Occupy the semantic space! Opening up the language of better regulation

Professor Claudio Radaelli introduces the first article – ‘Occupy the semantic space!’ – to be published in the Journal of European Public Policy Special Issue ‘The Politics of Policy Analysis’. Radaelli analyses the regulatory reform agenda of international organizations to shine a light on the language of depoliticization. He highlights a tendency for policymakers to use the phrase ‘Better Regulation’ as a tool to describe policy activities as self-evident, common sense, or natural (who would not want regulation to be better?). This approach helps to insulate current approaches from debate. Such cases studies highlight the need for policy actors to challenge attempts to ‘occupy the semantic space’.

What do ‘better regulation’, ‘policy coherence’, ‘agile governance’, ‘smart cities’, and ‘social value judgements’ have in common? They are all part of our contemporary language of governance. Policymakers use them every day. International organizations publish indicators on the progress made by individual countries in achieving better, coherent, agile governance. But, there is something else.

Look at the semantics

Semantically, these conceptual entities have something important in common. It is difficult to object to language that points to something naturally desirable. Who can argue for worse regulation or policy incoherence? The whole semantic space is kind of already taken, occupied by the dominant language of governance. Then, you either talk within that language or you do not find semantic space to explore, argue for, and organise alternatives. In a recent article, I explore what happens with this language of governance.

I explore in detail better regulation as policy reform agenda. This appears at first glance unquestionable, universally desirable. Yet, the content of better regulation is actually assembled in distinctive ways – such as the pivotal role of economics as justification for regulatory choice, the concerns about excessive regulatory burdens, the imperative to use regulation to stimulate innovation. Again, I am not saying these are wrong concepts. But they are one of the ways we can reason about regulation, not the only one. Instead, with better regulation, it looks like there is no other way.

As political theorist Michael Freeden would say, concepts are assembled in morphologies that make up an ideology. I use ideology not in the sense that this reform agenda is ideological or false consciousness. Ideology, in this case, is how concepts are assembled and work together.

A semantic double act

So, how do concepts work together? First, the adoption of better regulation language limits semantic fragmentation within large coalitions for reforms, for example it keeps together the delegates of the Regulatory Policy Committee of the OECD. Imagine a semantic big tent where all delegates can say ‘we are all for better regulation’ whilst at the same time muting the difference between those of us who want to cut regulation and those who care more about the quality of regulation than its quantity.

This is the first move of the semantic act: all concepts are essentially contestable, but here, in this language, they appear de-contested. The second move is to erect a semantic wall that leaves no space to those outside. There is no semantic room for those who disagree with better regulation, only the absurdity of asking for ‘worse’ regulation. It is a bit like saying ‘here, we are all liberals’ (although policy disagreements exist within the liberal front) and vehemently discrediting how the concept of freedom is understood by libertarians. 

Not just language

It is not just a story about language. It is a story about how dominant policy coalitions shield internal conflict (by de-contesting concepts) and make it difficult to build alternative agendas.

I extend the analysis to other domains, such as policy coherence – a morphology of concepts that has been proved analytically flawed, yet it still seduces policy-makers and generates guidance documents of international organizations like the United Nations. In certain domains, these semantic constructions obfuscate winners and losers (as in the case of smart cities), in others they do not provide the correct basis for taking decisions (such as social value judgements).

So what?

In terms of policy practice, to understand how polysemy works brings in transparency. It allows a more diverse dialogue about the advantages and limitations of reform agendas, without obfuscating practice under generically attractive labels.

Providers of public management executive training should be able to discuss the tools they teach by opening up the semantic horizon, considering concepts that allow for an open discussion with practitioners. For policy entrepreneurs who want to contest dominant language, the pathway is the following: show the fragility of the intellectual foundations of certain morphologies of concepts, expose internal ambiguity camouflaged by decontestation, gain a discursive level-playing-field, re-configure polysemy in ways that are more transparent and inclusive.

Looking critically into the language that is taken for granted in international organizations, governments, and many schools of public policy is a valuable task. Unveiling and exposing the double act can empower alternative coalitions but also benefit the members of the dominant coalition willing to reduce ambiguity and increase transparency in the connection between language and practice. To expose ambiguity helps a dominant coalition to move forward – for example the OECD has carried out a project on moving beyond the classic perimeter of better regulation, discussing four beliefs systems.

And what about us, policy researchers? In the end, all concepts are contestable: policy researchers can contribute to keep this important door (to contestation) open. The identification and critical discussion of dominant language offers citizens the possibility to discuss what is really ‘better’ and ‘for whom’.

Claudio M. Radaelli (2023) ‘Occupy the semantic space! Opening up the language of better regulation’, Journal of European Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2181852 (Special Issue: The politics of policy analysis: theoretical insights on real world problems)

What is effective government?

This post (1) summarises my oral evidence to the Scottish Parliament Finance and Public Administration Committee Inquiry ‘Public Administration – Effective Scottish Government decision-making’, and (2) introduces my report ‘What is effective government?’. While I am the committee’s adviser on this inquiry, the report and this post represent my thoughts (not those of committee members).

My overall impression, of the 28 submissions to the committee, is that they inform a very familiar two-part story:

1. There should be clearly defined steps or stages to making decisions, and governments should make use of well-established, rigorous, decision-making tools (the call for systematic policymaking in theory)
2. They identify their generally disappointing experiences of unfulfilled reforms and implementation gaps (the absence of systematic policymaking in practice)

In that context, it is worth asking:

1. Are these problems specific to Scottish Government (right now), or are they more general and systemic?
2. Can we separate specific expectations for Scottish Government from more general expectations about policymaking?

Why these problems are general and systemic

My report identifies two main reasons to expect the same problems in any government (based on theories and studies of policymaking).

First, there is always a gap between simple and idealised models of systematic policymaking and real-world policy processes. We can tell this story as follows:

• Policymakers do not (a) fully understand the problems they face, or (b) control the complex policymaking systems in which they engage.
• They need to be pragmatic (to recognise these limits) but also tell a story of being in charge (to reflect an electoral imperative).
• This imperative to be pragmatic but project central government control (as part of a story of governing competence) is relatively strong in Westminster systems.

Second, governments pursue a large number of worthy ‘effective government’ principles, which seem fine in isolation (and when expressed vaguely), but are contradictory when combined (and turned into concrete measures). In my report, I listed seven principles which map (somewhat) onto the committee’s list of topics:

1. Hold to account the people and organisations responsible for policy.

2. Anticipate and prevent policy problems rather than react to crisis.

3. Avoid power hoarding at the ‘centre’. Co-produce policy with citizens.

4. Ensure policy coherence and policymaking integration.

5. Foster evidence-informed policymaking.

6. Mainstream equity, fairness, or justice across all policy.

7. Ensure that public services deliver public value.

For example, the primacy of national elections concentrates power in the centre, fosters short-term thinking, biases evidence-gathering towards experts, limits consensus seeking, and reduces incentives to learn.

The Scottish Government is no exception to the general rule

This general picture is familiar to students of public policy in Scotland, where a fixation with Scottish Parliament elections, as the main vehicle for accountability, overshadows other aims such as more preventive, decentralised, and co-produced policy processes.

There is also a specific Scottish story, such as how the Scottish Government might pursue (1) policy coherence (for example, via the National Performance Framework) and, (2) co-produced, integrated, and equitable ‘public value’ approaches (via the Scottish model of government or Scottish approach to policymaking).

However, this story has the same ending as many others, recounting a gap between aspiration and reality, followed by a tendency to retell the fictional story rather than focus on what governments can actually do. The result is a lost opportunity to generate new knowledge of – and thoughtful reflection on – what exactly a government does  (and if it has policy capacity). It fuels a cycle of disappointment and reinvention rather than proper investigation.

What can the Scottish Government learn?

My report identifies some examples of comparable places where some elements of government are worth examining, including:

1. Welsh government and Welsh Centre for Public Policy – on the systematic use of external evidence for policy.
2. New Zealand Policy Project – on the pursuit of a formalised and systematic approach to giving good policy advice to ministers.
3. Annex A also lists some possibilities regarding international benchmarks and performance indicators.

It is also essential for the Scottish Government to learn from its own experiences as part of a process of continuous development, although a focus on other governments can often take the heat out of debate (since a focus on Scottish policy success is inevitably partisan).

In each case, what would be the likelihood of learning, and about what? My final remark was to suggest that (1) learning about specific initiatives (such as to improve evidence and advice to minsters), is very limited without (2) situating that learning in a much wider systemic perspective.