Can Westminster take back control after Brexit?

All going well, this discussion will be in a box in Chapter 8 of Understanding Public Policy 2nd ed.

“The ‘Brexit’ referendum was dominated by a narrative of taking back control of policy and policy making. Control of policy would allow the UK government to make profound changes to immigration and spending. Control of policymaking would allow Parliament and the public to hold the UK government directly to account, in contrast to a more complex and distant EU policy process less subject to direct British scrutiny.

Such high level political debate is built on the false image of a small number of elected policymakers – and the Prime Minister in particular – responsible for the outcomes of the policy process.

There is a strange disconnect between the ways in which elected politicians and elected policymakers describe UK policymaking. Ministers have mostly given up the language of control; modern manifestos no longer make claims – such as to secure ‘full employment’ or eradicate health inequalities – that suggest they control the economy or can solve problems by providing public services. Yet, much Brexit rhetoric suggests that a vote to leave the EU will put control back in the hands of ministers to solve major problems.

The main problem with the latter way of thinking is that it is rejected continuously in the modern literature on policymaking. Policymaking is multi-centric: responsibility for outcomes is spread across many levels and types of government, to the extent that it is not possible to simply know who is in charge and to blame.

Some multi-level governance (MLG) relates to the choice to share power with EU, devolved, and local policymaking organisations.

However, most MLG is necessary because ministers do not have the cognitive or coordinative capacity to control policy outcomes.

They can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of their responsibilities, and have to delegate the rest. Most decisions are taken in their name but without their intervention. They occur within a policymaking environment over which ministers have limited knowledge and control.

The problem with using Brexit as a lens through which to understand British politics is that it emphasises the choice to no longer spread power across a political system, without acknowledging the necessity of doing so.

Our understanding of the future of UK policy and policymaking is incomplete without a focus on the concepts and evidence that help us understand why UK ministers must accept their limitations and act accordingly.

Yet, clearly the Westminster model archetype remains important even if it does not exist (Duggett, 2009). Policy studies have challenged successfully its image of central control, but, the model’s importance resides in its rhetorical power in wider politics when people maintain a simple argument during general election and referendum debates: we know who is – or should be – in charge. This perspective has a profound effect on the ways in which policymakers defend their actions, and political actors compete for votes, even when it is ridiculously misleading (Rhodes, 2013; Bevir, 2013)”

See also Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: the Westminster Model and Multi-level Governance

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Understanding Public Policy 2nd edition?

Almost. I have sent a full draft following external feedback and review (next stage: copy-editing). All going well, it will be out in November 2019.

I have included below some sample chapters (and each chapter should also have its own entry (or multiple entries) in the 1000 Words and 500 Words series).

Book Preface 18.5.19

Chapter 1 Intro UPP 2nd ed 18.5.19

Chapter 13 Conclusion UPP 2nd ed 25.5.19

New references UPP 2ND ed 27.5.19

2nd ed cover

 

 

 

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Putting it all together: dissertation research question and research design (POLU9RM)

Writing a dissertation can be daunting. It is likely the longest piece of work you will plan as an undergraduate (10000 words plus bibliography) but, when you are done, it will not seem long enough.

On the one hand, it is a joyous exploration of research, in which you receive supervision but are in charge. On the other, you don’t want it to go horribly wrong.

It seems unlikely that reading my blog will spark joy, but I can at least give you some tips to avoid unnecessary problems and make your dissertation manageable.

Other advice (such as the reading in your module guide) is available, and I suggest you take it. Indeed, whenever I speak with colleagues about my approach to supervision, it seems relatively conservative and joyless.

On the other hand, why not play it safe with the dissertation then use all the time you’ve saved by seeking joy in a lovely meadow or a summer’s day?

  1. Ask the right research question.

Most undergraduate coursework involves answering your lecturer’s rather generic question. Your task is to produce something a bit different, with some of these characteristics:

  • You should find it interesting and want to answer it.
  • It should be something that you can answer.
  • It should be specific enough to help you manage your time well and answer it with the resources you have.

Compare with Halperin and Heath’s (p164) criteria, in which it should be important, ‘researchable’, and it has not been ‘answered definitively’.

(also compare with Dunleavy’s call for full narrative titles)

For example, many projects that I supervise follow roughly the same format: what is policy, how much has it changed, and why?

We can then narrow it down in several ways by choosing a specific issue, political system, time period, and/ or aspect of policy change.

This narrowing can make the difference between:

(a) feeling the need to explain many theories in the literature review, versus

(b) limiting theory selection by focusing on a small number of political system dynamics.

Action point 1

Describe your initial question or theme with your supervisor, and work with them until you are both happy with the question.

  1. Write the abstract and the introduction first?

Many people suggest that your first main piece of work should be the literature review, for quite good reasons:

  • It allows you to gain enough initial knowledge to help you guide your research
  • It allows you to get writing – often a major stumbling block – and then edit later

I suggest that your first piece of work should be the abstract and introduction for these reasons:

  • Writing a half page abstract allows you to describe what your project adds up to.
  • It really helps you discuss your plans with your supervisor
  • Writing the introduction allows you to describe your research design in enough depth to reflect on it is coherence and feasibility.
  • All going well, it will be only a small jump from your POLU9RM ‘research project design’ exercise.
  • It allows you to make sense of a quite general format for research publications (in many fields): theory, method, results.

Action point 2

Write the question/ title and abstract, share it with your likely supervisor, and talk about how coherent and feasible your plan looks.

  1. Identify the relevant theory or literature.

In some cases, the potentially relevant literature is vast if you have, for example:

  1. A too-general question about political parties or elections.
  • One good solution is to select a subfield like ‘pledge fulfilment’
  1. A too-general question about policy change.

Action point 3.

Make sure to connect your research question to a well-defined literature (and do a preliminary literature search to see what is out there)

  1. Identify your method to gather information.

Halperin and Heath’s chapter 7 goes into some depth about the principles of research design:

  • what data collection is appropriate
  • what we can deduce from certain data
  • how confident you can be about cause/effect in this case (internal validity)
  • and cause-and-effect more generally (external validity)
  • if someone could do your research and get the same results (reliability)

They also describe the types of design you can likely not do (well, 1 and 2) in a UG dissertation, but can get the data to analyse:

  1. Experimental (like an RCT)
  2. Cross-sectional and longitudinal
  3. Comparative (for which I did a separate post)

Then they describe data gathering strategies that you might be tempted to do (subject to ethical clearance):

  • Surveys
  • Interviews
  • Focus groups
  • Ethnographic
  • Discourse analysis

In the lecture, I will put on my dour face and warn you against most of these methods, for reasons such as:

  • Doing a proper survey takes a lot of time and resources, someone has likely already done a better one, and it would be a shame not to find it
  • You can often find things in the public record without interviewing someone (and maybe they will only repeat what is out there)
  • The ethical clearance will be a major issue with ethnographic (and other) methods

I won’t try to put you off entirely. Rather, I will encourage you to ask yourself:

  • Why are you choosing this method?
  1. Does it relate clearly to your research question?
  2. Or, have you begun with the most interesting sounding method?
  3. Or, do you have some sort of connection that gets you access, which seems a shame not to use?
  • Are you prepared to do a literature review on your chosen method?
  • What do you realistically expect to get from your method?
  • What will you do if it goes wrong?

Action point 4

Discuss your choice of data collection with your supervisor.

  1. Think about how you will analyse and interpret the results.

This part tends to make the difference between a very good or an excellent dissertation.

Put most simply, simple description involves summarising things. Analysis is about telling the reader what the results mean. For example, you might:

  • Evaluate the size of the results according to your expectations. Does a survey result seem unusual?
  • Describe how much one should rely on the results. Does the result seem important after taking into account a margin of error?
  • Describe the wider context. Does the result mark a change over time, or seem different from another country?
  • Relate a case study result to your literature review. Is your case unusual, or as expected?

Action point 5

Clarify the difference between summary and analysis

  1. Be clear about the conclusion.

Don’t just to the dissertation equivalent of saying ‘cheerio’ (or, my favourite thing, leaving without saying cheerio).

The conclusion differs from:

  • The introduction, because you should use it to summarise your question and approach (perhaps quite briefly) and relate it in some depth to the results.
  • The analysis of results, because you relate the results much more clearly to your overall project.

Don’t think of it as saying: ‘as I have said before …’

Think of it as saying: ‘here is what it all adds up to …’

  1. The end.

Remember to add your bibliography and ask yourself if you need an appendix for your data (which does not count towards the word count).

POLU9RM action points

PS some of my supervisees write policy analysis reports, which differ somewhat from regular dissertations. If you are keen, please see me and/ or read more here.

hang-in-there-baby

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Policy in 500 Words: The advocacy coalition framework

Here is the ACF story.

People engage in politics to turn their beliefs into policy. They form advocacy coalitions with people who share their beliefs, and compete with other coalitions. The action takes place within a subsystem devoted to a policy issue, and a wider policymaking process that provides constraints and opportunities to coalitions.

The policy process contains multiple actors and levels of government. It displays a mixture of intensely politicized disputes and routine activity. There is much uncertainty about the nature and severity of policy problems. The full effects of policy may be unclear for over a decade. The ACF sums it up in the following diagram:

acf

Policy actors use their beliefs to understand, and seek influence in, this world. Beliefs about how to interpret the cause of and solution to policy problems, and the role of government in solving them, act as a glue to bind actors together within coalitions.

If the policy issue is technical and humdrum, there may be room for routine cooperation. If the issue is highly charged, then people romanticise their own cause and demonise their opponents.

The outcome is often long-term policymaking stability and policy continuity because the ‘core’ beliefs of coalitions are unlikely to shift and one coalition may dominate the subsystem for long periods.

There are two main sources of change.

  1. Coalitions engage in policy learning to remain competitive and adapt to new information about policy. This process often produces minor change because coalitions learn on their own terms. They learn how to retain their coalition’s strategic advantage and use the information they deem most relevant.
  2. ‘Shocks’ affect the positions of coalitions within subsystems. Shocks are the combination of events and coalition responses. External shocks are prompted by events including the election of a new government with different ideas, or the effect of socioeconomic change. Internal shocks are prompted by policy failure. Both may prompt major change as members of one coalition question their beliefs in the light of new evidence. Or, another coalition may adapt more readily to its new policy environment and exploit events to gain competitive advantage.

The ACF began as the study of US policymaking, focusing largely on environmental issues. It has changed markedly to reflect the widening of ACF scholarship to new policy areas, political systems, and methods.

For example, the flow diagram’s reference to the political system’s long term coalition opportunity structures is largely the response to insights from comparative international studies:

  • A focus on the ‘degree of consensus needed for major policy change’ reflects applications in Europe that highlighted the important of proportional electoral systems
  • A focus on the ‘openness of the political system’ partly reflects applications to countries without free and fair elections, and/ or systems that do not allow people to come together easily as coalitions to promote policy change.

As such, like all theories in this series, the ACF discusses elements that it would treat as (a) universally applicable, such as the use of beliefs to address bounded rationality, and (b) context-specific, such as the motive and opportunity of specific people to organize collectively to translate their beliefs into policy.

See also:

The 500 and 1000 Words series

Why Advocacy Coalitions Matter and How to Think about Them

Three lessons from a comparison of fracking policy in the UK and Switzerland

Bonus material

Scottish Independence and the Devil Shift

Image source: Weible, Heikkila, Ingold, and Fischer (2016: 6)

 

 

 

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Policy in 500 Words: Ecology of Games

The ‘Ecology of Games Framework’ (EG) combines insights from many approaches to analyze ‘institutional complexity’ and ‘complex institutional systems’.

The focus is on actors learning how to secure ‘mutually beneficial outcomes’, cooperating to produce and deliver agreed solutions, and bargaining within a system over which no actor has control. Therefore, it is worth reading the posts on game theory, the IAD, and SES first (especially if, like me, you associated ‘game’ with tig, then Monopoly, then The Wire).

Dz3Hmy2VsAAoO72.png

Insights from three key approaches

EG connects Norton’s ‘ecology of games’, the IAD, and insights from complexity theory to reinforce the idea that institutional arrangements are not simple and orderly.

In simple games, we need only analyse the interaction between a small number of actors with reference to one set of self-contained rules providing clear sanctions or payoffs. In real world policymaking, many different games take place at the same time in different venues.

Some policy games may be contained within a geographical area – such as California – but there are no self-contained collective action problems:

  • Examples such as ‘biodiversity’, ‘ecology’ or ‘environmental’ policies command a collection of interdependent policies relating to issues like local planning, protected species, water management, air pollution, transport, energy use, and contributors to such policies or policy problems in other areas of government (such as public services).
  • Each contributor to policy may come from different institutions associated with many policymaking venues spread across many levels and types of government.

Consequently, many games interact with each other. The same actor might participate in multiple games subject to different rules. Further, each game produces ‘externalities’ for the others; the ‘payoffs’ to each game are connected and complicated.

A focus on ‘complex adaptive systems’ suggests that central governments do not have the resources to control – or understand fully – interaction at this frequency and scale. Rather, policymaking influences are:

  • Internal to the game, when actors (a) follow and shape the rules of each institution, and (b) learn through trial and error.
  • External to the game, when physical resources change, or central levels of government change the resources of local actors.

Insights from the wider literature

The EG brings in wider insights – from theories in the 500 and 1000 Words series – to analyse this process. Examples include:

Consequently, we have come a long way from simple assumptions about human behaviour outlined in our first post in this series.

As with the IAD, the EG emphasis is on (a) finding solutions to complex (largely environmental) policy problems, with reference to (b) initiatives consistent with self-organising systems such as ‘collaborative governance’. Like most posts in this series, it rejects a naïve attachment to a single powerful central government. Policymaking is multi-centric, and solutions to complex problems will emerge in that context.

See also:

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) and Governing the Commons

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: it’s time for some game theory

Policy in 500 Words: the Social-Ecological Systems Framework

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Rational Choice and the IAD (the older post for the 1st edition)

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Multi-centric Policymaking

How to Navigate Complex Policy Designs

How can governments better collaborate to address complex problems?

 

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Policy in 500 Words: the Social-Ecological Systems Framework

Think of the SES framework as the combination of:

  • the IAD approach to analyzing ‘the commons’, and
  • ecological sciences approaches to ‘complex social-ecological systems’

The result is a framework that resembles CPR studies in key respects. Ostrom’s 2009 article in Science provides a visual emphasis on the interactions between ‘first-level’ concepts including users, their governance system, resource system (such as a protected park) and resource units (such as its trees):

SES Science Ostrom

It also raises similar questions, such as ‘When will the users of a resource invest time and energy to avert “a tragedy of the commons”’?

It answers them with reference to ‘second level’ concepts describing factors that encourage users to (a) value long term sustainability and (b) self-organize to secure this outcome. This table summarizes many of them:

SES table 7.2

Note that Ostrom describes their effect as indicative because, ‘As in most complex systems, the variables interact in a nonlinear fashion …Simple blueprint policies do not work’.

As a result, we have a super-complicated framework to help us understand an even more super-complicated world. For some, the SES framework serves to ‘diagnose’ the sustainability of social-ecological systems and explore the prospect of more effective self-organisation to manage resources. However, as with the IAD, effective use of the framework itself requires a fair amount of immersion in the language of analysis.

See also:

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) and Governing the Commons

Policy in 500 Words: Ecology of Games

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: it’s time for some game theory

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Rational Choice and the IAD (the older post for the 1st edition)

Policy Concepts in 100 Words: Multi-centric Policymaking

How to Navigate Complex Policy Designs

How can governments better collaborate to address complex problems?

 

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Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) and Governing the Commons

The IAD provides a language, and way of thinking, about the ways in which different institutions foster collective action. The language is so complicated that I have cheated by summarising key terms in this box (and describing polycentric governance in a different post) to stay within the 1000 words limit:

IAD box 2.2.19

Governing the Commons

For me, the best way to understand the IAD is through the lens of Governing the Commons (and the research agenda it inspired), which explains how to rethink ‘tragedies of the commons’ and encourage better management of common pool resources (CPRs).

Ostrom rejects the uncritical use of rational choice games to conclude – too quickly – that disastrous collective action problems are inevitable unless we ‘privatize’ commons or secure major government intervention (which is tricky anyway when global problems require international cooperation). The tragedy of the commons presents a too-bleak view of humanity, in which it would be surprising to find cooperation even when the fate of the world is in human hands.

Alternatively, what if there is evidence that people often work collectively and effectively without major coercion? People are social beings who share information, build trust by becoming known as reliable and predictable, and come together to produce, monitor and enforce rules for the group’s benefit. They produce agreements with each other that could be enforced if necessary.

The IAD helps us analyse these cooperative arrangements. Ostrom describes 8 ‘design principles’ of enduring and effective CPR management shared by many real world examples:

  1. CPRs have clear boundaries. Users know what they are managing, and can identify legitimate users.
  2. The rules suit local conditions. Users know what they (a) are expected to contribute to management and (b) receive from CPRs.
  3. The actors affected by the rules help shape them (at low cost).
  4. CPR monitors are users or accountable to users. They monitor (a) the conduct of users and (b) the state of the CPR. The costs of mutual monitoring are low, and their consequences felt quickly.
  5. The penalties for rule-breaking are low if the choice is a one-off and understandable under the circumstances (to avoid alienating the user). The penalties are high if the choice is part of a pattern which makes other users feel like ‘suckers’, or if rule-breaking would be catastrophic.
  6. Conflict resolution is frequent, rapid and low cost.
  7. Users have the right to self-organise without too much outside interference.
  8. Many projects are connected geographically and at different scales – local, regional, national – in ways that do not undermine individual projects.

These design principles help explain why some communities manage CPRs successfully. They allow users to share the same commitment and expect the long-term benefits to be worthwhile.

However, Ostrom stressed that there is no blueprint – no hard and fast rules – to CPR management. There are three particular complications:

  1. Trust

Good management requires high trust to encourage norms of reciprocity. Trust is crucial to minimizing the costs of compliance monitoring and enforcement. Trust may develop when participants communicate regularly, share an understanding of their common interests, reciprocate each other’s cooperation, and have proven reliable in the past.

Design principles are important to developing trust and solidarity, but so are evolutionary’ changes to behaviour. Actors have often learned about rule efficacy – to encourage cooperation and punish opportunism – through trial-and-error over a long period, beginning with simple, low-cost operational rules producing quick wins.

  1. Rules, rules on rules, more rules, then even more rules

Institutions contain a large, complicated set of rules that serve many different purposes, and need to be understood and analysed in different ways.

Different purposes include:

  • how many actors are part of an action situation, and the role they play
  • what they must/ must not do
  • who is eligible to participate
  • who can move from one role to another
  • who controls membership, and how
  • how many participants are involved in a choice
  • what will happen if there is no agreement
  • how to manage and communicate information
  • the rewards or sanctions
  • the range of acceptable actions or outcomes from action.

 

We also need to analyse the relative costs and simplicity of different rules, and the rules about the other rules, including

  • ‘operational’ rules on day-to-day issues (such as specific payoffs/ sanctions for behaviour)
  • ‘collective choice’ rules about how to make those rules
  • ‘constitutional’ rules on who can decide those rules and who can monitor and enforce, and
  • ‘metaconstitutional’ analysis of how to design these constitutions with reference to the wider political and social context.

 

  1. The world is too complex to break down into simple pieces

By now, you may be thinking that the IAD – and analysis of resource management – is complicated. This is true, partly because each case study – of the physical conditions and social practices regarding resource management – is different in some way. We can use the IAD to compare experiences, but accept that a profoundly successful scheme in one context may fail miserably in another.

Simplicity versus complexity: the world is complex, but should our analysis follow suit?

Indeed, this is why we need to think about rational choice games and the IAD simultaneously, to understand the analytical trade-offs.

Game theory laboratory experiments – built on simple rules and relatively small numbers of parameters – produce parsimonious analysis and results that we can understand relatively easily.

We may reject simple games as unrealistic, but what if we take this criticism to its extreme?

IAD in-depth field studies embrace complexity to try to understand the key dimensions of each study’s context. When we put them all together, there are too many concepts, variables, global applications, and variations-by-context, to contain in a simple theory.

The IAD addresses this trade off by offering a language to help organize research, encouraging people to learn it then use it to apply many different theories to explain different parts of the whole picture.

In other words, it is OK to reject simple models as unrealistic, but to embrace real-world complexity may require a rather complicated language.

See also:

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: it’s time for some game theory

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Rational Choice and the IAD (the older post for the 1st edition)

Policy Concepts in 100 Words: Multi-centric Policymaking

Policy in 500 Words: the Social-Ecological Systems Framework

Policy in 500 Words: Ecology of Games

How to Navigate Complex Policy Designs

How can governments better collaborate to address complex problems?

 

 

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