence referendum debate is that it did not help us clarify the most likely outcome: something that many people will call ‘devo max’. For some, devo max refers to the idea of devolving everything except foreign and defence policy – something that just can’t happen to Scotland if it remains part of the UK. Instead, at the very least, the Bank of England will remain in charge of monetary policy and the UK Government will retain control of many fiscal policies.

I think that most politicians, and many campaigners, know that devo max is not possible and was not offered during The Vow. Instead, the three UK party leaders offered ‘extensive new powers’ in a remarkably short space of time (with draft legislation to come before the next general election). From that starting point, what might happen?

  1. Each of the main parties produced their own plans before The Vow, and it is difficult to tell what will happen when they all get together, perhaps with the SNP, to produce a settlement that sticks this time – in a small fraction of the time it took to produce the ill-fated Scotland Act 2012. Whatever it is may still be called ‘devo max’, but it will come to mean the maximum you will get, not the maximum you thought you could have.
  2. The only thing we can be sure about is this: it won’t be a sensible outcome. By that, I mean it will be a political outcome. People won’t always get together to work out, in a ‘technical’ way, what responsibilities complement each other, and what level of government is appropriate to what decision (if, indeed, that is possible). They won’t always ask: what are the powers for? Instead, the outcome will result from who is the most persuasive or in the best position to further their interests – such as whatever party is in power after the UK General election in 2015. Or, the negotiations will work from what Scotland already has (note that the Scotland Act 1998 devolved to the Scottish Parliament the responsibilities already held by the Scottish Office, and the Scotland Act 2012 did not go much further) and consider what greater settlement people in Scotland and the rest of the UK will be content with.
  3. We might start to think about how the Scottish Government might share or negotiate more powers on a regular basis. In one sense, it would have been handier for this process to include a stronger representation from the Liberal Democrats, since they have thought about devolution for a long time and have a relatively mature sense of the idea of sharing powers in key areas – perhaps to encourage routine intergovernmental negotiations rather than seek a stark (and, in practice, often artificial) separation of powers. Such a relationship seems inevitable if the Scottish Government seeks to ‘join up’ its responsibilities with those of the UK – as opposed to (parts of) a Yes campaign simply waiting for an inadequate settlement to go wrong.

What would happen if we asked: powers for what?

Still, I remain a boringly optimistic academic with a lot of time on my hands. So, what follows is my attempt to work out what each government does, and what we might reasonably expect if our focus is more on the ‘joined up’ rather than political side to the next devolved settlement.

Economic and social security policy: what hope for redistributive policies?

The idea of devo max suggests that you can, in Scotland, join up taxation and spending issues. For example, if you want to redistribute on a massive scale, to address economic inequalities that contribute to health and education inequalities, you need to connect those dots. You decide who to raise taxes from, in what mix (corporations? North sea oil? People who buy things? Higher earners? Local property taxes?), and how much you want to borrow to fund capital programmes. At the same time, you decide which services (health, education, criminal justice, local authorities, universities and colleges, etc.) and which people should benefit from the distribution of that income.

Then, you might try to join up some of those things by, for example: spending big on employment and training programmes, on the assumption that you will then save money on benefits or gain it in tax; rolling out a huge childcare expansion policy, to do the same when more people (mostly women) are freed up to work; introducing a ‘living wage’ (higher minimum wage) and reducing benefits (or transferring benefits to tax credits); or, spending big on public health to reduce long term pressure on the NHS (as part of a broader focus on ‘prevention’ or ‘early intervention’). Under devo max, it is clear who to blame if your taxes are too high or your benefits are too low.

However, there are several obstacles to that outcome:

  1. Scotland remains part of the UK. Many of the arguments rehearsed during the referendum still apply, including: the desire to maintain a degree of fiscal uniformity when two countries share a currency; the cost of setting up new (or boosting old) institutions to deal with the administration of a new tax regime; and, the desire to maintain a certain level of uniformity in taxes and benefits (and to transfer proceeds across the UK) as part of a broad attachment to UK ‘social citizenship’.
  2. Scotland remains part of the EU. This makes it difficult to devolve certain taxes, such as corporation (if the Scottish Government reduced corporation tax, to become more competitive, it may be interpreted as state aid) and value added (or, at least, the EU promotes a high degree of uniformity and minimum levels of VAT). I’m not sure about alcohol duty which, if devolved, could have been a more straightforward instrument (than minimum pricing legislation) to keep prices high.
  3. No-one promised anything of the sort. If you look at the proposals by the main parties (summarised here), you find the greatest emphasis on devolving all, or most, responsibility for income tax. I have never heard a UK politician promise to assign oil tax revenue to Scotland. Instead, we have heard the three leaders maintain a commitment to the Barnett formula, which suggests that they envision Scottish Governments tinkering at the taxation margins while, on the whole, receiving their income from the Treasury. Under ‘devo max’, the Barnett formula would disappear in Scotland – and I just don’t see it happening.

So, we are likely to see the introduction of limited borrowing powers, plus the devolution of some taxes, some of which can be used as instruments in their own right (such as the landfill tax, already due to be devolved, which could be used for environmental purposes), and one which remains electorally toxic (income tax). If we are being super-cynical, we might say that the UK will mostly devolve a tax that it expects Scotland not to use, while claiming that a Scottish Government can raise taxes to fund more public services to satisfy an allegedly left-wing electorate.

It might also talk up the idea of the Scottish Parliament becoming more accountable for the money it spends. This is the bit I don’t get: if most of the Scottish Government budget is raised by the UK, and the Scottish Government is destined to tinker at the margins, and remains integrated within a UK regime, how can you hold it accountable for its tax and spending regime? It seems only a little more plausible than holding local authorities to account for their council tax rates. More broadly speaking, a multi-level policymaking environment makes it increasingly difficult to know who decides what happens.

Instead, what we could (but, I expect, won’t) explore is the idea of a shared strategy, with the Scottish Government signalling to the Treasury its desire to pursue distinctive policies (on employment, childcare, and/ or a higher minimum wage) and seek the financial rewards/ punishments if they work out. Or, it might seek equivalent funding when its policies have an effect on UK benefits. That would require a degree of regular cooperation (and, to be honest, Treasury guesswork) that we have yet to see since devolution. Indeed, in high profile cases – attendance allowance to people receiving free personal care (introduced by the Labour-LD Scottish Government), and council tax benefit for people paying local income tax (a policy proposed, but not introduced, by the SNP) – the experience has been bruising for all involved.

Perhaps a safer bet is in the field of ‘employability’, which currently combines devolved public service provision (such as education and training) and reserved job search/ support services. Certainly, the ‘Christie Commission’, which received cross-party support in Scotland, recommends the devolution of the latter.

International relations, defence and security: what does it cover?

This category covers some of the big, scary, issues regarding the future of nuclear weapons, the UK armed forces, and the UK’s part in international security. We can also expect immigration to be a UK (and EU) responsibility, with minimal scope for the Scottish Government to pursue a distinctive policy (Fresh Talent seems like a long time ago).

The UK would also remain the member state in the EU, responsible for monitoring the Scottish Government’s adherence to EU rules and regulations, particularly in areas (including environment, agriculture, and fish) with a strong EU presence. There is some scope for Scottish discretion in some areas (such as in the implementation of a common agricultural policy).

Crime: drugs and guns

Most aspects of criminal justice, and police operations, are already devolved, and Scotland has always had its own legal system. The main exceptions are in responsibility for firearms, drugs and certain driving offences. The Scotland Act 2012 would devolve responsibility for the regulation of air weapons (a longstanding issue for successive Scottish First Ministers, largely following high profile incidents of air rifle misuse), the treatment of drug addicts with controlled drugs (e.g. prescribing opiates), the national speed limit (which can’t really go up in Scotland while its roads are so crap) and drink drive limits.

It is in this field that we might see the greatest reason for governmental cooperation to address issues such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and terrorism – but perhaps without a great desire of the UK to devolve more responsibilities to do so.


It is in this field that we have seen a promising degree of cooperation (or, at least, delegation) beyond the reserved/ devolved divide. The UK remains responsible for energy policy, but has effectively devolved some decisions to Scottish ministers – such as agreeing (informally) to a Scottish veto on new nuclear power stations – and, through the devolution of planning (and land reform) laws, has allowed the Scottish Government to develop distinctive policies on the expansion of renewable energy (and, to all intents and purposes, the decision to allow or refuse fracking for unconventional oil and gas in Scotland – even though the UK still grants the drilling licenses). As things stand, the UK would remain responsible for the taxation of North Sea oil, and it is difficult to see a future in which that responsibility would be devolved, to allow the Scottish Government to pursue a coherent energy strategy (instead, we might expect a focus on entitlement to the proceeds of oil taxation, which is a different thing).


Who knew this would be a hot button topic? Our original concern was about the fate of Doctor Who (which has turned out to be not worth the debate), but now our attention has shifted to allegations of BBC bias against the Yes campaign, which might prompt the SNP to push harder for a devolved system.

The already-devolved areas

Health, education, housing and social care is devolved, and we have seen a significant amount of policy divergence in key areas, such as higher education tuition fees, personal care for older people, homelessness legislation, healthcare organisation, public health and mental health. The remaining issues regard the funding of public services and their link to the benefits system. We might expect the devolution of housing benefit, largely because the ‘bedroom tax’ became such a beacon of the Yes campaign, and (perhaps) other benefits related to previous Scottish Government policies on personal care (attendance allowance) and a proposed local income tax (council tax benefit) – subject to a strong desire within the UK to retain a uniform level of pension and social security entitlement.


Filed under Scottish independence, Scottish politics

8 responses to “What will devo-max mean?

  1. Pingback: Life goes on after the Scottish independence referendum | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

  2. Pingback: Why would the UK Government take a tough line with the Scottish Government after a Yes or No vote? | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

  3. Pingback: Fracking in Scotland: maximum devolution versus a quadruple lock? | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

  4. Pingback: When People Talk About Media Bias, What Do They Mean? What is the Evidence? | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

  5. On a minor issue on your interesting argument Paul, is linking ‘local income tax ‘ with ‘council tax benefit’ not an oxymoron. If you assess household incomes [ to kind of make a progressive poll tax eh?] then ‘benEfits ‘ become a dead letter…or do they ?

    • That was the problem – if LIT were to be introduced in Scotland, people would lose council tax benefits without them or the SG receiving the equivalent.

  6. Pingback: The result of the Scottish independence referendum and the future of British politics | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

  7. Pingback: Is politics and policymaking about sharing evidence and facts or telling good stories? Two very silly examples from #SP16 | Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s