Policy Analysis in 750 Words: Changing things from the inside

How should policy actors seek radical changes to policy and policymaking?

This question prompts two types of answer:

1. Be pragmatic, and change things from the inside

Pragmatism is at the heart of most of the policy analysis texts in this series. They focus on the needs and beliefs of clients (usually policymakers). Policymakers are time-pressed, so keep your analysis short and relevant. See the world through their eyes. Focus on solutions that are politically as well as technically feasible. Propose non-radical steps, which may add up to radical change over the long-term.

This approach will seem familiar to students of research ‘impact’ strategies which emphasise relationship-building, being available to policymakers, and responding to the agendas of governments to maximise the size of your interested audience.

It will also ring bells for advocates of radical reforms in policy sectors such as (public) health and intersectoral initiatives such as gender mainstreaming:

• Health in All Policies is a strategy to encourage radical changes to policy and policymaking to improve population health.  Common advice includes to: identify to policymakers how HiAP fits into current policy agendas, seek win-win strategies with partners in other sectors, and go to great lengths to avoid the sense that you are interfering in their work (‘health imperialism’).
• Gender mainstreaming is a strategy to consider gender in all aspect of policy and policymaking. An equivalent playbook involves steps to: clarify what gender equality is, and what steps may help achieve it; make sure that these ideas translate across all levels and types of policymaking; adopt tools to ensure that gender is a part of routine government business (such as budget processes); and, modify existing policies or procedures while increasing the representation of women in powerful positions.

In other words, the first approach is to pursue your radical agenda via non-radical means, using a playbook that is explicitly non-confrontational.  Use your insider status to exploit opportunities for policy change.

2. Be radical, and challenge things from the outside

Challenging the status quo, for the benefit of marginalised groups, is at the heart of critical policy analysis:

• Reject the idea that policy analysis is a rationalist, technical, or evidence-based process. Rather, it involves the exercise of power to (a) depoliticise problems to reduce attention to current solutions, and (b) decide whose knowledge counts.
• Identify and question the dominant social constructions of problems and populations, asking who decides how to portray these stories and who benefits from their outcomes.

This approach resonates with frequent criticisms of ‘impact’ advice, emphasising the importance of producing research independent of government interference, to challenge policies that further harm already-marginalised populations.

It will also rings bells among advocates of more confrontational strategies to seek radical changes to policy and policymaking. They include steps to: find more inclusive ways to generate and share knowledge, produce multiple perspectives on policy problems and potential solutions, focus explicitly on the impact of the status quo on marginalised populations, politicise issues continuously to ensure that they receive sufficient attention, and engage in outsider strategies to protest current policies and practices.

Does this dichotomy make sense?

It is tempting to say that this dichotomy is artificial and that we can pursue the best of both worlds, such as working from within when it works and resorting to outsider action and protest when it doesn’t.

However, the blandest versions of this conclusion tend to ignore or downplay the politics of policy analysis in favour of more technical fixes. Sometimes collaboration and consensus politics is a wonderful feat of human endeavour. Sometimes it is a cynical way to depoliticise issues, stifle debate, and marginalise unpopular positions.

This conclusion also suggests that it is possible to establish what strategies work, and when, without really saying how (or providing evidence for success that would appeal to audiences associated with both approaches). Indeed, a recurrent feature of research in these fields is that most attempts to produce radical change prove to be dispiriting struggles. Non-radical strategies tend to be co-opted by more powerful actors, to mainstream new ways of thinking without changing the old. Radical strategies are often too easy to dismiss or counter.

The latter point reminds us to avoid excessively optimistic overemphasis on the strategies of analysts and advocates at the expense of context and audience. The 500 and 1000 words series perhaps tip us too far in the other direction, but provide a useful way to separate (analytically) the reasons for often-minimal policy change. To challenge dominant forms of policy and policymaking requires us to separate the intentional sources of inertia from the systemic issues that would constrain even the most sincere and energetic reformer.

Further reading

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series, including posts on the role of analysts and marginalised groups. It also relates to work with St Denny, Kippin, and Mitchell (drawing on this draft paper) and posts on ‘evidence based policymaking’.

Call for papers for a JEPP Special Issue, ‘The politics of policy analysis: theoretical insights on real world problems’

Note: this call will appear shortly on the JEPP page. See also my 750 words series on policy analysis.

For a special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy, we invite proposals for papers that reflect on the theory and practice of policy analysis. This special issue will include state of the art articles on the politics of policy analysis, and empirical studies that use theoretical insights to analyse and address real world problems.

Policy analysis is not a rationalist, technocratic, centrally managed, or ‘evidence based’ process to solve policy problems. Rather, critical policy analysis and mainstream policy studies describe contemporary policy analysis as a highly contested (but unequal) process in which many policymakers, analysts, and influencers cooperate or compete across many centres of government. Further, governments are not in the problem solving business. Instead, they inherit policies that address some problems and create or exacerbate others, benefit some groups and marginalize others, or simply describe problems as too difficult to solve. The highest profile problems, such as global public health and climate change, require the kinds of (1) cooperation across many levels of government (and inside and outside of government), and (2) attention to issues of justice and equity, of which analysts could only dream.

This description of policymaking complexity presents a conundrum. On the one hand, there exist many five-step guides to analysis, accompanied by simple stage-based descriptions of policy processes, but they describe what policy actors would need or like to happen rather than policymaking reality. On the other, policy theory-informed studies are essential to explanation, but not yet essential reading for policy analysts. Policy theorists may be able to describe policy processes – and the role of policy analysts – more accurately than simple guides, but do not offer a clear way to guide action. Practitioner audiences are receptive to accurate descriptions of policymaking reality, but also want a take-home message that they can pick up and use in their work. Critical policy analysts may appreciate insights on the barriers to policy and policymaking change, but only if there is equal attention to how to overcome them.

We seek contributions that engage with this conundrum. We welcome papers which use theories, concepts and frameworks that are considered the policy studies mainstream, but also contributions from critical studies that use research to support marginalized populations as they analyse contemporary policy problems. We focus on Europe broadly defined, but welcome contributions with  direct lessons from any other region.

Potential themes include but are not limited to:

• State of the art articles that use insights from policy theories and/ or critical policy analysis to guide the study and practice of policy analysis
• Articles that situate the analysis of contemporary policy problems within a wider policymaking context, to replace wishful thinking with more feasible (but equally ambitious) analysis
• Articles that engage critically with contemporary themes in policy analysis and design, such as how to encourage ‘entrepreneurial’ policy analysis, foster ‘co-production’ during policy analysis and design, or engage in ‘systems thinking’ without relying on jargon and gimmicks.
• Articles that engage with the unrealistic idea of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ to produce more feasible (and less technocratic) images of evidence-informed policymaking.

Expressions of interest consisting of a title, author(s) names and affiliation, and a short abstract (no more than 300 words) should be sent to p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk by Feb 28th 2022. Successful authors should have a full article draft for submission into the JEPP review process by August 30th 2022.

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: power and knowledge

This post adapts Policy in 500 Words: Power and Knowledge (the body of this post) to inform the Policy Analysis in 750 words series (the top and tails).

One take home message from the 750 Words series is to avoid seeing policy analysis simply as a technical (and ‘evidence-based’) exercise. Mainstream policy analysis texts break down the process into technical-looking steps, but also show how each step relates to a wider political context. Critical policy analysis texts focus more intensely on the role of politics in the everyday choices that we might otherwise take for granted or consider to be innocuous. The latter connect strongly to wider studies of the links between power and knowledge.

Power and ideas

Classic studies suggest that the most profound and worrying kinds of power are the hardest to observe. We often witness highly visible political battles and can use pluralist methods to identify who has material resources, how they use them, and who wins. However, key forms of power ensure that many such battles do not take place. Actors often use their resources to reinforce social attitudes and policymakers’ beliefs, to establish which issues are policy problems worthy of attention and which populations deserve government support or punishment. Key battles may not arise because not enough people think they are worthy of debate. Attention and support for debate may rise, only to be crowded out of a political agenda in which policymakers can only debate a small number of issues.

Studies of power relate these processes to the manipulation of ideas or shared beliefs under conditions of bounded rationality (see for example the NPF). Manipulation might describe some people getting other people to do things they would not otherwise do. They exploit the beliefs of people who do not know enough about the world, or themselves, to know how to identify and pursue their best interests. Or, they encourage social norms – in which we describe some behaviour as acceptable and some as deviant – which are enforced by (1) the state (for example, via criminal justice and mental health policy), (2) social groups, and (3) individuals who govern their own behaviour with reference to what they feel is expected of them (and the consequences of not living up to expectations).

Such beliefs, norms, and rules are profoundly important because they often remain unspoken and taken for granted. Indeed, some studies equate them with the social structures that appear to close off some action. If so, we may not need to identify manipulation to find unequal power relationships: strong and enduring social practices help some people win at the expense of others, by luck or design.

Relating power to policy analysis: whose knowledge matters?

The concept of‘epistemic violence’ is one way todescribe the act of dismissing an individual, social group, or population by undermining the value of their knowledge or claim to knowledge. Specific discussions include: (a) the colonial West’s subjugation of colonized populations, diminishing the voice of the subaltern; (b) privileging scientific knowledge and dismissing knowledge claims via personal or shared experience; and (c) erasing the voices of women of colour from the history of women’s activism and intellectual history.

It is in this context that we can understand ‘critical’ research designed to ‘produce social change that will empower, enlighten, and emancipate’ (p51). Powerlessness can relate to the visible lack of economic material resources and factors such as the lack of opportunity to mobilise and be heard.

750 Words posts examining this link between power and knowledge

Some posts focus on the role of power in research and/ or policy analysis:

• Policy analysis for marginalized groups in racialized political systems
• Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) Decolonizing Methodologies 
• Carol Bacchi (2009) Analysing Policy: What’s the problem represented to be? 

These posts ask questions such as: who decides what evidence will be policy-relevant, whose knowledge matters, and who benefits from this selective use of evidence? They help to (1) identify the exercise of power to maintain evidential hierarchies (or prioritise scientific methods over other forms of knowledge gathering and sharing), and (2) situate this action within a wider context (such as when focusing on colonisation and minoritization). They reflect on how (and why) analysts should respect a wider range of knowledge sources, and how to produce more ethical research with an explicit emancipatory role. As such, they challenge the – naïve or cynical – argument that science and scientists are objective and that science-informed analysis is simply a technical exercise (see also Separating facts from values).

Many posts incorporate these discussions into many policy analysis themes.

• Reflecting on your role as a policy analyst compares pragmatic and critical approaches to policy analysis.
• Entrepreneurial policy analysis warns against a too-strong focus on the agency – rather than the unequal status and resources – of successful political actors.
• Who should be involved in the process of policy analysis? highlights the tensions between ‘evidence based’ and ‘co-production’ approaches (regarding who should be involved, and how to prioritise evidence)

See also

Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Power and Ideas

Education equity policy: ‘equity for all’ as a distraction from race, minoritization, and marginalization. It discusses studies of education policy (many draw on critical policy analysis)

There are also many EBPM posts that slip this discussion of power and politics into discussions of evidence and policy. They don’t always use the word ‘power’ though (see Evidence-informed policymaking: context is everything)

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: How to communicate effectively with policymakers

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview. The title comes from this article by Cairney and Kwiatkowski on ‘psychology based policy studies’.

One aim of this series is to combine insights from policy research (1000, 500) and policy analysis texts. How might we combine insights to think about effective communication?

1. Insights from policy analysis texts

Most texts in this series relate communication to understanding your audience (or client) and the political context. Your audience has limited attention or time to consider problems. They may have a good antennae for the political feasibility of any solution, but less knowledge of (or interest in) the technical details. In that context, your aim is to help them treat the problem as worthy of their energy (e.g. as urgent and important) and the solution as doable. Examples include:

• Bardach: communicating with a client requires coherence, clarity, brevity, and minimal jargon.
• Dunn: argumentation involves defining the size and urgency of a problem, assessing the claims made for each solution, synthesising information from many sources into a concise and coherent summary, and tailoring reports to your audience.
• Smith: your audience makes a quick judgement on whether or not to read your analysis. Ask yourself questions including: how do I frame the problem to make it relevant, what should my audience learn, and how does each solution relate to what has been done before? Maximise interest by keeping communication concise, polite, and tailored to a policymaker’s values and interests.

2. Insights from studies of policymaker psychology

These insights emerged from the study of bounded rationality: policymakers do not have the time, resources, or cognitive ability to consider all information, possibilities, solutions, or consequences of their actions. They use two types of informational shortcut associated with concepts such as cognition and emotion, thinking ‘fast and slow’, ‘fast and frugal heuristics’, or, if you like more provocative terms:

• ‘Rational’ shortcuts. Goal-oriented reasoning based on prioritizing trusted sources of information.
• ‘Irrational’ shortcuts. Emotional thinking, or thought fuelled by gut feelings, deeply held beliefs, or habits.

We can use such distinctions to examine the role of evidence-informed communication, to reduce:

• Uncertainty, or a lack of policy-relevant knowledge. Focus on generating ‘good’ evidence and concise communication as you collate and synthesise information.
• Ambiguity, or the ability to entertain more than one interpretation of a policy problem. Focus on argumentation and framing as you try to maximise attention to (a) one way of defining a problem, and (b) your preferred solution.

Many policy theories describe the latter, in which actors: combine facts with emotional appeals, appeal to people who share their beliefs, tell stories to appeal to the biases of their audience, and exploit dominant ways of thinking or social stereotypes to generate attention and support. These possibilities produce ethical dilemmas for policy analysts.

3. Insights from studies of complex policymaking environments

None of this advice matters if it is untethered from reality.

Policy analysis texts focus on political reality to note that even a perfectly communicated solution is worthless if technically feasible but politically unfeasible.

Policy process texts focus on policymaking reality: showing that ideal-types such as the policy cycle do not guide real-world action, and describing more accurate ways to guide policy analysts.

For example, they help us rethink the ‘know your audience’ mantra by:

Identifying a tendency for most policy to be processed in policy communities or subsystems:

• Elected policymakers prioritise some issues and ignore the rest, and pay attention to some information and ignore the rest.
• Note the importance of ‘serial’ and ‘parallel’ processing: policymakers may process issues one at a time, but political systems process many issues in many different venues (or multiple ‘centres’).
• This dynamic produces many different audiences spread across policymaking systems: blurring boundaries between those who make and influence policy; following their own rules, norms, or dominant ways to understand problems (and assumptions about whose framing and whose knowledge matters); and, responding to different policy conditions or events (which might create different windows of opportunity for action).

Showing that many policymaking ‘centres’ create the instruments that produce policy change

Gone are the mythical days of a small number of analysts communicating to a single core executive (and of the heroic researcher changing the world by speaking truth to power). Instead, we have many analysts engaging with many centres, creating a need to not only (a) tailor arguments to different audiences, but also (b) develop wider analytical skills (such as to foster collaboration and the use of ‘design principles’).

How to communicate effectively with policymakers

In that context, we argue that effective communication requires analysts to:

1. Understand your audience and tailor your response (using insights from psychology)

2. Identify ‘windows of opportunity’ for influence (while noting that these windows are outside of anyone’s control)

3. Engage with real world policymaking rather than waiting for a ‘rational’ and orderly process to appear (using insights from policy studies).

See also:

Why don’t policymakers listen to your evidence?

3. How to combine principles on ‘good evidence’, ‘good governance’, and ‘good practice’

Entrepreneurial policy analysis

Policy in 500 words and Policy Analysis in 750 words: writing about policy

This post is a shortened version of The Politics of Policy Analysis Annex A. It shows how to use insights from policy process research in policy analysis and policymaking coursework (much like the crossover between Scooby-Doo and Batman). It describes a range of exercises, including short presentations, policy analysis papers, blog posts, and essays. In each case, it explains the rationale for each exercise and the payoff to combining them.

If you prefer me to describe these insights less effectively, there is also a podcast:

[See also Writing About Policy 2: Write Harder, which describes how to write a 10000 word dissertation]

One step to combining policy analysis and policy process research is to modify the former according to the insights of the latter. In other words, consider how a ‘new policy sciences’ inspired policy analysis differs from the analyses already provided by 5-step guides.

It could turn out that the effects of our new insights on a policy briefing could be so subtle that you might blink and miss them. Or, there are so many possibilities from which to choose that it is impossible to provide a blueprint for new policy science advice. Therefore, I encourage students to be creative in their policy analysis and reflective in their assessment of their analysis. Our aim is to think about the skills you need to analyse policy, from producing or synthesising evidence, to crafting an argument based on knowing your audience, and considering how your strategy might shift in line with a shifting context.

To encourgage creativity, I set a range of tasks so that students can express themselves in different ways, to different audiences, with different constraints. For example, we can learn how to be punchy and concise from a 3-minute presentation or 500-word blog, and use that skill to get to the point more quickly in policy analysis or clarify the research question in the essay.

The overall effect should be that students can take what they have learned from each exercise and use it for the others.

In each section below, I reproduce the ways in which I describe this mix of coursework to students then, in each box, note the underlying rationale.

1. A 3-minute spoken presentation to your peers in a seminar.

In 3 minutes, you need to identify a problem, describe one or more possible solutions, and end your presentation in a convincing way. For example, if you don’t make a firm recommendation, what can you say to avoid looking like you are copping out? Focus on being persuasive, to capture your audience’s imagination. Focus on the policy context, in which you want to present a problem as solvable (who will pay attention to an intractable problem?) but not make inflated claims about how one action can solve a major problem. Focus on providing a memorable take home message.

The presentation can be as creative as you wish, but it should not rely on powerpoint in the room. Imagine that none of the screens work or that you are making your pitch to a policymaker as you walk along the street: can you make this presentation engaging and memorable without any reference to someone else’s technology? Can you do it without just reading out your notes? Can you do it well in under 3 minutes? We will then devote 5 minutes to questions from the audience about your presentation. Being an active part of the audience – and providing peer review – is as important as doing a good presentation of your own.

BOX A1: Rationale for 3-minute presentation.

If students perform this task first (before the coursework is due), it gives them an initial opportunity to see how to present only the most relevant information, and to gauge how an audience responds to their ideas. Audience questions provide further peer-driven feedback. I also plan a long seminar to allow each student (in a group of 15-20 people) to present, then ask all students about which presentation they remember and why. This exercise helps students see that they are competing with each other for limited policymaker attention, and learn from their peers about what makes an effective pitch. Maybe you are wondering why I discourage powerpoint. It’s largely because it will cause each presenter to go way over time by cramming in too much information, and this problem outweighs the benefit of being able to present an impressive visualisation. I prefer to encourage students to only tell the audience what they will remember (by only presenting what they remember).

2. A policy analysis paper, and 3. A reflection on your analysis

Provide a policy analysis paper which has to make a substantive argument or recommendation in approximately two pages (1000 words), on the assumption that busy policymakers won’t read much else before deciding whether or not to pay attention to the problem and your solutions. Then provide a reflection paper (also approximately 1000 words) to reflect your theoretical understanding of the policy process. You can choose how to split the 2000 word length, between analysis and reflection. You can give each exercise 1000 each (roughly a 2-page analysis), provide a shorter analysis and more reflection, or widen the analysis and reject the need for conceptual reflection. The choice is yours to make, as long as you justify your choice in your reflection.

When writing policy analysis, I ask you to keep it super-short on the assumption that you have to make your case quickly to people with 99 other things to do. For example, what can you tell someone in one paragraph or a half-page to get them to read all 2 pages?  It is tempting to try to tell someone everything you know, because everything is connected and to simplify is to describe a problem simplistically. Instead, be smart enough to know that such self-indulgence won’t impress your audience. In person, they might smile politely, but their eyes are looking at the elevator lights. In writing, they can skim your analysis or simply move on. So, use these three statements to help you focus less on your need to supply information and more on their demand:

1. Your aim is not to give a full account of a problem. It is to get powerful people to care about it.
2. Your aim is not to give a painstaking account of all possible solutions. It is to give a sense that at least one solution is feasible and worth pursuing.
3. Your guiding statement should be: policymakers will only pay attention to your problem if they think they can solve it, and without that solution being too costly.

Otherwise, I don’t like to give you too much advice because I want you to be creative about your presentation; to be confident enough to take chances and feel that you’ll see the reward of making a leap. At the very least, you have three key choices to make about how far you’ll go to make a point:

1. Who is your audience? Our discussion of the limits to centralised policymaking suggest that your most influential audience will not necessarily be an elected policymaker, but who else would it be?
2. How ‘manipulative’ should you be? Our discussions of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘evidence-based policymaking’ suggest that policymakers combine ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ shortcuts to gather information and make choices. So, do you appeal to their desire to set goals and gather a lot of scientific information, make an emotional appeal, or rely on Riker-style heresthetics?
3. What is your role? Contemporary discussions of science advice to government highlight unresolved debates about the role of unelected advisors: should you simply lay out some possible solutions or advocate one solution strongly?

For our purposes, there are no wrong answers to these questions. Instead, I want you to make and defend your decisions. That is the aim of your policy paper ‘reflection’: to ‘show your work’. You still have some room to be creative in your reflection: tell me what you know about policy theory and how it informed your decisions. Here are some examples, but it is up to you to decide what to highlight:

1. Show how your understanding of policymaker psychology helped you decide how to present information on problems and solutions.
2. Extract insights from policy theories, such as from punctuated equilibrium theory on policymaker attention, multiple streams analysis on timing and feasibility, or the NPF on how to tell persuasive stories.
3. Explore the implications of the lack of ‘comprehensive rationality’ and absence of a ‘policy cycle’: feasibility is partly about identifying the extent to which a solution is ‘doable’ when central governments have limited powers. What ‘policy style’ or policy instruments would be appropriate for the solution you favour?

I use the following questions to guide the marking on the policy paper: Tailored properly to a clearly defined audience? Punchy and concise summary? Clearly defined problem? Good evidence or argument behind the solution? Clear recommendations backed by a sense that the solution is feasible? Evidence of substantial reading, accompanied by well explained further reading?

In my experience of marking, successful students gave a very clear and detailed account of the nature and size of the policy problem. The best reports used graphics and/ or statistics to describe the problem in several ways. Some identified a multi-faceted problem – such as in health outcomes, and health inequalities – without presenting confusing analysis. Some were able to present an image of urgency, to separate this problem from the many others that might grab policymaker attention. Successful students presented one or more solutions which seemed technically and/ or politically feasible. By technically feasible, I mean that there is a good chance that the policy will work as intended if implemented. For example, they provided evidence of its success in a comparable country (or in the past) or outlined models designed to predict the effects of specific policy instruments. By politically feasible, I mean that you consider how open your audience would be to the solution, and how likely the suggestion is to be acceptable to key policymakers. Some students added to a good discussion of feasibility by comparing the pros/ cons of different scenarios. In contrast, some relatively weak reports proposed solutions which were vague, untested, and/ or not likely to be acted upon.

BOX A2: Rationale for policy analysis and reflection

Students already have 5-step policy analysis texts at their disposal, and they give some solid advice about the task. However, I want to encourage students to think more about how their knowledge of the policy process will guide their analysis. First, what do you do if you think that one audience will buy your argument, and another reject it wholeheartedly? Just pretend to be an objective analyst and put the real world in the ‘too hard’ pile? Or, do you recognise that policy analysts are political actors and make your choices accordingly? For me, an appeal to objectivity combined with insufficient recognition of the ways in which people respond emotionally to information, is a total cop-out. I don’t want to contribute to a generation of policy analysts who provide long, rigorous, and meticulous reports that few people read and fewer people use. Instead, I want students to show me how to tell a convincing story with a clear moral, or frame policy analysis to grab their audience’s attention and generate enthusiasm to try to solve a problem. Then, I want them to reflect on how they draw the line between righteous persuasion and unethical manipulation.

Second, how do you account for policymaking complexity? You can’t assume that there is a cycle in which a policymaker selects a solution and it sets in train a series of stages towards successful implementation. Instead, you need to think about the delivery of your policy as much as the substance. Students have several choices. In some cases, they will describe how to deliver policy in a multi-level or multi-centric environment, in which, say, a central government actor will need to use persuasion or cooperation rather than command-and-control. Or, if they are feeling energetic, they might compare a top-down delivery option with support for Ostrom-style polycentric arrangements. Maybe they’ll recommend pilots and/ or trial and error, to monitor progress continuously instead of describing a one-shot solution.  Maybe they’ll reflect on multiple streams analysis and think about how you can give dependable advice in a policy process containing some serendipity. Who knows? Policy process research is large and heterogeneous, which opens the possibility for some creative solutions that I won’t be able to anticipate in advance.

4. One kind of blog post (for the policy analysis)

Write a short and punchy blog post which recognises the need to make an argument succinctly and grab attention with the title and first sentence/ paragraph, on the assumption that your audience will be reading it on their phone and will move on to something else quickly. In this exercise, your blog post is connected to your policy analysis. Think, for example, about how you would make the same case for a policy solution to a wider ‘lay’ audience. Or, use the blog post to gauge the extent to which your client could sell your policy solution. If they would struggle, should you make this recommendation in the first place?

Your blog post audience is wider than your policy analysis audience. You are trying to make an argument that will capture the attention of a larger group of people who are interested in politics and policy, but without being specialists. They will likely access your post from Twitter/ Facebook or via a search engine. This constraint produces a new requirement, to: present a punchy title which sums up the whole argument in under 280 characters (a statement is often better than a vague question); to summarise the whole argument in approximately 100 words in the first paragraph (what is the problem and solution?); then, to provide more information up to a maximum of 500 words. The reader can then be invited to read the whole policy analysis.

The style of blog posts varies markedly, so you should consult many examples before attempting your own (for example, compare the LSE with The Conversation and newspaper blogs to get a sense of variations in style). When you read other posts, take note of their strengths and weaknesses. For example, many posts associated with newspapers introduce a personal or case study element to ground the discussion in an emotional appeal. Sometimes this works, but sometimes it causes the reader to scroll down quickly to find the main argument. Perhaps ironically, I recommend storytelling but I often skim past people’s stories. Many academic posts are too long (well beyond your 500 limit), take too long to get to the point, and do not make explicit recommendations, so you should not emulate them. You should aim to be better than the scholars whose longer work you read. You should not just chop down your policy analysis to 500 words; you need a new kind of communication.

Hopefully, by the end of this fourth task, you will appreciate the transferable life skills. I have generated some uncertainty about your task to reflect the sense among many actors that they don’t really know how to make a persuasive case and who to make it to. We can follow some basic Bardach-style guidance, but a lot of this kind of work relies on trial-and-error. I maintain a short word count to encourage you to get to the point, and I bang on about ‘stories’ in modules to encourage you to present a short and persuasive story to policymakers.

This process seems weird at first, but isn’t it also intuitive? For example, next time you’re in my seminar, measure how long it takes you to get bored and look forward to the weekend. Then imagine that policymakers have the same attention span as you. That’s how long you have to make your case! Policymakers are not magical beings with an infinite attention span. In fact, they are busier and under more pressure than us, so you need to make your pitch count.

BOX A3: Rationale for blog post 1

This exercise forces students to make their case in 500 words. It helps them understand the need to communicate in different ways to different audiences. It suggests that successful communication is largely about knowing how your audience consumes information, rather than telling people all you know. I gauge success according to questions such as: Punchy and eye grabbing title? Tailored to an intelligent ‘lay’ audience rather than a specific expert group? Clearly defined problem? Good evidence or argument behind the solution? Clear recommendations backed by a sense that the solution is feasible? Well embedded weblinks to further relevant reading?

5. Writing a theory-informed essay

I tend to set this simple-looking question for coursework in policy modules: what is policy, how much has it changed, and why? Students get to choose the policy issue, timeframe, political system, and relevant explanatory concepts.

On the face of it, it looks very straightforward. Give it a few more seconds, and you can see the difficulties:

1. We spend a lot of time in class agreeing that it seems almost impossible to define policy
2. There are many possible measures of policy change
3. There is an almost unmanageable number of models, concepts, and theories to use to explain policy dynamics.

I try to encourage some creativity when solving this problem, but also advise students to keep their discussion as simple and jargon-free as possible (often by stretching an analogy with competitive diving, in which a well-executed simple essay can score higher than a belly-flopped hard essay).

Choosing a format: the initial advice

1. Choose a policy area (such as health) or issue (such as alcohol policy).
2. Describe the nature of policy, and the extent of policy change, in a particular time period (such as in a particular era, after an event or constitutional change, or after a change in government).
3. Select one or more policy concepts or theory to help structure your discussion and help explain how and why policy has changed.

For example, a question might be: What is tobacco policy in the UK, how much has it changed since the 1980s, and why? I use this example because I try to answer that question myself, even though some of my work is too theory-packed to be a good model for a student essay (Cairney, 2007 is essentially a bad model for students).

Choosing a format: the cautionary advice

You may be surprised about how difficult it is to answer a simple question like ‘what is policy?’ and I will give you a lot of credit for considering how to define and measure it; by identifying, for example, the use of legislation/ regulation, funding, staff, and information sharing, and/ or by considering the difference between, say, policy as a statement of intent or a long term outcome. In turn, a good description and explanation of policy change is difficult. If you are feeling ambitious, you can go further, to compare, say, two issues (such as tobacco and alcohol) or places (such UK Government policy and the policy of another country), but sometimes a simple and narrow discussion can be more effective. Similarly, you can use many theories or concepts to aid explanation, but one theory may do. Note that (a) your description of your research question, and your essay structure, is more important than (b) your decision on what topic or concepts to use.

BOX A4: Rationale for the essay

The wider aim is to encourage students to think about the relationship between differentperspectives on policy theory and analysis. For example, in a blog and policy analysis paper they try to generate attention to a policy problem and advocate a solution. Then, they draw on policy theories and concepts to reflect on their papers, highlighting (say): the need to identify the most important audience; the importance of framing issues with a mixture of evidence and emotional appeals; and, the need to present ‘feasible’ solutions.

The reflection can provide a useful segue to the essay, since we’re already identifying important policy problems, advocating change, reflecting on how best to encourage it – such as by presenting modest objectives – and then, in the essay, trying to explain (say) why governments have not taken that advice in the past. Their interest in the policy issue can prompt interest in researching the issue further; their knowledge of the issue and the policy process can help them develop politically-aware policy analysis. All going well, it produces a virtuous circle.

BOX A5: Rationale for blog post 2

I get students to do the analysis/reflection/blog combination in the first module, and an essay/ blog combo in the second module. The second blog post has a different aim. Students use the 500 words to present a jargon-free analysis of policy change. The post represents a useful exercise in theory translation. Without it, students tend to describe a large amount of jargon because I am the audience and I understand it. By explaining the same thing to a lay audience, they are obliged to explain key developments in a plain language. This requirement should also help them present a clearer essay, because people (academics and students) often use jargon to cover the fact that they don’t really know what they are saying.

The future of public health policymaking after COVID-19: lessons from Health in All Policies

Behold Paul’s attempt to make our faces the same size

Paul Cairney, Emily St Denny, Heather Mitchell 

This post summarises new research on the health equity strategy Health in All Policies. As our previous post suggests, it is common to hope that a major event will create a ‘window of opportunity’ for such strategies to flourish, but the current COVID-19 experience suggests otherwise. If so, what do HIAP studies tell us about how to respond, and do they offer any hope for future strategies? The full report is on Open Research Europe, accompanied by a brief interview on its contribution to the Horizon 2020 project – IMAJINE – on spatial justice.

COVID-19 should have prompted governments to treat health improvement as fundamental to public policy

Many had made strong rhetorical commitments to public health strategies focused on preventing a pandemic of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). To do so, they would address the ‘social determinants’ of health and health inequalities, defined by the WHO as ‘the unfair and avoidable differences in health status’ that are ‘shaped by the distribution of money, power and resources’ and ‘the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age’.

COVID-19 reinforces the impact of the social determinants of health. Health inequalities result from factors such as income and social and environmental conditions, which influence people’s ability to protect and improve their health. COVID-19 had a visibly disproportionate impact on people with (a) underlying health conditions associated with NCDs, and (b) less ability to live and work safely.

Yet, the opposite happened. The COVID-19 response side-lined health improvement

Health departments postponed health improvement strategies and moved resources to health protection.

This experience shows that the evidence does not speak for itself

The evidence on social determinants is clear to public health specialists, but the idea of social determinants is less well known or convincing to policymakers.

It also challenges the idea that the logic of health improvement is irresistible

Health in All Policies (HIAP) is the main vehicle for health improvement policymaking, underpinned by: a commitment to health equity by addressing the social determinants of health; the recognition that the most useful health policies are not controlled by health departments; the need for collaboration across (and outside) government; and, the search for high level political commitment to health improvement.

Its logic is undeniable to HIAP advocates, but not policymakers. A government’s public commitment to HIAP does not lead inevitably to the roll-out of a fully-formed HIAP model. There is a major gap between the idea of HIAP and its implementation. It is difficult to generate HIAP momentum, and it can be lost at any time.

Instead, we need to generate more realistic lessons from health improvement and promotion policy

However, most HIAP research does not provide these lessons. Most HIAP research combines:

1. functional logic (here is what we need)
2. programme logic (here is what we think we need to do to achieve it), and
3. hope.

Policy theory-informed empirical studies of policymaking could help produce a more realistic agenda, but very few HIAP studies seem to exploit their insights.

To that end, this review identifies lessons from studies of HIAP and policymaking

It summarises a systematic qualitative review of HIAP research. It includes 113 articles (2011-2020) that refer to policymaking theories or concepts while discussing HIAP.

We produced these conclusions from pre-COVID-19 studies of HIAP and policymaking, but our new policymaking context – and its ironic impact on HIAP – is impossible to ignore.

It suggests that HIAP advocates produced a 7-point playbook for the wrong game

The seven most common pieces of advice add up to a plausible but incomplete strategy:

1. adopt a HIAP model and toolkit
2. raise HIAP awareness and support in government
3. seek win-win solutions with partners
4. avoid the perception of ‘health imperialism’ when fostering intersectoral action
5. find HIAP policy champions and entrepreneurs
6. use HIAP to support the use of health impact assessments (HIAs)
7. challenge the traditional cost-benefit analysis approach to valuing HIAP.

Yet, two emerging pieces of advice highlight the limits to the current playbook and the search for its replacement:

1. treat HIAP as a continuous commitment to collaboration and health equity, not a uniform model; and,
2. address the contradictions between HIAP aims.

As a result, most country studies report a major, unexpected, and disappointing gap between HIAP commitment and actual outcomes

These general findings are apparent in almost all relevant studies. They stand out in the ‘best case’ examples where: (a) there is high political commitment and strategic action (such as South Australia), or (b) political and economic conditions are conducive to HIAP (such as Nordic countries).

These studies show that the HIAP playbook has unanticipated results, such as when the win-win strategy leads to  HIAP advocates giving ground but receiving little in return.

HIAP strategies to challenge the status quo are also overshadowed by more important factors, including (a) a far higher commitment to existing healthcare policies and the core business of government, and (b) state retrenchment. Additional studies of decentralised HIAP models find major gaps between (a) national strategic commitment (backed by national legislation) and (b) municipal government progress.

Some studies acknowledge the need to use policymaking research to produce new ways to encourage and evaluate HIAP success

Studies of South Australia situate HIAP in a complex policymaking system in which the link between policy activity and outcomes is not linear.  

Studies of Nordic HIAP show that a commitment to municipal responsibility and stakeholder collaboration rules out the adoption of a national uniform HIAP model.

However, most studies do not use policymaking research effectively or appropriately

Almost all HIAP studies only scratch the surface of policymaking research (while some try to synthesise its insights, but at the cost of clarity).

Most HIAP studies use policy theories to:

1. produce practical advice (such as to learn from ‘policy entrepreneurs’), or
2. supplement their programme logic (to describe what they think causes policy change and better health outcomes).

Most policy theories were not designed for this purpose.

Policymaking research helps primarily to explain the HIAP ‘implementation gap’

Its main lesson is that policy outcomes are beyond the control of policymakers and HIAP advocates. This explanation does not show how to close implementation gaps.

Its practical lessons come from critical reflection on dilemmas and politics, not the reinvention of a playbook

It prompts advocates to:

• Treat HIAP as a political project, not a technical exercise or puzzle to be solved.
• Re-examine the likely impact of a focus on intersectoral action and collaboration, to recognise the impact of imbalances of power and the logic of policy specialisation.
• Revisit the meaning-in-practice of the vague aims that they take for granted without explaining, such as co-production, policy learning, and organisational learning.
• Engage with key trade-offs, such as between a desire for uniform outcomes (to produce health equity) but acceptance of major variations in HIAP policy and policymaking.
• Avoid reinventing phrases or strategies when facing obstacles to health improvement.

We describe these points in more detail here:

Our Open Research Europe article (peer reviewed) The future of public health policymaking… (europa.eu)

Paul summarises the key points as part of a HIAP panel: Health in All Policies in times of COVID-19

ORE blog on the wider context of this work: forthcoming

I am not Peter Matthews

Some notes for my guest appearance on @urbaneprofessor ‘s module

Peter’s description

Paul comes from a Political Science background and started off his project trying to understand why politicians don’t make good policy. He uses a lot of Political Science theory to understand the policy process (what MPP students have been learning) and theory from Public Policy about how to make the policy process better.

I come from a Social Policy background. I presume policy will be bad, and approach policy analysis from a normative position, analysing and criticising it from theoretical and critical perspectives.

Paul’s description

I specialize in the study of public policy and policymaking. I ‘synthesise’ and use policy concepts and theories to ask: how do policy processes work, and why?

Most theories and concepts – summarized in 1000 and 500 words – engage with that question in some way.

As such, I primarily seek to describe and explain policymaking, without spending much time thinking about making it better (unless asked to do so, or unless I feel very energetic).

In particular, I can give you a decent account of how all of these policy theories relate to each other, which is more important that it first seems.

A story of complex government

This ‘synthesis’ relates to my story about key elements of policy theories, with a different context influencing how I tell it. For example, I tend to describe ‘The Policy Process’ in 500 or 1000 words with the ‘Westminster Model’ versus ‘policy communities’ stories in mind (and a US scholar might tell this story in a different way):

Bounded rationality (500, 1000):

• Individual policymakers can only pay attention to and understand a tiny proportion of (a) available information (b) the policy problems of which they are ostensibly responsible
• So, they find cognitive shortcuts to pay attention to some issues/ information and ignore the rest (goal setting, relying on trusted advisors, belief translation, gut instinct, etc.)
• Governmental organisations have more capacity, but also develop ‘standard operating procedures’ to limit their attention, and rely on many other actors for information and advice

Complex Policymaking Environments consisting of:

• Many actors in many venues
• Institutions (formal and informal rules)
• Networks (relationships between policymakers and influencers)
• Ideas (dominant beliefs, influencing the interpretation of problems and solutions)
• Socioeconomic context and events

As such, the story of, say, multi-centric policymaking (or MLG, or complexity theory) contrasts with the idea of highly centralized control in the UK government.

A story of ‘evidence based policymaking’

That story provides context for applications to the agendas taken forward by other disciplines or professions.

• The most obvious example is ‘evidence based policymaking’: my role is to explain why it is little more than a political slogan, and why people should not expect (or indeed want) it to exist, not to lobby for its existence
• Also working on similar stories in relation to policy learning and policy design: my role is to highlight dilemmas and cautionary tales, not be a policy designer.

The politics of policymaking research

Most of the theories I describe relate to theory-informed empirical projects, generally originating from the US, and generally described as ‘positivist’ in contrast to (say) ‘interpretive’ (or, say, ‘constructivist’).

However, there are some interesting qualifications:

• Some argue that these distinctions are overcooked (or, I suppose, overboiled)
• Some try to bring in postpositivist ideas to positivist networks (NPF)
• Some emerged from ‘critical policy analysis’ (SCPD)

The politics of policy analysis

This context helps understand my most recent book: The Politics of Policy Analysis

The initial podcast tells a story about MPP development, in which I used to ask students to write policy analyses (1^st semester) without explaining what policy analysis was, or how to do it. My excuse is that the punchline of the module was: your account of the policy theories/ policy context is more important than your actual analysis (see the Annex to the book).

Since then, I have produced a webpage – 750 – which:

• summarises the stories of the most-used policy analysis texts (e.g. Bardach) which identify steps including: define the problem; identify solutions; use values to compare trade-offs between solutions; predict their effects; make a recommendation
• relates those texts to policy theories, to identify how bounded rationality and complexity change that story (and the story of the policy cycle)
• relates both to ‘critical’ policy analysis and social science texts (some engage directly – like Stone, like Bacchi – while some provide insights – such as on critical race theory – without necessarily describing ‘policy analysis’)

A description of ‘critical’ approaches is fairly broad, but I think they tend to have key elements in common:

• a commitment to use research to improve policy for marginalized populations (described by Bacchi as siding with the powerless against the powerful, usually in relation to class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability)
• analysing policy to identify: who is portrayed positively/negatively; who benefits or suffers as a result
• analysing policymaking to identify: whose knowledge counts (e.g. as high quality and policy relevant), who is included or excluded
• identifying ways to challenge (a) dominant and damaging policy frames and (b) insulated/ exclusive versus participatory/ inclusive forms of policymaking

If so, I would see these three approaches as ways to understand and engage with policymaking that could be complementary or contradictory. In other words, I would warn against assuming one or the other.

The politics of policy analysis: podcasts

My new book, The Politics of Policy Analysis, comes with:

1. A webpage (750) containing summaries of key themes in policy analysis, and
2. A series of (quietly voiced, almost a whisper) podcasts summarising each chapter.

You can find the podcasts in different ways:

Find on a podcasting service (Anchor FM contains each individual episode plus all of them together):

https://anchor.fm/paul-cairney/episodes/The-Politics-of-Policy-Analysis-eon520

The Politics of Policy analysis: podcasts on Anchor FMhttps://t.co/RJtbpWrbrs

— Professor Paul Cairney (@CairneyPaul) January 8, 2021

iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-politics-of-policy-analysis/id1548022023

Click each one to play on this site (they are quite quiet, so you may prefer the back up versions below)

Access the files from my dropbox

Please note that I recorded on a PC and used my phone as a backup. This backup proved to be super-handy when Chapter 10 recorded badly on the PC.

PS if you want to read along, here are most of the words of the book, but without any of the pizazz:

Paul Cairney 2021 The Politics of Policy Analysis (pre publication draft)

Back up versions (recorded on my phone):

What have we learned so far from the UK government’s COVID-19 policy?

This post first appeared on LSE British Politics and Policy (27.11.20) and is based on this article in British Politics.

Paul Cairney assesses government policy in the first half of 2020. He identifies the intense criticism of its response so far, encouraging more systematic assessments grounded in policy research.

In March 2020, COVID-19 prompted policy change in the UK at a speed and scale only seen during wartime. According to the UK government, policy was informed heavily by science advice. Prime Minister Boris Johnson argued that, ‘At all stages, we have been guided by the science, and we will do the right thing at the right time’. Further, key scientific advisers such as Sir Patrick Vallance emphasised the need to gather evidence continuously to model the epidemic and identify key points at which to intervene, to reduce the size of the peak of population illness initially, then manage the spread of the virus over the longer term.

Both ministers and advisors emphasised the need for individual behavioural change, supplemented by government action, in a liberal democracy in which direct imposition is unusual and unsustainable. However, for its critics, the government experience has quickly become an exemplar of policy failure.

Initial criticisms include that ministers did not take COVID-19 seriously enough in relation to existing evidence, when its devastating effect was apparent in China in January and Italy from February; act as quickly as other countries to test for infection to limit its spread; or introduce swift-enough measures to close schools, businesses, and major social events. Subsequent criticisms highlight problems in securing personal protective equipment (PPE), testing capacity, and an effective test-trace-and-isolate system. Some suggest that the UK government was responding to the ‘wrong pandemic’, assuming that COVID-19 could be treated like influenza. Others blame ministers for not pursuing an elimination strategy to minimise its spread until a vaccine could be developed. Some criticise their over-reliance on models which underestimated the R (rate of transmission) and ‘doubling time’ of cases and contributed to a 2-week delay of lockdown. Many describe these problems and delays as the contributors to the UK’s internationally high number of excess deaths.

How can we hold ministers to account in a meaningful way?

I argue that these debates are often fruitless and too narrow because they do not involve systematic policy analysis, take into account what policymakers can actually do, or widen debate to consider whose lives matter to policymakers. Drawing on three policy analysis perspectives, I explore the questions that we should ask to hold ministers to account in a way that encourages meaningful learning from early experience.

These questions include:

Was the government’s definition of the problem appropriate?
Much analysis of UK government competence relates to specific deficiencies in preparation (such as shortages in PPE), immediate action (such as to discharge people from hospitals to care homes without testing them for COVID-19), and implementation (such as an imperfect test-trace-and-isolate system). The broader issue relates to its focus on intervening in late March to protect healthcare capacity during a peak of infection, rather than taking a quicker and more precautionary approach. This judgment relates largely to its definition of the policy problem which underpins every subsequent policy intervention.

Did the government select the right policy mix at the right time? Who benefits most from its choices?

Most debates focus on the ‘lock down or not?’ question without exploring fully the unequal impact of any action. The government initially relied on exhortation, based on voluntarism and an appeal to social responsibility. Initial policy inaction had unequal consequences on social groups, including people with underlying health conditions, black and ethnic minority populations more susceptible to mortality at work or discrimination by public services, care home residents, disabled people unable to receive services, non-UK citizens obliged to pay more to live and work while less able to access public funds, and populations (such as prisoners and drug users) that receive minimal public sympathy. Then, in March, its ‘stay at home’ requirement initiated a major new policy and different unequal impacts in relation to the income, employment, and wellbeing of different groups. These inequalities are list in more general discussions of impacts on the whole population.

Did the UK government make the right choices on the trade-offs between values, and what impacts could the government have reasonably predicted?

Initially, the most high-profile value judgment related to freedom from state coercion to reduce infection versus freedom from the harm of infection caused by others. Then, values underpinned choices on the equitable distribution of measures to mitigate the economic and wellbeing consequences of lockdown. A tendency for the UK government to project centralised and ‘guided by the science’ policymaking has undermined public deliberation on these trade-offs between policies. The latter will be crucial to ongoing debates on the trade-offs associated with national and regional lockdowns.

Did the UK government combine good policy with good policymaking?

A problem like COVID-19 requires trial-and-error policymaking on a scale that seems incomparable to previous experiences. It requires further reflection on how to foster transparent and adaptive policymaking and widespread public ownership for unprecedented policy measures, in a political system characterised by (a) accountability focused incorrectly on strong central government control and (b) adversarial politics that is not conducive to consensus seeking and cooperation.

These additional perspectives and questions show that too-narrow questions – such as was the UK government ‘following the science’ – do not help us understand the longer term development and wider consequences of UK COVID-19 policy. Indeed, such a narrow focus on science marginalises wider discussions of values and the populations that are most disadvantaged by government policy.

_____________________

The coronavirus and evidence-informed policy analysis (short version)

• Paul Cairney (2020) ‘The UK Government’s COVID-19 policy: assessing evidence-informed policy analysis in real time’, British Politics https://rdcu.be/b9zAk (PDF)

The coronavirus feels like a new policy problem that requires new policy analysis. The analysis should be informed by (a) good evidence, translated into (b) good policy. However, don’t be fooled into thinking that either of those things are straightforward. There are simple-looking steps to go from defining a problem to making a recommendation, but this simplicity masks the profoundly political process that must take place. Each step in analysis involves political choices to prioritise some problems and solutions over others, and therefore prioritise some people’s lives at the expense of others.

My article in British Politics takes us through those steps in the UK, and situates them in a wider political and policymaking context. This post is shorter, and only scratches the surface of analysis.

5 steps to policy analysis

1. Define the problem.

Perhaps we can sum up the initial UK government approach as: (a) the impact of this virus and illness will be a level of death and illness that could overwhelm the population and exceed the capacity of public services, so (b) we need to contain the virus enough to make sure it spreads in the right way at the right time, so (c) we need to encourage and make people change their behaviour (primarily via hygiene and social distancing). However, there are many ways to frame this problem to emphasise the importance of some populations over others, and some impacts over others.

2. Identify technically and politically feasible solutions.

Solutions are not really solutions: they are policy instruments that address one aspect of the problem, including taxation and spending, delivering public services, funding research, giving advice to the population, and regulating or encouraging changes to social behaviour. Each new instrument contributes an existing mix, with unpredictable and unintended consequences. Some instruments seem technically feasible (they will work as intended if implemented), but will not be adopted unless politically feasible (enough people support their introduction). Or vice versa. From the UK government’s perspective, this dual requirement rules out a lot of responses.

3. Use values and goals to compare solutions.

Typical judgements combine: (a) broad descriptions of values such as efficiency, fairness, freedom, security, and human dignity, (b) instrumental goals, such as sustainable policymaking (can we do it, and for how long?), and political feasibility (will people agree to it, and will it make me more or less popular or trusted?), and (c) the process to make choices, such as the extent to which a policy process involves citizens or stakeholders (alongside experts) in deliberation. They combine to help policymakers come to high profile choices (such as the balance between individual freedom and state coercion), and low profile but profound choices (to influence the level of public service capacity, and level of state intervention, and therefore who and how many people will die).

4. Predict the outcome of each feasible solution.

It is difficult to envisage a way for the UK Government to publicise all of the thinking behind its choices (Step 3) and predictions (Step 4) in a way that would encourage effective public deliberation. People often call for the UK Government to publicise its expert advice and operational logic, but I am not sure how they would separate it from their normative logic about who should live or die, or provide a frank account without unintended consequences for public trust or anxiety. If so, one aspect of government policy is to keep some choices implicit and avoid a lot of debate on trade-offs. Another is to make choices continuously without knowing what their impact will be (the most likely scenario right now).

5. Make a choice, or recommendation to your client.

Your recommendation or choice would build on these four steps. Define the problem with one framing at the expense of the others. Romanticise some people and not others. Decide how to support some people, and coerce or punish others. Prioritise the lives of some people in the knowledge that others will suffer or die. Do it despite your lack of expertise and profoundly limited knowledge and information. Learn from experts, but don’t assume that only scientific experts have relevant knowledge (decolonise; coproduce). Recommend choices that, if damaging, could take decades to fix after you’ve gone. Consider if a policymaker is willing and able to act on your advice, and if your proposed action will work as intended. Consider if a government is willing and able to bear the economic and political costs. Protect your client’s popularity, and trust in your client, at the same time as protecting lives. Consider if your advice would change if the problem seemed to change. If you are writing your analysis, maybe keep it down to one sheet of paper (in other words, fewer words than in this post up to this point).

Policy analysis is not as simple as these steps suggest, and further analysis of the wider policymaking environment helps describe two profound limitations to simple analytical thought and action.

1. Policymakers must ignore almost all evidence

The amount of policy relevant information is infinite, and capacity is finite. So, individuals and governments need ways to filter out almost all of it. Individuals combine cognition and emotion to help them make choices efficiently, and governments have equivalent rules to prioritise only some information. They include: define a problem and a feasible response, seek information that is available, understandable, and actionable, and identify credible sources of information and advice. In that context, the vague idea of trusting or not trusting experts is nonsense, and the larger post highlights the many flawed ways in which all people decide whose expertise counts.

2. They do not control the policy process.

Policymakers engage in a messy and unpredictable world in which no single ‘centre’ has the power to turn a policy recommendation into an outcome.

• There are many policymakers and influencers spread across a political system. For example, consider the extent to which each government department, devolved governments, and public and private organisations are making their own choices that help or hinder the UK government approach.
• Most choices in government are made in ‘subsystems’, with their own rules and networks, over which ministers have limited knowledge and influence.
• The social and economic context, and events, are largely out of their control.

The take home messages (if you accept this line of thinking)

1. The coronavirus is an extreme example of a general situation: policymakers will always have very limited knowledge of policy problems and control over their policymaking environment. They make choices to frame problems narrowly enough to seem solvable, rule out most solutions as not feasible, make value judgements to try help some more than others, try to predict the results, and respond when the results do not match their hopes or expectations.
2. This is not a message of doom and despair. Rather, it encourages us to think about how to influence government, and hold policymakers to account, in a thoughtful and systematic way that does not mislead the public or exacerbate the problem we are seeing. No one is helping their government solve the problem by saying stupid shit on the internet (OK, that last bit was a message of despair).

Further reading:

The article (PDF) sets out these arguments in much more detail, with some links to further thoughts and developments.

This series of ‘750 words’ posts summarises key texts in policy analysis and tries to situate policy analysis in a wider political and policymaking context. Note the focus on whose knowledge counts, which is not yet a big feature of this crisis.

These series of 500 words and 1000 words posts (with podcasts) summarise concepts and theories in policy studies.

This page on evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) uses those insights to demonstrate why EBPM is  a political slogan rather than a realistic expectation.

These recorded talks relate those insights to common questions asked by researchers: why do policymakers seem to ignore my evidence, and what can I do about it? I’m happy to record more (such as on the topic you just read about) but not entirely sure who would want to hear what.

The coronavirus and evidence-informed policy analysis (long version)

Final update 2.11.20. Don’t read this post. It became too long and unwieldy. I turned it into:

A published article https://rdcu.be/b9zAk (PDF)

A 25000 word version with more discussion and links Cairney UK coronavirus policy 25000 14.7.20 

This is the long version. It is long. Too long to call a blog post. Let’s call it a ‘living document’ that I update and amend as new developments arise (then start turning into a more organised paper). In most cases, I am adding tweets, so the date of the update is embedded. If I add a new section, I will add a date. If you seek specific topics (like ‘herd immunity’), it might be worth doing a search. The short version is shorter.

The coronavirus feels like a new policy problem. Governments already have policies for public health crises, but the level of uncertainty about the spread and impact of this virus seems to be taking it to a new level of policy, media, and public attention. The UK Government’s Prime Minister calls it ‘the worst public health crisis for a generation’.

As such, there is no shortage of opinions on what to do, but there is a shortage of well-considered opinions, producing little consensus. Many people are rushing to judgement and expressing remarkably firm opinions about the best solutions, but their contributions add up to contradictory evaluations, in which:

• the government is doing precisely the right thing or the completely wrong thing,
• we should listen to this expert saying one thing or another expert saying the opposite.

Lots of otherwise-sensible people are doing what they bemoan in politicians: rushing to judgement, largely accepting or sharing evidence only if it reinforces that judgement, and/or using their interpretation of any new development to settle scores with their opponents.

Yet, anyone who feels, without uncertainty, that they have the best definition of, and solution to, this problem is a fool. If people are also sharing bad information and advice, they are dangerous fools. Further, as Professor Madley puts it (in the video below), ‘anyone who tells you they know what’s going to happen over the next six months is lying’.

In that context, how can we make sense of public policy to address the coronavirus in a more systematic way?

Studies of policy analysis and policymaking do not solve a policy problem, but they at least give us a language to think it through.

1. Let’s focus on the UK as an example, and use common steps in policy analysis, to help us think through the problem and how to try to manage it.

• In each step, note how quickly it is possible to be overwhelmed by uncertainty and ambiguity, even when the issue seems so simple at first.
• Note how difficult it is to move from Step 1, and to separate Step 1 from the others. It is difficult to define the problem without relating it to the solution (or to the ways in which we will evaluate each solution).

2. Let’s relate that analysis to research on policymaking, to understand the wider context in which people pay attention to, and try to address, important problems that are largely out of their control.

Throughout, note that I am describing a thought process as simply as I can, not a full examination of relevant evidence. I am highlighting the problems that people face when ‘diagnosing’ policy problems, not trying to diagnose it myself. To do so, I draw initially on common advice from the key policy analysis texts (summaries of the texts that policy analysis students are most likely to read) that simplify the process a little too much. Still, the thought process that it encourages took me hours alone (spread over three days) to produce no real conclusion. Policymakers and advisers, in the thick of this problem, do not have that luxury of time or uncertainty.

See also: Boris Johnson’s address to the nation in full (23.3.20) and press conference transcripts

I have written to all leaders of opposition parties to invite them to work together at this moment of national emergency. pic.twitter.com/HgEsMo3DO2

— Boris Johnson (@BorisJohnson) April 4, 2020

Over the last 24 hours I have developed mild symptoms and tested positive for coronavirus.

I am now self-isolating, but I will continue to lead the government’s response via video-conference as we fight this virus.

Together we will beat this. #StayHomeSaveLives pic.twitter.com/9Te6aFP0Ri

— Boris Johnson (@BorisJohnson) March 27, 2020

In our latest guest blog, Jonny Pearson-Stuttard, RSPH Trustee and Public Health Doctor @imperialcollege sets out what we know about the spread of coronavirus to date, and why the Government has taken the measures it hashttps://t.co/XM7zKKjwtE

— RSPH (@R_S_P_H) March 25, 2020

Step 1 Define the problem

Common advice in policy analysis texts:

• Provide a diagnosis of a policy problem, using rhetoric and eye-catching data to generate attention.
• Identify its severity, urgency, cause, and our ability to solve it. Don’t define the wrong problem, such as by oversimplifying.
• Problem definition is a political act of framing, as part of a narrative to evaluate the nature, cause, size, and urgency of an issue.
• Define the nature of a policy problem, and the role of government in solving it, while engaging with many stakeholders.
• ‘Diagnose the undesirable condition’ and frame it as ‘a market or government failure (or maybe both)’.

Coronavirus as a physical problem is not the same as a coronavirus policy problem. To define the physical problem is to identify the nature, spread, and impact of a virus and illness on individuals and populations. To define a policy problem, we identify the physical problem and relate it (implicitly or explicitly) to what we think a government can, and should, do about it. Put more provocatively, it is only a policy problem if policymakers are willing and able to offer some kind of solution.

This point may seem semantic, but it raises a profound question about the capacity of any government to solve a problem like an epidemic, or for governments to cooperate to solve a pandemic. It is easy for an outsider to exhort a government to ‘do something!’ (or ‘ACT NOW!’) and express certainty about what would happen. However, policymakers inside government:

1. Do not enjoy the same confidence that they know what is happening, or that their actions will have their intended consequences, and
2. Will think twice about trying to regulate social behaviour under those circumstances, especially when they
3. Know that any action or inaction will benefit some and punish others.

For example, can a government make people wash their hands? Or, if it restricts gatherings at large events, can it stop people gathering somewhere else, with worse impact? If it closes a school, can it stop children from going to their grandparents to be looked after until it reopens? There are 101 similar questions and, in each case, I reckon the answer is no. Maybe government action has some of the desired impact; maybe not. If you agree, then the question might be: what would it really take to force people to change their behaviour?

See also: Coronavirus has not suspended politics – it has revealed the nature of power (David Runciman)

The answer is: often too much for a government to consider (in a liberal democracy), particularly if policymakers are informed that it will not have the desired impact.

A couple of key takeaways from our analysis of early COVID-19 dynamics in Wuhan:

1. We estimated that the control measures introduced – unprecedented interventions that will have had a huge social and psychological toll – reduced transmission by around 55% in space of 2 weeks 1/

— Adam Kucharski (@AdamJKucharski) March 12, 2020

If so, the UK government’s definition of the policy problem will incorporate this implicit question: what can we do if we can influence, but not determine (or even predict well) how people behave?

Uncertainty about the coronavirus plus uncertainty about policy impact

Now, add that general uncertainty about the impact of government to this specific uncertainty about the likely nature and spread of the coronavirus:

A summary of this video suggests:

• There will be an epidemic (a profound spread to many people in a short space of time), then the problem will be endemic (a long-term, regular feature of life) (see also UK policy on coronavirus COVID-19 assumes that the virus is here to stay).
• In the absence of a vaccine, the only way to produce ‘herd immunity’ is for most people to be infected and recover

[Note: there is much debate on whether ‘herd immunity’ is or is not government policy. Much of it relates to interpretation, based on levels of trust/distrust in the UK Government, its Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister’s special adviser. I discuss this point below under ‘trial and error policymaking’. See also Who can you trust during the coronavirus crisis? ]

• The ideal spread involves all well people sharing the virus first, while all vulnerable people (e.g. older, and/or with existing health problems that affect their immune systems) protected in one isolated space, but it won’t happen like that; so, we are trying to minimise damage in the real world.
• We mainly track the spread via deaths, with data showing a major spike appearing one month later, so the problem may only seem real to most people when it is too late to change behaviour

• A lot of the spread will happen inside homes, where the role of government is minimal (compared to public places). So, for example, the impact of school closures could be good (isolation) or make things worse (children spreading the virus to vulnerable relatives) (see also ‘we don’t know [if the UKG decision not to close schools] was brilliant or catastrophic’). [Update 18.3.20: as it turned out, the First Minister’s argument for closing Scottish schools was that there were too few teachers available).

See also: Coronavirus: Government expert defends not closing UK schools (BBC, Sir Patrick Vallance 13th March 2020)

Lots of people talking about this Lancet study on impact of school closures and COVID today https://t.co/bHRnHTqnMn

It's a good review of what we know. However, it is getting a bit mangled by some in the press… 👇

— Sam Sims (@DrSamSims) April 7, 2020

Lots of people talking about this Lancet study on impact of school closures and COVID today https://t.co/bHRnHTqnMn

It's a good review of what we know. However, it is getting a bit mangled by some in the press… 👇

— Sam Sims (@DrSamSims) April 7, 2020

• The choice in theory is between a rapid epidemic with a high peak, or a slowed-down epidemic over a longer period, but ‘anyone who tells you they know what’s going to happen over the next six months is lying’.
• Maybe this epidemic will be so memorable as to shift social behaviour, but so much depends on trying to predict (badly) if individuals will actually change (see also Spiegelhalter on communicating risk).

None of this account tells policymakers what to do, but at least it helps them clarify three key aspects of their policy problem:

1. The impact of this virus and illness could overwhelm the population, to the extent that it causes mass deaths, causes a level of illness that exceeds the capacity of health services to treat, and contributes to an unpredictable amount of social and economic damage.
2. We need to contain the virus enough to make sure it (a) spreads at the right speed and/or (b) peaks at the right time. The right speed seems to be: a level that allows most people to recover alone, while the most vulnerable are treated well in healthcare settings that have enough capacity. The right time seems to be the part of the year with the lowest demand on health services (e.g. summer is better than winter). In other words, (a) reduce the size of the peak by ‘flattening the curve’, and/or (b) find the right time of year to address the peak, while (c) anticipating more than one peak.

My impression is that the most frequently-expressed aim is (a) …

Delaying the spread of coronavirus could potentially prevent the health service from being stretched to breaking point, as national clinical director @jasonleitch explains to @LouiseScottSTV here. https://t.co/atrEOVgihf pic.twitter.com/AhaCHFKjCj

— STV News (@STVNews) March 13, 2020

Yesterday we entered the Delay phase of our #COVID_19uk Action Plan. @UKScienceChief explained why this is important.

It allows us to #FlattenTheCurve, which means reducing the impact in the short-term to ensure our health & care system can effectively protect vulnerable people pic.twitter.com/1I45C3v38V

— Department of Health and Social Care (@DHSCgovuk) March 13, 2020

… while the UK Government’s Deputy Chief Medical Officer also seems to be describing (b):

Dr Jenny Harries, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, came into Downing Street to answer some of the most commonly asked questions on coronavirus. pic.twitter.com/KCdeHsaz6a

— UK Prime Minister (@10DowningStreet) March 11, 2020

3. We need to encourage or coerce people to change their behaviour, to look after themselves (e.g. by handwashing) and forsake their individual preferences for the sake of public health (e.g. by self-isolating or avoiding vulnerable people). Perhaps we can foster social trust and empathy to encourage responsible individual action. Perhaps people will only protect others if obliged to do so (compare Stone; Ostrom; game theory).

See also: From across the Ditch: How Australia has to decide on the least worst option for COVID-19 (Prof Tony Blakely on three bad options: (1) the likelihood of ‘elimination’ of the virus before vaccination is low; (2) an 18-month lock-down will help ‘flatten the curve’; (3) ‘to prepare meticulously for allowing the pandemic to wash through society over a period of six or so months. To tool up the production of masks and medical supplies. To learn as quickly as possible which treatments of people sick with COVID-19 saves lives. To work out our strategies for protection of the elderly and those with a chronic condition (for whom the mortality from COVID-19 is much higher’).

Also need 1. Leadership 2. Deliberation and 3. Societal consent #covid19 https://t.co/aZo2VRxoRC

— Lucia D'Ambruoso (@luciadambruoso) April 4, 2020

Why politicians fear being accused of over reaction. Which in turn might prevent them from reacting appropriately when a real crisis hits 👇🏽👇🏽 https://t.co/UrxHTAs2z5

— Anand Menon (@anandMenon1) April 5, 2020

From uncertainty to ambiguity

If you are still with me, I reckon you would have worded those aims slightly differently, right? There is some ambiguity about these broad intentions, partly because there is some uncertainty, and partly because policymakers need to set rather vague intentions to generate the highest possible support for them. However, vagueness is not our friend during a crisis involving such high anxiety. Further, they are only delaying the inevitable choices that people need to make to turn a complex multi-faceted problem into something simple enough to describe and manage. The problem may be complex, but our attention focuses only on a small number of aspects, at the expense of the rest. Examples that have arisen, so far, include to accentuate:

1. The health of the whole population or people who would be affected disproportionately by the illness.

• For example, the difference in emphasis affects the health advice for the relatively vulnerable (and the balance between exhortation and reassurance)

2. Inequalities in relation to health, socio-economic status (e.g. income, gender, race, ethnicity), or the wider economy.

Emily Maitlis with powerful words that needed saying tonight. pic.twitter.com/yqNgxlHoJU

— Huw (@ed_son) April 8, 2020

• For example, restrictive measures may reduce the risk of harm to some, but increase the burden on people with no savings or reliable sources of income.
• For example, some people are hoarding large quantities of home and medical supplies that (a) other people cannot afford, and (b) some people cannot access, despite having higher need.
• For example, social distancing will limit the spread of the virus (see the nascent evidence), but also produce highly unequal forms of social isolation that increase the risk of domestic abuse (possibly exacerbated by school closures) and undermine wellbeing. Or, there will be major policy changes, such as to the rules to detain people under mental health legislation, regarding abortion, or in relation to asylum (note: some of these tweets are from the US, partly because I’m seeing more attention to race – and the consequence of systematic racism on the socioeconomic inequalities so important to COVID-19 mortality – than in the UK).

See also: COVID-19: how the UK’s economic model contributes towards a mismanagement of the crisis (Carolina Alves and Farwa Sial 30.3.20),

Economic downturn and wider NHS disruption likely to hit health hard – especially health of most vulnerable (Institute for Fiscal Studies 9.4.20),

Don’t be fooled: Britain’s coronavirus bailout will make the rich richer still (Christine Berry 13.4.20)

COVID-19 has brought new focus to women’s continued inequality. Without a gendered response to both the health and economic crises, gender inequality will be further cemented. Read more on the blog: https://t.co/zYxSFpUTNE

— Close the Gap (@closethepaygap) March 30, 2020

“The epidemic has had a huge impact on domestic violence,” said Wan. “According to our statistics, 90% of the causes of violence are related to the COVID-19 epidemic.” https://t.co/xswemtf548

— dejan (@heyDejan) March 14, 2020

I just asked a DC cop what he’s noticed since the coronavirus sent people home. “More domestic violence,” he said, without missing a beat. https://t.co/kv9zH5VNj1

— Timothy Noah (@TimothyNoah1) March 18, 2020

NEW: Priti Patel unveils extra help for domestic abuse support lines amid surge in demand during coronavirus lockdownhttps://t.co/FbVqRifYkD

— PoliticsHome (@politicshome) April 12, 2020

 

While black people make up about 12% of Michigan’s population, they make up about 40% of all COVID-19 deaths reported.

A social epidemiologist says the numbers don’t say everything, but there's something that can’t be ignored: inequality. @MichiganRadio https://t.co/bWsqFaCrUJ

— NPR (@NPR) April 5, 2020

Available evidence (though injuriously limited) shows that Black people are being infected & dying of #coronavirus at higher rates. Disproportionate Black suffering is what many of us have suspected and feared because it is consistent with the entirety of American history. https://t.co/qzmXvGCGvV

— Jamila Michener (@povertyscholar) April 4, 2020

Dr. Fauci is pleading especially w/ black ppl to social distance bc they are more likely to have underlying conditions & die from coronavirus.

Context: For some, social distancing is a privilege. Black ppl in many cities are more likely to hold jobs that they can't do from home.

— Yamiche Alcindor (@Yamiche) April 8, 2020

#Coronavirus is not the 'great equalizer'—race matters:

“I believe that the actions and omissions of world leaders in charge of fighting the #COVID19 pandemic will reveal historical and current impacts of colonial violence and continued health inequities” https://t.co/nUuBIKfrVL

— Dr. Malinda S. Smith (@MalindaSmith) April 6, 2020

BAME lives matter, so far they account for:

– 100% of Dr deaths
– 50% nurse deaths
– 35% of Patients in ICU

Yet account for only 14% of population and account for 44% of NHS staff. Who is asking the questions, why the disparity?https://t.co/VOL8FAmy45

— Jas Athwal (@Jas_Athwal) April 11, 2020

BBC news reports on the disproportionate deaths of African Americans & minorities in the US from #COVID19, but silence on similar issues in the UK. Why? Where is the reporting? Where is the accountability? https://t.co/DkGPjfnWG1

— Gurminder K Bhambra (@GKBhambra) April 11, 2020

cc

Non-whites are 13% of the UK population but a full third of Covid-19 critically ill patients.https://t.co/3kilRSU8oA

Worrying. Possibly because:
– more likely to live in hotspots (cities)?
– underlying health conditions that make us more susceptible?

— Sunny Hundal (@sunny_hundal) April 7, 2020

There is some – possibly because black and Asian people are more likely to live in big cities. https://t.co/LfzSS0Dd5p

— Oliver Moody (@olivernmoody) April 9, 2020

https://twitter.com/boodleoops/status/1246717497308577792

https://twitter.com/boodleoops/status/1246717497308577792

https://twitter.com/MarioLuisSmall/status/1239879542094925825

What the coronavirus bill will do: https://t.co/qoBdKKr64H
Mental Health Act – detention implemented using just one doctor’s opinion (not 2) & AMHP, & temporarily allow extension or removal of time limits to allow for greater flexibility where services are less able to respond

— Dr Kevin Stone 🕷 (@DrKevinstone) March 17, 2020

English obviously, but fascinating that have issued an explicitly ethical framework for COVID decisions re mental health and incapacity. Can Scotland do same? https://t.co/WccPntZOwf

— Colin McKay (@colinimckay) March 19, 2020

WOW – government has relaxed restrictions on WHERE abortions can take place, temporary inclusion of 'the home' as a legal site for abortion: https://t.co/Vw714fWXEM

— Laura Hurley (@heytherehurley) March 23, 2020

The right call from @matthancock – thank you everyone who helped make this happen and so protected the healthcare rights of women across the country #trustwomen https://t.co/lD1QNiJH9R

— stellacreasy (@stellacreasy) March 28, 2020

Abortion services for women from Northern Ireland remain available free of charge in England. This provision will continue until services are available to meet these needs in Northern Ireland. For more information, visit: https://t.co/YYjop5lSgU pic.twitter.com/M8k95aIisM

— Northern Ireland Office (@NIOgov) April 4, 2020

BREAKING NEWS!!!!
The Home Office have confirmed that ALL evictions and terminations of asylum support have been paused for 3 months. Find out more and read the letter from Home Office Minister Chris Philp confirming this on our website at: https://t.co/KDlVr4PHyP

— Refugee Council (@refugeecouncil) March 28, 2020

A public health emergency needs a public health response.

People are too afraid to get medical treatment in a pandemic in case their details are passed to immigration enforcement.

E N D

T H E

H O S T I L E

E N V I R O N M E N T

— Liberty (@libertyhq) April 9, 2020

NEW Editorial: While responding to #COVID19, policy makers should consider the risk of deepening health inequalities. If vulnerable groups are not properly identified, the consequences of this pandemic will be even more devastating https://t.co/BrypuXH6vS pic.twitter.com/hka3nLzxdv

— The Lancet (@TheLancet) April 3, 2020

ACMD advice on COVID-19 emergency legislation to enable supply of controlled drugs https://t.co/RU00LYNLOF

— Harry Sumnall (@profhrs) April 7, 2020

In relation to Prison Rule Changes – these would only ever be used as an absolute last resort, in order to protect staff & those in our care. I can confirm that emergency changes to showering have not been implemented in any establishment.

Oh & Barlinnie has not run out of soap. https://t.co/pOSWnVw8zg

— Humza Yousaf (@HumzaYousaf) April 9, 2020

• For example, governments cannot ignore the impact of their actions on the economy, however much they emphasise mortality, health, and wellbeing. Most high-profile emphasis was initially on the fate of large and small businesses, and people with mortgages, but a long period of crisis will a tip the balance from low income to unsustainable poverty (even prompting Iain Duncan Smith to propose policy change), and why favour people who can afford a mortgage over people scraping the money together for rent?

So…. Govt income protection package includes…..
1. 80% of wage costs up to £2500
2. Deferred VAT.
3. £7 billion uplift to Universal Credit and Woring Tax crdit.
4. £1 billion to cover 30% of house rental costs.
5. Self employed to get same as sickness benefit payments.

— norman smith (@Thehackandhound) March 20, 2020

3. A need for more communication and exhortation, or for direct action to change behaviour.
4. The short term (do everything possible now) or long term (manage behaviour over many months).

The Imperial College COVID report is being discussed. But a major takeaway from it will likely survive discussion: the human cost of a pure mitigation strategy is inacceptable, whilst a pure suppression strategy is unsustainable over time (thread)

— Jean Pisani-Ferry (@pisaniferry) March 18, 2020

3. How to maintain trust in the UK government when (a) people are more or less inclined to trust a the current part of government and general trust may be quite low, and (b) so many other governments are acting differently from the UK.

• For example, note the visible presence of the Prime Minister, but also his unusually high deference to unelected experts such as (a) UK Government senior scientists providing direct advice to ministers and the public, and (b) scientists drawing on limited information to model behaviour and produce realistic scenarios (we can return to the idea of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ later). This approach is not uncommon with epidemics/ pandemics (LD was then the UK Government’s Chief Medical Officer):

• For example, note how often people are second guessing and criticising the UK Government position (and questioning the motives of Conservative ministers).

See also: Coronavirus: meet the scientists who are now household names

6. How policy in relation to the coronavirus relates to other priorities (e.g. Brexit, Scottish independence, trade, education, culture)

🔎 Want to know what Covid-19 means for the transition period?

🔎 Does either the UK government or the EU want to extend the transition period?

🔎 Who decides whether an extension happens?

Find answers in our latest explainer here ⬇️https://t.co/rC59OlkHC4

— The UK in a Changing Europe (@UKandEU) April 4, 2020

A few half-formed thoughts on this… https://t.co/IZgla0yzFg

— James Chalmers (@ProfChalmers) March 18, 2020

7. Who caused, or who is exacerbating, the problem? The answers to such questions helps determine which populations are most subject to policy intervention.

• For example, people often try to lay blame for viruses on certain populations, based on their nationality, race, ethnicity, sexuality, or behaviour (e.g. with HIV).
• For example, the (a) association between the coronavirus and China and Chinese people (e.g. restrict travel to/ from China; e.g. exacerbate racism), initially overshadowed (b) the general role of international travellers (e.g. place more general restrictions on behaviour), and (c) other ways to describe who might be responsible for exacerbating a crisis.

For social scientists wondering “what can I do now?” here’s a challenge:@cp_roth @LukasHenselEcon & others ran a survey with 2500 Italians yday & found that:

— those under 50
— with full time jobs
— male

were less likely to adhere to the quarantine

How would you intervene?

— Jon M Jachimowicz (@jonj) March 13, 2020

congrats to everyone who insists on calling covid-19 the “Chinese Virus” or the “Chinese Flu” https://t.co/E72vPqC2Ll

— b-boy boooo-eebaisse (@jbouie) March 18, 2020

See also: ‘Othering the Virus‘ by Marius Meinhof

Under ‘normal’ policymaking circumstances, we would expect policymakers to resolve this ambiguity by exercising power to set the agenda and make choices that close off debate. Attention rises at first, a choice is made, and attention tends to move on to something else. With the coronavirus, attention to many different aspects of the problem has been lurching remarkably quickly. The definition of the policy problem often seems to be changing daily or hourly, and more quickly than the physical problem. It will also change many more times, particularly when attention to each personal story of illness or death prompts people to question government policy every hour. If the policy problem keeps changing in these ways, how could a government solve it?

⁦@alexwickham⁩ doing fine work as a journalist again. Gets right into Government somehow and tells people what is going on.

10 Days That Changed Britain: "Heated" Debate Between Scientists Forced Boris Johnson To Act On Coronavirus https://t.co/hDLEAPT3Z0

— Rob Wilson (@RobWilson_RDG) March 21, 2020

Step 2 Identify technically and politically feasible solutions

Common advice in policy analysis texts:

• Identify the relevant and feasible policy solutions that your audience/ client might consider.
• Explain potential solutions in sufficient detail to predict the costs and benefits of each ‘alternative’ (including current policy).
• Provide ‘plausible’ predictions about the future effects of current/ alternative policies.
• Identify many possible solutions, then select the ‘most promising’ for further analysis.
• Identify how governments have addressed comparable problems, and a previous policy’s impact.

Policy ‘solutions’ are better described as ‘tools’ or ‘instruments’, largely because (a) it is rare to expect them to solve a problem, and (b) governments use many instruments (in different ways, at different times) to make policy, including:

1. Public expenditure (e.g. to boost spending for emergency care, crisis services, medical equipment)
2. Economic incentives and disincentives (e.g. to reduce the cost of business or borrowing, or tax unhealthy products)
3. Linking spending to entitlement or behaviour (e.g. social security benefits conditional on working or seeking work, perhaps with the rules modified during crises)
4. Formal regulations versus voluntary agreements (e.g. making organisations close, or encouraging them to close)
5. Public services: universal or targeted, free or with charges, delivered directly or via non-governmental organisations
6. Legal sanctions (e.g. criminalising reckless behaviour)
7. Public education or advertising (e.g. as paid adverts or via media and social media)
8. Funding scientific research, and organisations to advise on policy
9. Establishing or reforming policymaking units or departments
10. Behavioural instruments, to ‘nudge’ behaviour (seemingly a big feature in the UK , such as on how to encourage handwashing).

Government #coronavirus science advisor Dr David Halpern tells me of plans to ‘cocoon’ vulnerable groups. pic.twitter.com/dhECJNbmnI

— Mark Easton (@BBCMarkEaston) March 11, 2020

As a result, what we call ‘policy’ is really a complex mix of instruments adopted by one or more governments. A truism in policy studies is that it is difficult to define or identify exactly what policy is because (a) each new instrument adds to a pile of existing measures (with often-unpredictable consequences), and (b) many instruments designed for individual sectors tend, in practice, to intersect in ways that we cannot always anticipate. When you think through any government response to the coronavirus, note how every measure is connected to many others.

Further, it is a truism in public policy that there is a gap between technical and political feasibility: the things that we think will be most likely to work as intended if implemented are often the things that would receive the least support or most opposition. For example:

1. Redistributing income and wealth to reduce socio-economic inequalities (e.g. to allay fears about the impact of current events on low-income and poverty) seems to be less politically feasible than distributing public services to deal with the consequences of health inequalities.
2. Providing information and exhortation seems more politically feasible than the direct regulation of behaviour. Indeed, compared to many other countries, the UK Government seems reluctant to introduce ‘quarantine’ style measures to restrict behaviour.

Under ‘normal’ circumstances, governments may be using these distinctions as simple heuristics to help them make modest policy changes while remaining sufficiently popular (or at least looking competent). If so, they are adding or modifying policy instruments during individual ‘windows of opportunity’ for specific action, or perhaps contributing to the sense of incremental change towards an ambitious goal.

Right now, we may be pushing the boundaries of what seems possible, since crises – and the need to address public anxiety – tend to change what seems politically feasible. However, many options that seem politically feasible may not be possible (e.g. to buy a lot of extra medical/ technology capacity quickly), or may not work as intended (e.g. to restrict the movement of people). Think of technical and political feasibility as necessary but insufficient on their own, which is a requirement that rules out a lot of responses.

Add in the UK legislation and we see that it is a major feat simply to account for all of the major moving parts (while noting that much policy change is not legislative)https://t.co/gKsIx7aHr2 pic.twitter.com/Ms6fjaDbhF

— Professor Paul Cairney (@CairneyPaul) March 31, 2020

A few 'somewhat overwritten' newspaper stories today using some of our quotes on PPE. Here is exactly what we are saying, in the tone in which we are saying it: https://t.co/j6PO420WSF

— Chris Hopson (@ChrisCEOHopson) April 13, 2020

Step 3 Use value-based criteria and political goals to compare solutions

Common advice in policy analysis texts:

• Typical value judgements relate to efficiency, equity and fairness, the trade-off between individual freedom and collective action, and the extent to which a policy process involves citizens in deliberation.
• Normative assessments are based on values such as ‘equality, efficiency, security, democracy, enlightenment’ and beliefs about the preferable balance between state, communal, and market/ individual solutions
• ‘Specify the objectives to be attained in addressing the problem and the criteria  to  evaluate  the  attainment  of  these  objectives  as  well as  the  satisfaction  of  other  key  considerations  (e.g.,  equity,  cost, equity, feasibility)’.
• ‘Effectiveness, efficiency, fairness, and administrative efficiency’ are common.
• Identify (a) the values to prioritise, such as ‘efficiency’, ‘equity’, and ‘human dignity’, and (b) ‘instrumental goals’, such as ‘sustainable public finance or political feasibility’, to generate support for solutions.
• Instrumental questions may include: Will this intervention produce the intended outcomes? Is it easy to get agreement and maintain support? Will it make me popular, or diminish trust in me even further?

How to weigh the many future health problems and deaths caused by the lockdown against those saved? How to account for the worse effects of the lockdown on the young and the poor? Near impossible ethical choices that government will have to make. https://t.co/DJgwE4b3rd

— Paul Johnson (@PJTheEconomist) April 13, 2020

Step 3 is the most simple-looking but difficult task. Remember that it is a political, not technical, process. It is also a political process that most people would like to avoid doing (at least publicly) because it involves making explicit the ways in which we prioritise some people over others. Public policy is the choice to help some people and punish or refuse to help others (and includes the choice to do nothing).

Policy analysis texts describe a relatively simple procedure of identifying criteria and producing a table (with a solution in each row, and criteria in each column) to compare the trade-offs between each solution. However, these criteria are notoriously difficult to define, and people resolve that problem by exercising power to decide what each term means, and whose interests should be served when they resolve trade-offs. For example, see Stone on whose needs come first, who benefits from each definition of fairness, and how technical-looking processes such as ‘cost benefit analysis’ mask political choices.

Right now, the most obvious and visible trade-off, accentuated in the UK, is between individual freedom and collective action, or the balance between state, communal, and market/ individual solutions. In comparison with many countries (and China and Italy in particular), the UK Government seems to be favouring individual action over state quarantine measures. However, most trade-offs are difficult to categorise

1. What should be the balance between efforts to minimise the deaths of some (generally in older populations) and maximise the wellbeing of others? This is partly about human dignity during crisis, how we treat different people fairly, and the balance of freedom and coercion.
2. How much should a government spend to keep people alive using intensive case or expensive medicines, when the money could be spent improving the lives of far more people? This is partly about human dignity, the relative efficiency of policy measures, and fairness.

If you are like me, you don’t really want to answer such questions (indeed, even writing them looks callous). If so, one way to resolve them is to elect policymakers to make such choices on our behalf (perhaps aided by experts in moral philosophy, or with access to deliberative forums). To endure, this unusually high level of deference to elected ministers requires some kind of reciprocal act:

"I hope the UK government will be transparent about its decision-making; willing to listen to NHS staff concerns; humble in learning from other countries’ experiences; and pro-active in building relationships with them."https://t.co/CYUyvij2bK

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) March 16, 2020

I agree. There is a need to show that divergent opinons in the public health/virology expert sector have been heard, debates have been had and conclusions explained. This is what I need as a citizen. Also casting the public not a bog roll stowing mob is not helpful or kind. https://t.co/g61Nypcqlc

— Sue White (@ProfSueWhite) March 14, 2020

The Guardian calls this document a “secret” briefing from Public Health England. At a time of national crisis there is no place for secrecy from health experts. If you want public support, share your data, scenarios, and forecasts. Now. https://t.co/O8BpDlCJ7H

— richard horton (@richardhorton1) March 15, 2020

I am glad Johnson has listened, but we shouldn't have to drag him kicking and screaming to these decisions. A daily update is a basic step. Transparency, honesty, compassion are vital in this time of a global crisis! no more secret briefings PM.https://t.co/eMxZnMehUp

— Dawn Butler MP✊🏾 (@DawnButlerBrent) March 16, 2020

The CSA and CMO say they will publish the models underlying their strategy on Covid-19. Sharing the data and models is important for accountability, testing and learning. https://t.co/rOuJWwy93i

— Sense about Science (@senseaboutsci) March 16, 2020

Dear Boris – Number 10 needs a professional communications operation, immediately. (Open letter to the Prime Minister. Britain has some great comms specialists. He needs to hire one of them urgently) https://t.co/8w6MBYHHbm

— Iain Martin (@iainmartin1) March 15, 2020

Just published: our letter to @TheLancet

Evidence informing the UK's COVID-19 public health response must be transparenthttps://t.co/JvAJIkjykX

— Trisha Greenhalgh 😷 #BlackLivesMatter (@trishgreenhalgh) March 17, 2020

What governments & science advisers must do now. Powerful editorial in @NatureNews calls for more openness & transparency in evidence-informed responses to #Covid19 https://t.co/LpkWGvTrcA @INGSciAdvice @Magda_Skipper @PeterGluckman

— James Wilsdon (@jameswilsdon) March 17, 2020

https://twitter.com/devisridhar/status/1240648925998178304

See also: We must all do everything in our power to protect lives (UK Secretary of State for Health and Social Care)

Still, I doubt that governments are making reportable daily choices with reference to a clear and explicit view of what the trade-offs and priorities should be, because their choices are about who will die, and their ability to predict outcomes is limited.

See also: Media experts despair at Boris Johnson’s coronavirus campaign (Sonia Sodha)

Step 4 Predict the outcome of each feasible solution.

Common advice in policy analysis texts:

• Focus on the outcomes that key actors care about (such as value for money), and quantify and visualise your predictions if possible. Compare the pros and cons of each solution, such as how much of a bad service policymakers will accept to cut costs.
• ‘Assess the outcomes of the policy options in light of the criteria and weigh trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of the options’.
• Estimate the cost of a new policy, in comparison with current policy, and in relation to factors such as savings to society or benefits to certain populations. Use your criteria and projections to compare each alternative in relation to their likely costs and benefits.
• Explain potential solutions in sufficient detail to predict the costs and benefits of each ‘alternative’ (including current policy).
• Short deadlines dictate that you use ‘logic and theory, rather than systematic empirical evidence’ to make predictions efficiently.
• Monitoring is crucial because it is difficult to predict policy success, and unintended consequences are inevitable. Try to measure the outcomes of your solution, while noting that evaluations are contested.

It is difficult to envisage a way for the UK Government to publicise the thinking behind its choices (Step 3) and predictions (Step 4) in a way that would encourage effective public deliberation, rather than a highly technical debate between a small number of academics:

Ferguson et al (link) simulate outbreak response. Positive: They show suppression (lockdown R0<1) is essential as mitigation (R0>1, “flattening the curve”) results in massive hospital overload and many dead. BUT 1/3 (review attached)https://t.co/srbBS7F1s5 pic.twitter.com/qbEymBdOqm

— Yaneer Bar-Yam (@yaneerbaryam) March 17, 2020

I’m conscious that lots of people would like to see and run the pandemic simulation code we are using to model control measures against COVID-19. To explain the background – I wrote the code (thousands of lines of undocumented C) 13+ years ago to model flu pandemics…

— neil_ferguson (@neil_ferguson) March 22, 2020

Further, people often call for the UK Government to publicise its expert advice and operational logic, but I am not sure how they would separate it from their normative logic, or provide a frank account without unintended consequences for public trust or anxiety. If so, government policy involves (a) to keep some choices implicit to avoid a lot of debate on trade-offs, and (b) to make general statements about choices when they do not know what their impact will be.

Step 5 Make a recommendation to your client

Common advice in policy analysis texts:

• Examine your case through the eyes of a policymaker. Keep it simple and concise.
• Make a preliminary recommendation to inform an iterative process, drawing feedback from clients and stakeholder groups
• Client-oriented advisors identify the beliefs of policymakers and tailor accordingly.
• ‘Unless your client asks you not to do so, you should explicitly recommend one policy’

I now invite you to make a recommendation (step 5) based on our discussion so far (steps 1-4). Define the problem with one framing at the expense of the others. Romanticise some people and not others. Decide how to support some people, and coerce or punish others. Prioritise the lives of some people in the knowledge that others will suffer or die. Do it despite your lack of expertise and profoundly limited knowledge and information. Learn from experts, but don’t assume that only scientific experts have relevant knowledge (decolonise; coproduce). Recommend choices that, if damaging, could take decades to fix after you’ve gone. Consider if a policymaker is willing and able to act on your advice, and if your proposed action will work as intended. Consider if a government is willing and able to bear the economic and political costs. Protect your client’s popularity, and trust in your client, at the same time as protecting lives. Consider if your advice would change if the problem would seem to change. If you are writing your analysis, maybe keep it down to one sheet of paper (and certainly far fewer words than in this post). Better you than me.

Please now watch this video before I suggest that things are not so simple.

Would that policy analysis were so simple

Imagine writing policy analysis in an imaginary world, in which there is a single powerful ‘rational’ policymaker at the heart of government, making policy via an orderly series of stages.

Your audience would be easy to identify at each stage, your analysis would be relatively simple, and you would not need to worry about what happens after you make a recommendation for policy change (since the selection of a solution would lead to implementation).  You could adopt a simple 5 step policy analysis method, use widely-used tools such as cost-benefit analysis to compare solutions, and know where the results would feed into the policy process.

Studies of policy analysts describe how unrealistic this expectation tends to be (Radin, Brans, Thissen).

For example, there are many policymakers, analysts, influencers, and experts spread across political systems, and engaging with 101 policy problems simultaneously, which suggests that it is not even clear how everyone fits together and interacts in what we call (for the sake of simplicity) ‘the policy process’.

Instead, we can describe real world policymaking with reference to two factors.

The wider policymaking environment: 1. Limiting the use of evidence

First, policymakers face ‘bounded rationality’, in which they only have the ability to pay attention to a tiny proportion of available facts, are unable to separate those facts from their values (since we use our beliefs to evaluate the meaning of facts), struggle to make clear and consistent choices, and do not know what impact they will have. The consequences can include:

• Limited attention, and lurches of attention. Policymakers can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of their responsibilities, and policymaking organizations struggle to process all policy-relevant information. They prioritize some issues and information and ignore the rest.
• Power and ideas. Some ways of understanding and describing the world dominate policy debate, helping some actors and marginalizing others.
• Beliefs and coalitions. Policymakers see the world through the lens of their beliefs. They engage in politics to turn their beliefs into policy, form coalitions with people who share them, and compete with coalitions who don’t.
• Dealing with complexity. They engage in ‘trial-and-error strategies’ to deal with uncertain and dynamic environments (see the new section on trial-and-error- at the end).
• Framing and narratives. Policy audiences are vulnerable to manipulation when they rely on other actors to help them understand the world. People tell simple stories to persuade their audience to see a policy problem and its solution in a particular way.
• The social construction of populations. Policymakers draw on quick emotional judgements, and social stereotypes, to propose benefits to some target populations and punishments for others.
• Rules and norms. Institutions are the formal rules and informal understandings that represent a way to narrow information searches efficiently to make choices quickly.
• Learning. Policy learning is a political process in which actors engage selectively with information, not a rational search for truth.

Evidence-based or expert-informed policymaking

Don’t think science can or should make decisions Donna. In conditions of uncertainty, it must inform decision makers who must be transparent about the choices they make and be held to account for them https://t.co/Wj4s9IS6fO

— Sir Chris Ham (@profchrisham) April 13, 2020

Put simply, policymakers cannot oversee a simple process of ‘evidence-based policymaking’. Rather, to all intents and purposes:

1. They need to find ways to ignore most evidence so that they can focus disproportionately on some. Otherwise, they will be unable to focus well enough to make choices. The cognitive and organisational shortcuts, described above, help them do it almost instantly.
2. They also use their experience to help them decide – often very quickly – what evidence is policy-relevant under the circumstances. Relevance can include:

• How it relates to the policy problem as they define it (Step 1).
• If it relates to a feasible solution (Step 2).
• If it is timely, available, understandable, and actionable.
• If it seems credible, such as from groups representing wider populations, or from people they trust.

3. They use a specific shortcut: relying on expertise.

However, the vague idea of trusting or not trusting experts is a nonsense, largely because it is virtually impossible to set a clear boundary between relevant/irrelevant experts and find a huge consensus on (exactly) what is happening and what to do. Instead, in political systems, we define the policy problem or find other ways to identify the most relevant expertise and exclude other sources of knowledge.

In the UK Government’s case, it appears to be relying primarily on expertise from its own general scientific advisers, medical and public health advisers, and – perhaps more controversially – advisers on behavioural public policy.

Not a thread but an interesting exchange on #coronavirus & Behavioural Sciences including readings from @LiamDelaneyEcon https://t.co/7Yn89XwOk6

— Brigid Laffan (@BrigidLaffan) March 23, 2020

Here’s my article on why I wish my fellow psychologists and “behavioural scientists” would just stop talking about the coronavirus: https://t.co/ofjJWdIY9v

— Stuart Ritchie (@StuartJRitchie) March 31, 2020

Right now, it is difficult to tell exactly how and why it relies on each expert (at least when the expert is not in a clearly defined role, in which case it would be irresponsible not to consider their advice). Further, there are regular calls on Twitter for ministers to be more open about their decisions.

Key point from @jameswilsdon 'It is problematic if political choices are being made and then the science advice system has to front them up. There needs to be a clearer sense of where science advice ends and political judgement begins.'https://t.co/TjLCJDZijO via @timeshighered

— Emmeline Ledgerwood (@EmmeLedgerwood) March 26, 2020

See also: Coronavirus: do governments ever truly listen to ‘the science’?

However, don’t underestimate the problems of identifying why we make choices, then justifying one expert or another (while avoiding pointless arguments), or prioritising one form of advice over another. Look, for example, at the kind of short-cuts that intelligent people use, which seem sensible enough, but would receive much more intense scrutiny if presented in this way by governments:

• Sophisticated speculation by experts in a particular field, shared widely (look at the RTs), but questioned by other experts in another field:

2. This all assumes I'm correct in what I think the govt are doing and why. I could be wrong – and wouldn't be surprised. But it looks to me like. . .

— Professor Ian Donald 3.5% (@iandonald_psych) March 13, 2020

As many have said, it would be good to get an official version of this, with acknowledged uncertainties and sources of evidence https://t.co/jxgoysYb3L

— David Spiegelhalter (@d_spiegel) March 14, 2020

But what happened is that they have as a group fallen into a logical error in their attempts to model what will bring this epidemic under control. They have not appreciated that the answer to this question is adaptive behavior change. 3/17

— daniel falush (@DanielFalush) March 15, 2020

A fiasco in the making? As the coronavirus pandemic takes hold, we are making decisions without reliable data
Op-ed in @statnews by John Ioannidis @METRICStanfordhttps://t.co/La793K2Bio

— METRICStanford (@METRICStanford) March 17, 2020

Couldn't concentrate on anything else so here's my rebuttal to Ioannidis' opinion piece in @statnews "A fiasco in the making?" My conclusion: pay more attention to people who have done their homework on pandemics https://t.co/pWMzPu2Bqq @mlipsitch @METRICStanford @globalhlthtwit pic.twitter.com/Mn4LsOoUwX

— Hilda Bastian (@hildabast) March 18, 2020

It would be really helpful to project risk of covid death with and without mitigation strategies? Possible to map with inside / outside projections (ie what we gain/ don’t gain with current measures ?)

— Margaret McCartney (@mgtmccartney) March 22, 2020

• Experts in one field trusting certain experts in another field based on personal or professional interaction:

Lots of concern about UK's approach to #COVID19. I'm not an epidemiologist or a virologist (=> can't judge the detail) but I knew Patrick Vallance before he was famous and I believe he is a man of integrity. Same for Chris Whitty. Science, not politics, is driving their thinking.

— Trisha Greenhalgh 😷 #BlackLivesMatter (@trishgreenhalgh) March 14, 2020

• Experts in one field not trusting a government’s approach based on its use of one (of many) sources of advice:

Why is UK government listening to the ‘nudge unit’ on the pandemic, and not expert epidemiologists and the WHO? You would think the ‘anti-experts’ approach would have at least on this occasion, with so many lives at risk, given way to a scientific approach https://t.co/QZIicXYpsj

— Mariana Mazzucato (@MazzucatoM) March 13, 2020

• Experts representing a community of experts, criticising another expert (Prof John Ashton), for misrepresenting the amount of expert scepticism of government experts (yes, I am trying to confuse you):

The Chief Medical Officer @CMO_England and his team have the 100% support and backing of the Public Health community. Every DPH I know thinks he is doing an amazing job in difficult circumstances
Sorry but JRA is just demonstrating he is out of touch on this https://t.co/ExmOjEgum0

— greg fell FFPH (@felly500) March 12, 2020

• Expert debate on how well policymakers are making policy based on expert advice

Disagree.

Not much audible consensus amongst scientists anywhere for UK approach. Science can only illuminate value judgements yet now used a shield for determining them. UK science advice has always been characterised by old boys, political operators. Blurring is concerning. https://t.co/iBt07QfvqH

— Michael Veale (@mikarv) March 16, 2020

• Finding quite-sensible ways to trust certain experts over others, such as because they can be held to account in some way (and may be relatively worried about saying any old shit on the internet):

My current approach to making sense of conflicting expert opinion on #coronavirus: no expert is infallible, but some are accountable and others are not, and I will value the opinions of those who are accountable above the opinions of those who are not.

— Duncan Hothersall🌹 (@dhothersall) March 14, 2020

• Keeping lists of people who seem to know what they are talking about (or reporting lists of people who sign a letter)

I've also been adding to my twitter list of experts: epidemiologists; virologists; statisticians; science journalists etc… https://t.co/samyKAT7NX

— Sam Freedman (@Samfr) March 14, 2020

There are many more examples in which the shortcut to expertise is fine, but not particularly better than another shortcut (and likely to include a disproportionately high number of white men with STEM backgrounds).

Update: of course, they are better than the volume trumps expertise approach:

Piers Morgan got owned by an expert.

“I’m not sure where your master’s in public health came from, Piers.” pic.twitter.com/Iil9mMKBCK

— Ben (@Jamin2g) March 16, 2020

See also:

"It is a national scandal." I transcribed some devastating key quotes from @richardhorton1 when he recently appeared on BBC Question Time to discuss the UK government's response to coronavirus https://t.co/SQ4mSb5QQo @medialens @ToryFibs @GreenRupertRead

— Ian Sinclair (@IanJSinclair) April 1, 2020

Coronavirus is the greatest global science policy failure in a generation | Richard Horton https://t.co/WmVEueiMlg

— Anne Glover (@AnneGlover_EU) April 10, 2020

Further, in each case, we may be receiving this expert advice via many other people, and by the time it gets to us the meaning is lost or reversed (or there is some really sophisticated expert analysis of something rumoured – not demonstrated – to be true):

This meme is spreading (you could say, in a not very funny joke, that it has gone viral). The WHO Director-General did not say this (brief thread). https://t.co/3eMfy70tKZ

— James Chalmers (@ProfChalmers) March 14, 2020

For what it’s worth, I tend to favour experts who:

(a) establish the boundaries of their knowledge, (b) admit to high uncertainty about the overall problem:

After having spent considerable time thinking how to mitigate and manage this pandemic, and analysing the available data. I failed to identify the best course of action. Even worse, I'm not sure there is such a thing as an acceptable solution to the problem we are facing. (2/12)

— Prof Francois Balloux (@BallouxFrancois) March 14, 2020

https://twitter.com/robertstats/status/1245665871961436160

I would challenge anyone to provide an accurate estimate of prevalence. The difference between models & real life is that with models we can set the parameters as if they are known. In real life these parameters are as clear as mud.
Extract 04/13/2020
https://t.co/Qg2OrCo8tR

— Silvio Funtowicz (@SFuntowicz) April 12, 2020

(c) (in this case) make it clear that they are working on scenarios, not simple prediction

I am deeply uncomfortable with the message that UK is actively pursuing ‘herd immunity’ as the main COVID-19 strategy. Our group’s scenario modelling has focused on reducing two main things: peak healthcare demand and deaths… 1/

— Adam Kucharski (@AdamJKucharski) March 14, 2020

"Prediction models are just estimates of what might happen and a model is only as good as the data that goes into it." https://t.co/KXDILsbZgr via @ConversationUK

— Stephen Khan (@StephenKhan) April 9, 2020

(d) examine critically the too-simple ideas that float around, such as the idea that the UK Government should emulate ‘what works’ somewhere else

It's easy to say 'let's just do what Wuhan did', but the measures there have involved a change to daily life that really has been unimaginable in scale and impact. And as we've seen, China cannot sustain them indefinitely. 3/

— Adam Kucharski (@AdamJKucharski) March 12, 2020

A lot of my colleagues in the @LSHTM modelling centre (@cmmid_lshtm) have been working extremely hard to help expand the COVID-19 evidence base over the past two months. I'd like to take a moment to highlight some of their work… 1/

— Adam Kucharski (@AdamJKucharski) March 15, 2020

8. There's no gotcha-ism. Updating your models and predictions in light of new evidence and new inferential methods and insightful counterpoints from colleagues isn't a sign of weakness, it's *doing science*.

— Carl T. Bergstrom (@CT_Bergstrom) March 26, 2020

Short thread

Why is [insert country of choice] not doing what [insert country of choice] is doing? Well, perhaps there is another question to ask first.

— Paul Gray (@PAG1962) March 16, 2020

Read our new piece: "A call to honesty in pandemic modeling", with @ChikinaLab:https://t.co/kCOWxgxRl6

The basic message? Hiding infections in the future is not the same as avoiding them. pic.twitter.com/L9NP2U6T3i

— Wes Pegden (@WesPegden) March 30, 2020

I do not agree with this interpretation. Multiple papers that tested people at high risk found that asymptomatic infection is relatively uncommon, in the range of 6-32%. https://t.co/gv5e2upEwz

— Caitlin Rivers, PhD (@cmyeaton) April 3, 2020

(e) situate their own position (in Prof Sridhar’s case, for mass testing) within a broader debate

Scientific community is well-intentioned but split in two camps: one argues why sacrifice short-term social/economic well-being if everyone will get virus regardless, & other which says we have to buy time in short-term & save lives now while figuring out exit plan.

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) March 29, 2020

How much effort does your govt want to put into suppressing this outbreak? There is no quick fix or easy solution. S.Korea & Germany show what huge govt effort, planning, strong leadership, & doing utmost to protect population look like. Do everything v. do minimum.

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) March 27, 2020

Been saying 3 objectives for weeks. Not to attack anyone, but to highlight what we have learned so far:
1. Testing, tracing, isolating
2. Protect health workers with PPE & testing
3. Buy time for NHS

We are moving but too slowly it seems https://t.co/CYUyvij2bK

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) March 29, 2020

Another reason why testing isnt the panacea we all hope it might be

The issue of false negative is *a bit* important

Again this nuance is missing from mainstream media https://t.co/hOo3upS3w8

— greg fell FFPH (@felly500) April 5, 2020

Two weeks ago Boris Johnson said Britain was aiming to eventually test 250,000 people a day. The reality is still far off the aspiration https://t.co/2SHX40B9Ul

— The Economist (@TheEconomist) April 5, 2020

See also:

https://twitter.com/war_student/status/1245756010645553152

See also: Prof Sir John Bell (4.3.20) on why an accurate antibody test is at least one month away and these exchanges on the problems with test ‘accuracy’:

maybe best to avoid the term ‘accurate’ altogether when it comes to diagnostic/screening tests – it’s very ambiguous https://t.co/CRfQD5O1bR https://t.co/zSJFB3yfhj

— David Spiegelhalter (@d_spiegel) April 7, 2020

My new blog on whether Covid raises everyone’s relative risk of dying by a similar amount. https://t.co/76NSNuDJ3i Latest ONS data shows that, of recent death registrations, the proportion linked to Covid does not depend on age.

— David Spiegelhalter (@d_spiegel) April 11, 2020

(f) use their expertise on governance to highlight problems with thoughtless criticism

me getting stroppy on dumb briefing wars inside governnment – the last thing we need now @FT https://t.co/9olCcfIXvT

— Jill Rutter (@jillongovt) April 3, 2020

However, note that most of these experts are from a very narrow social background, and from very narrow scientific fields (first in modelling, then likely in testing), despite the policy problem being largely about (a) who, and how many people, a government should try to save, and (b) how far a government should go to change behaviour to do it (Update 2.4.20: I wrote that paragraph before adding so many people to the list). It is understandable to defer in this way during a crisis, but it also contributes to a form of ‘depoliticisation’ that masks profound choices that benefit some people and leave others vulnerable to harm.

See also: COVID-19: a living systematic map of the evidence

See also: To what extent does evidence support decision making during infectious disease outbreaks? A scoping literature review

See also: Covid-19: why is the UK government ignoring WHO’s advice? (British Medical Journal editorial)

See also: Coronavirus: just 2,000 NHS frontline workers tested so far

Challenging piece on experts as patsies during #COVID19, by Matthew Flinders & Gergana Dimova @PolStudiesAssoc @_UoW @PoliticalSpike @sheffielduni https://t.co/7hWAqEm4fW

— Louis M M Coiffait (@LouisMMCoiffait) April 6, 2020

See also: ‘What’s important is social distancing’ coronavirus testing ‘is a side issue’, says Deputy Chief Medical Officer [Professor Jonathan Van-Tam talks about the important distinction between a currently available test to see if someone has contracted the virus (an antigen test) and a forthcoming test to see if someone has had and recovered from COVID-19 (an antibody test)]. The full interview is here (please feel free to ignore the editorialising of the uploader):

See also: Why is Germany able to test for coronavirus so much more than the UK? (which is mostly a focus on Germany’s innovation and partly on the UK (Public Health England) focus on making sure its test is reliable, in the context of ‘coronavirus tests produced at great speed which have later proven to be inaccurate’ (such as one with a below-30% accuracy rate, which is worse than not testing at all). Compare with The Coronavirus Hit Germany And The UK Just Days Apart But The Countries Have Responded Differently. Here’s How and the Opinion piece ‘A public inquiry into the UK’s coronavirus response would find a litany of failures‘

🇩🇪 Germany
▪️More ICU beds per capita than any other country
▪️500,000 tests a week
▪️Treatment of mild symptoms

🇬🇧 UK
▪️5 times less ICU beds per capita than Germany
▪️200,000 tests in total
▪️No treatment of mild symptoms

My @BylineTimesSubs article. https://t.co/bhI1lzawYV

— James Melville (@JamesMelville) April 12, 2020

We might need to change our criteria to decide on capacity and resources. COVID-19 showed that the standard CEO approach of doing more with less is no good. German planners have apparently safely ignored this holy managerial mantra. @Breconomics https://t.co/MKi3f1Pueq

— Martin O'Flaherty (@moflaher) April 13, 2020

Cross country comparisons of the efficacy of anti covid19 policies are going to be hard. There are so many likely inputs; and data on them is scarce and noisy.

— Tony Yates (@t0nyyates) April 12, 2020

The UK Govts chief medical officer has conceded that Germany “got ahead” in testing people for Covid-19 and said the UK needed to learn from that.
Ministers have been challenged repeatedly during the pandemic over their failure to increase testing. https://t.co/V0bgcMR7l0

— SHA Scotland (@shascotland) April 8, 2020

Tweeps, your homework for today is to study this infographic. No tweeting about #testing till you’ve understood it.
Via @pash22 pic.twitter.com/NtZIxAtTSD

— Trisha Greenhalgh 😷 #BlackLivesMatter (@trishgreenhalgh) April 3, 2020

On the politics of evidence – a critical take on the use of models & math @oliver_kathryn @CairneyPaul @AdeleCassola @evelynedeleeuw @ProfKatSmith @justinparkhurst https://t.co/znBhjfkrwg

— Patrick Fafard (@FafardPatrick) April 1, 2020

Covid-19: What is the UK’s testing strategy
4 essential questions https://t.co/Wva4MsKq9Z

— greg fell FFPH (@felly500) March 26, 2020

See also: Rights and responsibilities in the Coronavirus pandemic

He says there is not as much scrutiny as we might normally wish and says concerns raised about human rights, the length of powers and need for safeguards should be heeded in Westminster. He also commits to legislate for reporting requirements for use of powers by SG 4/5

— Jess Sargeant (@Jess_Sargeant) March 19, 2020

Glad Scottish Government recognise need for ethical guidance on Covid 19, and hope they can say more on human rights in next version https://t.co/GiyTd2Xksu

— Colin McKay (@colinimckay) April 6, 2020

Everything has changed – including our democracy — Unlock Democracy https://t.co/s5BlKAyZHQ

— Open Govt Network NI (@OpenGovNI) April 13, 2020

See also: UK police warned against ‘overreach’ in use of virus lockdown powers (although note that there is no UK police force and that Scotland has its own legal system) and Coronavirus: extra police powers risk undermining public trust (Alex Oaten and Chris Allen)

Criminal Bar strongly opposed to ‘draconian’ proposals, including extension of time limits and no trial by jury https://t.co/qisFST3RfR @ScottishCBA @ScotGovJustice #CriminalJustice #coronavirus

— Faculty of Advocates (@FacultyScot) March 31, 2020

I am pleased to see the police are adopting a policing by consent reasonable approach in these new guidelines.

UK coronavirus lockdown: police reissued with guidance on enforcement https://t.co/7MxwbCQZCU

— Robin Murray (@robinthemint) April 8, 2020

This is an excellent initiative from @policescotland – commissioning @johndscott to provide independent scrutiny of new Coronavirus Emergency Powers. Policing is by consent of the people, this step hopefully gives further public reassurance on the application of powers https://t.co/6MtrqdTqIm

— Humza Yousaf (@HumzaYousaf) April 9, 2020

See also (Calderwood resigned as CMO that night):

Chief Constable @CC_Livingstone statement on the conduct of the Chief Medical Officer. pic.twitter.com/oTkCyk6xzd

— Police Scotland (@policescotland) April 5, 2020

See also: Social Licensing of Privacy-Encroaching Policies to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic (U.K.) (research on public opinion)

Unprecedented restrictions are in force in order to limit social contact and slow the spread of the coronavirus. But the govt and police must make clear what is enforceable and what is guidance if they are to retain the trust and confidence of the public https://t.co/ieLcg2qVE5 pic.twitter.com/mBOK2fppH2

— Institute for Gov (@instituteforgov) April 5, 2020

The wider policymaking environment: 2. Limited control

Second, policymakers engage in a messy and unpredictable world in which no single ‘centre’ has the power to turn a policy recommendation into an outcome. I normally use the following figure to think through the nature of a complex and unwieldy policymaking environment of which no ‘centre’ of government has full knowledge or control.

It helps us identify (further) the ways in which we can reject the idea that the UK Prime Minister and colleagues can fully understand and solve policy problems:

Actors. The environment contains many policymakers and influencers spread across many levels and types of government (‘venues’).

For example, consider how many key decisions that (a) have been made by organisations not in the UK central government, and (b) are more or less consistent with its advice, including:

• Devolved governments announcing their own healthcare and public health responses (although the level of UK coordination seems more significant than the level of autonomy).
• Public sector employers initiating or encouraging at-home working (and many Universities moving quickly from in-person to online teaching)
• Private organisations cancelling cultural and sporting events.

There’s some coverage today suggesting Scotland proposing different policy to rest of UK on over 70s. This isn’t so. The policy of social distancing, not isolation, set out here by @jasonleitch is the policy all 4 nations have been discussing at COBR – and will do so again today. https://t.co/D89nwUDZTb

— Nicola Sturgeon (@NicolaSturgeon) March 16, 2020

This is interesting, particularly the contrast with the approach to Brexit. The key difference is that Brexit blurred the boundaries between reserved and devolved competences in a way that health does not. https://t.co/4kSIcQFmJf

— Aileen McHarg (@AileenMcHarg) April 8, 2020

Context and events. Policy solutions relate to socioeconomic context and events which can be impossible to ignore and out of the control of policymakers. The coronavirus, and its impact on so many aspects on population health and wellbeing, is an extreme example of this problem.

Networks, Institutions, and Ideas. Policymakers and influencers operate in subsystems (specialist parts of political systems). They form networks or coalitions built on the exchange of resources or facilitated by trust underpinned by shared beliefs or previous cooperation. Many different parts of government have practices driven by their own formal and informal rules. Formal rules are often written down or known widely. Informal rules are the unwritten rules, norms and practices that are difficult to understand, and may not even be understood in the same way by participants. Political actors relate their analysis to shared understandings of the world – how it is, and how it should be – which are often so established as to be taken for granted. These dominant frames of reference establish the boundaries of the political feasibility of policy solutions.  These kinds of insights suggest that most policy decisions are considered, made, and delivered in the name of – but not in the full knowledge of – government ministers.

Trial and error policymaking in complex policymaking systems (17.3.20)

One way of viewing the UK's COVID-19 policy is that it changed to reflect changing evidence. That is fair; it's both how science-guided policy *should* work, and how I think the govt's advisors are seeing it, as per the Imperial paper. But… 1/

— Ed Yong (@edyong209) March 17, 2020

There are many ways to conceptualise this policymaking environment, but few theories provide specific advice on what to do, or how to engage effectively in it. One notable exception is the general advice that comes from complexity theory, including:

• Law-like behaviour is difficult to identify – so a policy that was successful in one context may not have the same effect in another.
• Policymaking systems are difficult to control; policy makers should not be surprised when their policy interventions do not have the desired effect.
• Policy makers in the UK have been too driven by the idea of order, maintaining rigid hierarchies and producing top-down, centrally driven policy strategies.  An attachment to performance indicators, to monitor and control local actors, may simply result in policy failure and demoralised policymakers.
• Policymaking systems or their environments change quickly. Therefore, organisations must adapt quickly and not rely on a single policy strategy.

On this basis, there is a tendency in the literature to encourage the delegation of decision-making to local actors:

1. Rely less on central government driven targets, in favour of giving local organisations more freedom to learn from their experience and adapt to their rapidly-changing environment.
2. To deal with uncertainty and change, encourage trial-and-error projects, or pilots, that can provide lessons, or be adopted or rejected, relatively quickly.
3. Encourage better ways to deal with alleged failure by treating ‘errors’ as sources of learning (rather than a means to punish organisations) or setting more realistic parameters for success/ failure (although see this example and this comment).
4. Encourage a greater understanding, within the public sector, of the implications of complex systems and terms such as ‘emergence’ or ‘feedback loops’.

In other words, this literature, when applied to policymaking, tends to encourage a movement from centrally driven targets and performance indicators towards a more flexible understanding of rules and targets by local actors who are more able to understand and adapt to rapidly-changing local circumstances.

[See also: Complex systems and systems thinking]

Now, just imagine the UK Government taking that advice right now. I think it is fair to say that it would be condemned continuously (even more so than right now). Maybe that is because it is the wrong way to make policy in times of crisis. Maybe it is because too few people are willing and able to accept that the role of a small group of people at the centre of government is necessarily limited, and that effective policymaking requires trial-and-error rather than a single, fixed, grand strategy to be communicated to the public. The former highlights policy that changes with new information and perspective. The latter highlights errors of judgement, incompetence, and U-turns. In either case, the advice is changing as estimates of the coronavirus’ impact change:

Bloody hell. This is extraordinary. https://t.co/ZejfSQcO0Y pic.twitter.com/frNM09Z2bL

— Duncan Weldon (@DuncanWeldon) March 16, 2020

Result of the Imperial COVID model
Hat @andrewleedr
It doesnt make for pleasant reading

Cc @DrChrisGibbons ICYM https://t.co/iz9qBNZ6Q8

— greg fell FFPH (@felly500) March 17, 2020

I think this tension, in the way that we understand UK government, helps explain some of the criticism that it faces when changing its advice to reflect changes in its data or advice. This criticism becomes intense when people also question the competence or motives of ministers (and even people reporting the news) more generally, leading to criticism that ranges from mild to outrageous:

The science has not shifted at all. https://t.co/GGXIBHtzJV

— Will Jennings 🗳 (@drjennings) March 17, 2020

Incredible detail in this FT story: up until last week, the UK was basing its coronavirus control policy on a model based on hospitalisation rates for 😲a different disease😲 with lower rates of intensive care need than coronavirus pic.twitter.com/7rJYh9sqg2

— Tom Hancock (@hancocktom) March 16, 2020

Laura Kuenssberg says (BBC) that, “The science has changed.” This is not true. The science has been the same since January. What has changed is that govt advisors have at last understood what really took place in China and what is now taking place in Italy. It was there to see.

— richard horton (@richardhorton1) March 17, 2020

We can’t keep changing our #COVID19 control policies whenever the results of the “mathematical modelling” change. We need to implement standard WHO-approved epidemic control policies hard and fast, as well as providing more support to frontline NHS staff. https://t.co/HAM9OqbmqW

— Prof. Azeem Majeed (@Azeem_Majeed) March 17, 2020

There may be perfectly valid or at least debatable reasons for each but obfuscation does not help public to understand uncertainty around decisions. In other words, not communicating rationale = incompetence (as in incompetent in terms of state craft, not nec individual decision)

— Stefanie Ettelt (@s_ettelt) March 29, 2020

One wonders if Brit leaders have decided that the ultimate way to cut national budgets is to cull the herd of the weak, those who require costly NHS care, and pray for "herd immunity" among the rest.
Cruel, cost effective #COVID19 strategy?@richardhorton1

— Laurie Garrett (@Laurie_Garrett) March 17, 2020

For me, this casual reference to a government policy to ‘cull the heard of the weak’ is outrageous, but you can find much worse on Twitter. It reflects wider debate on whether ‘herd immunity’ is or is not government policy. Much of it relates to interpretation of government statements, based on levels of trust/distrust in the UK Government, its Prime Minister and Secretaries of State, and the Prime Minister’s special adviser

I have enormous respect for the SAGE team and scientific advisors trying to understand the situation & inform the UK's response. If this article is accurate & partisan hacks were deliberately sacrificing lives based on their information, its scandalous. A week ago I was saying… https://t.co/WYsHbj6o0a

— Justin Parkhurst (@justinparkhurst) March 22, 2020

If you read the whole article you will see that Dominic Cummings has been, for the last 10 days, the most zealous advocate of a tough lockdown. Which is what his critics seem to want. The world is not black and white

— Tim Shipman (@ShippersUnbound) March 22, 2020

However, I think that some of it is also about:

1. Wilful misinterpretation (particularly on Twitter). For example, in the early development and communication of policy, Boris Johnson was accused (in an irresponsibly misleading way) of advocating for herd immunity rather than restrictive measures.

See: Here is the transcript of what Boris Johnson said on This Morning about the new coronavirus (Full Fact)

Below is one of the most misleading videos of its type. Look at how it cuts each segment into a narrative not provided by ministers or their advisors (see also this stinker):

The herd immunity strategy would’ve likely caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. They even told us so.

Tories must listen or face the consequences!pic.twitter.com/LaMxnI6EMf

— Shamil Esq, UBI now to save people! (@Shamils18) March 26, 2020

See also:

Coronavirus: UK's initial COVID-19 plan would have been 'catastrophic', says Donald Trump https://t.co/XnRfHIIRKq

— SkyNews (@SkyNews) April 1, 2020

2. The accentuation of a message not being emphasised by government spokespeople.

See for example this interview, described by Sky News (13.3.20) as: The government’s chief scientific adviser Sir Patrick Vallance has told Sky News that about 60% of people will need to become infected with coronavirus in order for the UK to enjoy “herd immunity”. You might be forgiven for thinking that he was on Sky extolling the virtues of a strategy to that end (and expressing sincere concerns on that basis). This was certainly the write-up in respected papers like the FT (UK’s chief scientific adviser defends ‘herd immunity’ strategy for coronavirus). Yet, he was saying nothing of the sort. Rather, when prompted, he discussed herd immunity in relation to the belief that COVID-19 will endure long enough to become as common as seasonal flu.

The same goes for Vallance’s interview on the same day (13.3.20) during Radio 4’s Today programme (transcribed by the Spectator, which calls Vallance the author, and gives it the headline “How ‘herd immunity’ can help fight coronavirus” as if it is his main message). The Today Programme also tweeted only 30 seconds to single out that brief exchange:

Sir Patrick Vallance, the govt chief scientific adviser, says the thinking behind current approach to #coronavirus is to try and "reduce the peak" and to build up a "degree of herd immunity so that more people are immune to the disease". #R4Today

More: https://t.co/1FmqX3WPh7 pic.twitter.com/pMHknCAobr

— BBC Radio 4 Today (@BBCr4today) March 13, 2020

Yet, clearly his overall message – in this and other interviews – was that some interventions (e.g. staying at home; self-isolating with symptoms) would have bigger effects than others (e.g. school closures; prohibiting mass gatherings) during the ‘flattening of the peak’ strategy (‘What we don’t want is everybody to end up getting it in a short period of time so that we swamp and overwhelm NHS services’). Rather than describing ‘herd immunity’ as a strategy, he is really describing how to deal with its inevitability (‘Well, I think that we will end up with a number of people getting it’).

See also: British government wants UK to acquire coronavirus ‘herd immunity’, writes Robert Peston (12.3.20) and live debates (and reports grasping at straws) on whether or not ‘herd immunity’ was the goal of the UK government:

Narrator: It wasn’t misunderstood https://t.co/svkHwtGhm1

— John McTernan (@johnmcternan) March 29, 2020

See also: Why weren’t we ready? (Harry Lambert) which is a good exemplar of the ‘U turn’ argument, and compare with the evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee (CMO Whitty, DCMO Harries) that it describes.

Despite what @MattHancock says, the UK government's policy is still herd immunity via @globalhlthtwit https://t.co/Zh1qcQV0qP

— Ash Paul (@pash22) April 3, 2020

Saturday’s TIMES: “PM’s virus adviser calls for way out of lockdown” #BBCPapers #TomorrowsPapersToday pic.twitter.com/LF0ZIjNKbF

— Allie Hodgkins-Brown (@AllieHBNews) April 3, 2020

A more careful forensic analysis (such as this one) will try to relate each government choice to the ways in which key advisory bodies (such as the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group, NERVTAG) received and described evidence on the current nature of the problem:

For anyone who thinks it was all obvious in January and February reading these minutes is a sobering experience. What comes over is the real uncertainty about what could be foretold from the Chinese experience and the ease with which the disease could be transmitted.4/n

— Lawrence Freedman (@LawDavF) March 27, 2020

This is the most convincing account of the 'herd immunity' narrative that I have read. https://t.co/YnU3Pk84Xc

— Professor Paul Cairney (@CairneyPaul) April 1, 2020

https://twitter.com/SpinningHugo/status/1244570733566664705

See also: Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about coronavirus – but they were slow to sound the alarm (Reuters)

Some aspects may also be clearer when there is systematic qualitative interview data on which to draw. Right now, there are bits and pieces of interviews sandwiched between whopping great editorial discussions (e.g. FT Alphaville Imperial’s Neil Ferguson: “We don’t have a clear exit strategy”; compare with the more useful Let’s flatten the coronavirus confusion curve) or confused accounts by people speaking to someone who has spoken to someone else (e.g. Buzzfeed Even The US Is Doing More Coronavirus Tests Than The UK. Here Are The Reasons Why).

See also: other rabbit holes are available

Toby Young 'expert'. Nobody, including the Oxford team, believes this is true. Shame on The Sun for publishing this irresponsible rubbish. Shame on Toby Young for cynical misrepresentation of the science. pic.twitter.com/17hrOPW9b8

— Will Jennings 🗳 (@drjennings) April 12, 2020

[OK, that proved to be a big departure from the trial-and-error discussion. Here we are, back again]

In some cases, maybe people are making the argument that trial-and-error is the best way to respond quickly, and adapt quickly, in a crisis but that the UK Government version is not what, say, the WHO thinks of as good kind of adaptive response. It is not possible to tell, at least from the general ways in which they justify acting quickly.

Dr Michael J Ryan, Executive Director at WHO. An off the cuff answer to a question at today's virtual press conference. Inspiring stuff! pic.twitter.com/Q4EUs8V1dG

— Stephen Taylor (@Prof_S_Taylor) March 13, 2020

"This is still a very new virus, and we are learning all the time.

As the pandemic evolves, so does the evidence, and so does our advice."

–@DrTedros at @WHO #COVID19 briefing on 01 April. #coronavirus pic.twitter.com/sxffb1KmLo

— Global Health Strategies (@GHS) April 1, 2020

See also the BBC’s provocative question (which I expect to be replaced soon):

Coronavirus: Have UK experts over-egged deaths? https://t.co/yITMx3nriC

— BBC News (UK) (@BBCNews) March 21, 2020

Compare with:

https://twitter.com/TimHarford/status/1244958258630139905

The take home messages

1. The coronavirus is an extreme example of a general situation: policymakers will always have very limited knowledge of policy problems and control over their policymaking environment. They make choices to frame problems narrowly enough to seem solvable, rule out most solutions as not feasible, make value judgements to try help some more than others, try to predict the results, and respond when the results to not match their hopes or expectations.
2. This is not a message of doom and despair. Rather, it encourages us to think about how to influence government, and hold policymakers to account, in a thoughtful and systematic way that does not mislead the public or exacerbate the problem we are seeing.

BLOG: Modernity without its clothes: the pandemic crisis shines a light on futilities of control | Andy Stirlinghttps://t.co/h9bK7upQsL#COVID19 #uncertainty
(Image: Rob Oo / cc-by 2.0) pic.twitter.com/nopphJ6oGW

— STEPS Centre (@stepscentre) April 7, 2020

Further reading, until I can think of a better conclusion:

This series of ‘750 words’ posts summarises key texts in policy analysis and tries to situate policy analysis in a wider political and policymaking context. Note the focus on whose knowledge counts, which is not yet a big feature of this crisis.

These series of 500 words and 1000 words posts (with podcasts) summarise concepts and theories in policy studies.

This page on evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) uses those insights to demonstrate why EBPM is  a political slogan rather than a realistic expectation.

These recorded talks relate those insights to common questions asked by researchers: why do policymakers seem to ignore my evidence, and what can I do about it? I’m happy to record more (such as on the topic you just read about) but not entirely sure who would want to hear what.

What do feminists have to say on #COVID19. A thread on Resources from (mostly) Global South thinkers.

— Dr Rama S. Dieng (@Drsaalajeng) March 29, 2020

See also: Advisers, Governments and why blunders happen? (Colin Talbot)

Government: Centralism and Localism in the Covid Crisis https://t.co/PZBXtaSIrf

— Prof Colin Talbot (@colinrtalbot) April 12, 2020

See also: Why we might disagree about … Covid-19 (Ruth Dixon and Christopher Hood)

My new blog on how governments should handle risks – and why the UK government wasn't better prepared. https://t.co/TCpfPLWW85

— Geoff Mulgan (@geoffmulgan) April 13, 2020

See also: Pandemic Science and Politics (Daniel Sarewitz)

See also: We knew this would happen. So why weren’t we ready? (Steve Bloomfield)

The scientific response to COVID-19 demands speed. But changing incentives and norms in academic science may be pushing the enterprise toward fast science at the expense of good science. Read Dan Sarewitz's editor's journal in the Spring 2020 ISSUES: https://t.co/JSSS45eTze

— Issues in Science and Technology (@ISSUESinST) April 7, 2020

See also: Europe’s coronavirus lockdown measures compared (Politico)

“This ‘colonial hangover’ needs to stop.” –@DrTedros Yes. At long last, yes. https://t.co/SN0yzV3GrB

— Sherrilyn Ifill (@Sifill_LDF) April 7, 2020

'Making sense of a crisis is one of the hardest tasks in crisis management.' @MartinLodge and @arjenboin analyse the challenges for global leaders amid a pandemic such as #COVID19. https://t.co/MS7cWwpWO7

— LSE Government (@LSEGovernment) March 26, 2020

#politvirus Public Health has always been #political because it’s actions impact on politics, economics, commercial interests, personal freedoms – this becomes most obvious in crisis – it will be key to analyse the political responses to #Covid_19 if we want to be better prepared https://t.co/JkUZrVeAxv

— Ilona Kickbusch (@IlonaKickbusch) March 29, 2020

An assessment of the Government's response to date – written by Chair of Global Health at Edinburgh University..Prof Devi Sridhar https://t.co/N31QtFmQ2p

— Rowena Arshad (@rowenaarshad) March 24, 2020

Coronavirus: Boris Johnson's Covid-19 Response Is a Fiasco – Bloomberg https://t.co/j151616wi9

— Patrick Dunleavy (@PJDunleavy) April 3, 2020

This is a really important paper. Partisanship is a huge influence on timing of state public health measures- Republican governors and Trump majorities slow adoption of measures. This might have big mortality effects in a few weeks. https://t.co/BEOAM69aSw

— Scott Greer (@scottlgreer) March 28, 2020

One reason Germany has so many ventilators (and intensive care beds) given in The Times: Not just more money in the system but design of hospital payment rates through the insurance system has driven up ICU investment be hospital managers pic.twitter.com/7R062IJI2k

— Simon Jeffrey (@sjeffrey01) March 29, 2020

This is worrying. Singapore was held up as one of the models for how to control #COVID19 through a sophisticated programme of testing and tracing without having to resort to the kinds of lockdowns many other countries are going through. https://t.co/6R0LY4IhuO

— Ed Conway (@EdConwaySky) April 3, 2020

Yesterday I asked @nicolasturgeon why Scotland had stopped contact tracing against @WHO recommendations.

She suggested I had got this wrong.

Also yesterday, here is @WHO on the importance of contact tracing and breaking the chains of transmission. https://t.co/T71javVdGp

— Ciaran Jenkins (@C4Ciaran) April 3, 2020

Epidemiologists at Public Health Agency of Sweden (a country that has not locked down) are sceptical of Imperial College #coronavirus modelling that led to UK lockdown (from @ObserverUK)👇https://t.co/QmTz949OWw pic.twitter.com/RlSfs86paR

— Ben Chu (@BenChu_) March 29, 2020

Today’s reflection- A number of Swedes are pretty shit at social distancing and probably need at least a modicum of discipline- the notion that we should be so very different here is ludicrous

— Annika Rosamond (@BergmanRosamond) April 3, 2020

Worrisome signs for Sweden’s minimalist approach to pandemic response. https://t.co/BT0bnXZurU

— Carl T. Bergstrom (@CT_Bergstrom) April 4, 2020

How has the #UKGoverment responded to #COVID19 in comparison with other nations? Here are some reflections from @J_J_Kennedy for our Global Health Security and Pandemics series https://t.co/ojMVg6Ej84

— Mile End Institute (@MileEndInst) March 31, 2020

WATCH: "Some countries initially talked about herd immunity as a strategy. In New Zealand we never, ever considered that. It would have meant tens of thousands of New Zealanders dying" — New Zealand Prime Minister @jacindaardernpic.twitter.com/W1ei6OUUyr

— Ian Fraser (@Ian_Fraser) March 31, 2020

An online form to report lockdown breaches undermines the trust we have in each other – unhelpful in even the most benign of situations, and downright dangerous right now, writes Michael Macaulay. https://t.co/XCrnpfEVJt

— Newsroom (@NewsroomNZ) March 30, 2020

Speechless every time someone says that this was totally unexpected & nobody saw this coming. See chapter 3: 'Preparing for the Worst: A Rapidly Spreading, Lethal Respiratory Pathogen' published by the @WHO Sept 2019. https://t.co/23qTrz7dN9

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) March 30, 2020

People are facing uncertainty for days, weeks & months. We need a manageable way forward to keep the health, social & economic costs at a minimum. My analysis on where COVID-19 response is heading & how it could end: https://t.co/qLDm8tv8a9

— Prof. Devi Sridhar (@devisridhar) April 2, 2020

What could we have done differently if we could turn back the coronavirus clock? Listen to a new special edition of our EU Confidential podcast: https://t.co/d65CYotkSb pic.twitter.com/iN2PQih5l5

— POLITICOEurope (@POLITICOEurope) March 31, 2020

I wish the late great Mick Moran were still around – it feels like the next chapter of his analysis of the modern British state urgently needs to be written. https://t.co/ffxegGKVCu

— Will Jennings 🗳 (@drjennings) March 16, 2020

I’m writing a book about @ExtinctionR. Here are some thoughts about today’s controversy. 1. This may or may not be a legit XR group. 2. That may matter because it may be done in order to smear XR & climate activism generally 1/n https://t.co/NyQhbv53a3

— Oscar Berglund (@berglund_oscar) March 25, 2020

Cautionary words for anyone tempted to say "this must be good for the climate" or, worse, "this shows we can tackle climate change".

COVID19 is a re-framing of the climate issues – a dramatically changed context for the response – but those climate issues haven't gone away. https://t.co/gixVwnk6gq

— Chris Stark (@ChiefExecCCC) March 27, 2020

We are concerned about regulation rollbacks which impact the food system slipping under the radar at the moment – we are going to be keeping an eye on things and use hashtag #Covid19Watchdog https://t.co/niinfSWv6f#TuesdayThoughts

— Feedback (@feedbackorg) April 7, 2020

.

A study in politics – when leadership fails. Would those that were ready to bash the @WHO take the time to read this? The critical issue for all countries is: what did they do after the PHEIC was declared? Why did USA and China not work together to fight #COVID19 https://t.co/zK7hcEbU80

— Ilona Kickbusch (@IlonaKickbusch) April 12, 2020

I wrote about why the WHO can’t keep its members in line during the pandemic it was built to solve https://t.co/p8NRsJZsNi

— Stephen Buranyi (@stephenburanyi) April 10, 2020

Not a single voice from the Global South – that’s not good enough if you are reporting on a global organisation – @who has 194 member states – it’s not the donors who should be running it #COVID19 #geopolitics https://t.co/xqTaFEYLap

— Ilona Kickbusch (@IlonaKickbusch) April 10, 2020

'Leading in a crisis'https://t.co/sbG3Pm7Yjk

— Professor Paul Cairney (@CairneyPaul) April 9, 2020

The Australian #COVID19 modelling was published today. My thanks to James McCaw (@j_mccaw) for checking this thread. I’ll do two threads – one explaining the results and how we might interpret them; and another to try to explain how these models work. https://t.co/O6sGwggY9W

— Allen Cheng (@peripatetical) April 7, 2020

This was so predictable. Ireland was already closing pubs and restaurants. #COVIDー19 . Cheltenham Festival ‘spread coronavirus across country’ | News | The Times https://t.co/QVQnJblJiH

— Andrea Catherwood (@acatherwoodnews) April 3, 2020

expert comments about comparison between the COVID-19 situation in Ireland and the UKhttps://t.co/y4OBOhdbtT

— Science Media Centre UK (@SMC_London) April 13, 2020

.

@globalhlthtwit @devisridhar @neil_ferguson @LawDavF @Samfr @stephenkb As people are shocked by young, fit victims, this is not because the epidemic here is different: 17 Feb Chinese data showed 48% of victims under 70, 18% under 60, 33% w/out co-morbidity. Why was this ignored? https://t.co/DHvRRwakIY

— Martin Shaw (@martinshawx) April 4, 2020

Coronavirus: 1.3 billion smokers urged to quit to reduce COVID-19 risks https://t.co/ZFxwxRSxff

— SkyNews (@SkyNews) April 6, 2020

.

Our latest @reformscotland briefing by @siobhanhmathers supports a universal basic income as we emerge from the Coronavirus crisis https://t.co/njzyin85rw

— Chris Deerin (@chrisdeerin) April 10, 2020

UK public chooses health over wealth https://t.co/HZmjksEzyc

— The Conversation (@ConversationUK) April 9, 2020

.

Joint guidance agreed with @COSLA, @scotgov and Unions on the use of PPE in the context of #COVID19:@AlisonEvison pic.twitter.com/Iq2WdMH5jl

— COSLA (@COSLA) April 9, 2020

Hi Darren, we worked with Number 10 on this letter, as the PM wanted to write to everyone in the UK.

— Mark Drakeford (@fmwales) April 8, 2020

BBC News – Coronavirus: Belfast shops allowed to open early on Sundayhttps://t.co/OLrcMDWVPB

— Leigh Sparks (@sparks_stirling) April 5, 2020

.

Gender lens missing from the pandemic control measures in #India. This article by @AshwDeshpande makes reference to her work with #LSEGender's @N_Kabeer on women, domestic work and care in 🇮🇳: https://t.co/ViXu07MoLG

— LSE Gender (@LSEGenderTweet) April 14, 2020

Now @FafardPatrick @CairneyPaul @oliver_kathryn @ProfKatSmith @justinparkhurst *this* is #COVID19 expertise: https://t.co/qUFnHUvwty

— Evelyne 🙏 (@evelynedeleeuw) April 9, 2020

Policy Analysis in 750 words: Classic 5-step advice

‘Policy analysis’ describes the identification of a policy problem and possible solutions.

Classic models of policy analysis are client-oriented. Most texts identify the steps that a policy analysis should follow, from identifying a problem and potential solutions, to finding ways to predict and evaluate the impact of each solution. Each text describes this process in different ways, as outlined in Boxes 1-5. However, for the most part, they follow the same five steps:

1. Define a policy problem identified by your client.
2. Identify technically and politically feasible solutions.
3. Use value-based criteria and political goals to compare solutions.
4. Predict the outcome of each feasible solution.
5. Make a recommendation to your client.

Further, they share the sense that analysts need to adapt pragmatically to a political environment. Assume that your audience is not an experienced policy analyst. Assume a political environment in which there is limited attention or time to consider problems, and some policy solutions will be politically infeasible. Describe the policy problem for your audience: to help them see it as something worthy of their energy. Discuss a small number of possible solutions, the differences between them, and their respective costs and benefits. Keep it short with the aid of visual techniques that sum up the issue concisely, to minimise cognitive load and make the problem seem solvable.

Box 1. Bardach (2012) A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis

1. ‘Define the problem’. Provide a diagnosis of a policy problem, using rhetoric and eye-catching data to generate attention.
2. ‘Assemble some evidence’. Gather relevant data efficiently.
3. ‘Construct the alternatives’. Identify the relevant and feasible policy solutions that your audience might consider.
4. ‘Select the criteria’. Typical value judgements relate to efficiency, equity and fairness, the trade-off between individual freedom and collective action, and the extent to which a policy process involves citizens in deliberation.
5. ‘Project the outcomes’. Focus on the outcomes that key actors care about (such as value for money), and quantify and visualise your predictions if possible.
6. ‘Confront the trade-offs’. Compare the pros and cons of each solution, such as how much of a bad service policymakers will accept to cut costs.
7. ‘Decide’. Examine your case through the eyes of a policymaker.
8. ‘Tell your story’. Identify your target audience and tailor your case. Weigh up the benefits of oral versus written presentation. Provide an executive summary. Focus on coherence and clarity. Keep it simple and concise. Avoid jargon.

Box 2. Dunn (2017) Public Policy Analysis

1. What is the policy problem to be solved? Identify its severity, urgency, cause, and our ability to solve it. Don’t define the wrong problem, such as by oversimplifying.
2. What effect will each potential policy solution have? ‘Forecasting’ methods can help provide ‘plausible’ predictions about the future effects of current/ alternative policies.
3. Which solutions should we choose, and why? Normative assessments are based on values such as ‘equality, efficiency, security, democracy, enlightenment’ and beliefs about the preferable balance between state, communal, and market/ individual solutions (2017: 6; 205).
4. What were the policy outcomes? ‘Monitoring is crucial because it is difficult to predict policy success, and unintended consequences are inevitable (2017: 250).
5. Did the policy solution work as intended? Did it improve policy outcomes? Try to measure the outcomes your solution, while noting that evaluations are contested (2017: 332-41).

Box 3. Meltzer and Schwartz (2019) Policy Analysis as Problem Solving

1. ‘Define the problem’. Problem definition is a political act of framing, as part of a narrative to evaluate the nature, cause, size, and urgency of an issue.
2. ‘Identify potential policy options (alternatives) to address the problem’. Identify many possible solutions, then select the ‘most promising’ for further analysis (2019: 65).
3. ‘Specify the objectives to be attained in addressing the problem and the criteria  to  evaluate  the  attainment  of  these  objectives  as  well as  the  satisfaction  of  other  key  considerations  (e.g.,  equity,  cost, equity, feasibility)’.
4. ‘Assess the outcomes of the policy options in light of the criteria and weigh trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of the options’.
5. ‘Arrive at a recommendation’. Make a preliminary recommendation to inform an iterative process, drawing feedback from clients and stakeholder groups (2019: 212).

Box 4. Mintrom (2012) Contemporary Policy Analysis

1. ‘Engage in problem definition’. Define the nature of a policy problem, and the role of government in solving it, while engaging with many stakeholders (2012: 3; 58-60).
2. ‘Propose alternative responses to the problem’. Identify how governments have addressed comparable problems, and a previous policy’s impact (2012: 21).
3. ‘Choose criteria for evaluating each alternative policy response’. ‘Effectiveness, efficiency, fairness, and administrative efficiency’ are common (2012: 21).
4. ‘Project the outcomes of pursuing each policy alternative’. Estimate the cost of a new policy, in comparison with current policy, and in relation to factors such as savings to society or benefits to certain populations.
5. ‘Identify and analyse trade-offs among alternatives’. Use your criteria and projections to compare each alternative in relation to their likely costs and benefits.
6. ‘Report findings and make an argument for the most appropriate response’. Client-oriented advisors identify the beliefs of policymakers and tailor accordingly (2012: 22).

Box 5 Weimer and Vining (2017) Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice

1. ‘Write to Your Client’. Having a client such as an elected policymaker requires you to address the question they ask, by their deadline, in a clear and concise way that they can understand (and communicate to others) quickly (2017: 23; 370-4).
2. ‘Understand the Policy Problem’. First, ‘diagnose the undesirable condition’. Second, frame it as ‘a market or government failure (or maybe both)’.
3. ‘Be Explicit About Values’ (and goals). Identify (a) the values to prioritise, such as ‘efficiency’, ‘equity’, and ‘human dignity’, and (b) ‘instrumental goals’, such as ‘sustainable public finance or political feasibility’, to generate support for solutions.
4. ‘Specify Concrete Policy Alternatives’. Explain potential solutions in sufficient detail to predict the costs and benefits of each ‘alternative’ (including current policy).
5. ‘Predict and Value Impacts’. Short deadlines dictate that you use ‘logic and theory, rather than systematic empirical evidence’ to make predictions efficiently (2017: 27)
6. ‘Consider the Trade-Offs’. Each alternatives will fulfil certain goals more than others. Produce a summary table to make value-based choices about trade-offs (2017: 356-8).
7. ‘Make a Recommendation’. ‘Unless your client asks you not to do so, you should explicitly recommend one policy’ (2017: 28).

This is an excerpt from The Politics of Policy Analysis, found here: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/policy-analysis-in-750-words/

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: policy analysis for marginalized groups in racialized political systems

Note: this post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

For me, this story begins with a tweet by Professor Jamila Michener, about a new essay by Dr Fabienne Doucet, ‘Centering the Margins: (Re)defining Useful Research Evidence Through Critical Perspectives’:

Incisive essay from @bailabomba on studying the use of research evidence through critical perspectives that center the marginalized. There is so too much good stuff in here to summarize via twitter (you should just read it). But let me point out a few things that resonated (1/n) https://t.co/nIahyIjwBo

— Jamila Michener (@povertyscholar) December 17, 2019

Research and policy analysis for marginalized groups

For Doucet (2019: 1), it begins by describing the William T. Grant Foundation’s focus on improving the ‘use of research evidence’ (URE), and the key questions that we should ask when improving URE:

1. For what purposes do policymakers find evidence useful?

Examples include to: inform a definition of problems and solutions, foster practitioner learning, support an existing political position, or impose programmes backed by evidence (compare with How much impact can you expect from your analysis?).

2.   Who decides what to use, and what is useful?

For example, usefulness could be defined by the researchers providing evidence, the policymakers using it, the stakeholders involved in coproduction, or the people affected by research and policy (compare with Bacchi, Stone and Who should be involved in the process of policy analysis?).

3. How do critical theories inform these questions? (compare with T. Smith)

First, they remind us that so-called ‘rational’ policy processes have incorporated research evidence to help:

‘maintain power hierarchies and accept social inequity as a given. Indeed, research has been historically and contemporaneously (mis)used to justify a range of social harms from enslavement, colonial conquest, and genocide, to high-stakes testing, disproportionality in child welfare services, and “broken windows” policing’ (Doucet, 2019: 2)

Second, they help us redefine usefulness in relation to:

‘how well research evidence communicates the lived experiences of marginalized groups so that the understanding of the problem and its response is more likely to be impactful to the community in the ways the community itself would want’ (Doucet, 2019: 3)

In that context, potential responses include to:

1. Recognise the ways in which research and policy combine to reproduce the subordination of social groups.

• General mechanisms include: the reproduction of the assumptions, norms, and rules that produce a disproportionate impact on social groups (compare with Social Construction and Policy Design).
• Specific mechanism include: judging marginalised groups harshly according to ‘Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic’ norms (‘WEIRD’)

2. Reject the idea that scientific research can be seen as objective or neutral (and that researchers are beyond reproach for their role in subordination).
3. Give proper recognition to ‘experiential knowledge’ and ‘transdiciplinary approaches’ to knowledge production, rather than privileging scientific knowledge.
4. Commit to social justice, to help ‘eliminate oppressions and to emancipate and empower marginalized groups’, such as by disrupting ‘the policies and practices that disproportionately harm marginalized groups’ (2019: 5-7)
5. Develop strategies to ‘center race’, ‘democratize’ research production, and ‘leverage’ transdisciplinary methods (including poetry, oral history and narrative, art, and discourse analysis – compare with Lorde) (2019: 10-22)

See also Doucet, F. (2021) ‘Identifying and Testing Strategies to Improve the Use of Antiracist Research Evidence through Critical Race Lenses‘

Policy analysis in a ‘racialized polity’

A key way to understand these processes is to use, and improve, policy theories to explain the dynamics and impacts of a racialized political system. For example, ‘policy feedback theory’ (PFT) draws on elements from historical institutionalism and SCPD to identify the rules, norms, and practices that reinforce subordination.

In particular, Michener’s (2019: 424) ‘Policy Feedback in a Racialized Polity’ develops a ‘racialized feedback framework (RFF)’ to help explain the ‘unrelenting force with which racism and White supremacy have pervaded social, economic, and political institutions in the United States’. Key mechanisms include (2019: 424-6):

1. ‘Channelling resources’, in which the rules, to distribute government resources, benefit some social groups and punish others.

• Examples include: privileging White populations in social security schemes and the design/ provision of education, and punishing Black populations disproportionately in prisons (2019: 428-32).
• These rules also influence the motivation of social groups to engage in politics to influence policy (some citizens are emboldened, others alienated).

2. ‘Generating interests’, in which ‘racial stratification’ is a key factor in the power of interest groups (and balance of power in them).
3. ‘Shaping interpretive schema’, in which race is a lens through which actors understand, interpret, and seek to solve policy problems.
4. The ways in which centralization (making policy at the federal level) or decentralization influence policy design.

• For example, the ‘historical record’ suggests that decentralization is more likely to ‘be a force of inequality than an incubator of power for people of color’ (2019: 433).

Insufficient attention to race and racism: what are the implications for policy analysis?

One potential consequence of this lack of attention to race, and the inequalities caused by racism in policy, is that we place too much faith in the vague idea of ‘pragmatic’ policy analysis.

Throughout the 750 words series, you will see me refer generally to the benefits of pragmatism:

• How much impact can you expect from your analysis? focuses on making sure that your client-oriented advice builds on your client’s timetable and definition of the problem.
• What you need as an analyst versus policymaking reality focuses on managing your expectations about your ability to change policy (and influence policymaking).
• What can you realistically expect policymakers to do? describes how the pragmatic policy analysis texts (e.g. Bardach and Dunn) emphasise the value of this approach (albeit while inviting you to compare their accounts with the questioning, storytelling, and decolonizing approaches by Bacchi, Stone, and T. Smith).

In that context, pragmatism relates to the idea that policy analysis consists of ‘art and craft’, in which analysts assess what is politically feasible if taking a low-risk client-oriented approach.

In this context, pragmatism may be read as a euphemism for conservatism and status quo protection.

In other words, other posts in the series warn against too-high expectations for entrepreneurial and systems thinking approaches to major policy change, but they should not be read as an excuse to reject ambitious plans for much-needed changes to policy and policy analysis (compare with Meltzer and Schwartz, who engage with this dilemma in client-oriented advice).

Connections to blog themes

This post connects well to:

• policy analysis posts on T. Smith, Bacchi, Stone, and Who should be involved in the process of policy analysis?
• 500/1000 Words posts on Power and Knowledge, Feminist Institutionalism, Social Construction and Policy Design, and Feminism, Postcolonialism, and Critical Policy Studies, and
• the ‘politics of evidence based policymaking’ series.

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: complex systems and systems thinking

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview and connects to previous posts on complexity. The first 750 words tick along nicely, then there is a picture of a cat hanging in there baby to signal where it can all go wrong. I updated it (22.6.20) to add category 11 then again (30.9.20) when I realised that the former category 11 was a lot like 6.

There are a million-and-one ways to describe systems and systems thinking. These terms are incredibly useful, but also at risk of meaning everything and therefore nothing (compare with planning and consultation).

Let’s explore how the distinction between policy studies and policy analysis can help us clarify the meaning of ‘complex systems’ and ‘systems thinking’ in policymaking.

For example, how might we close a potentially large gap between these two stories?

1. Systems thinking in policy analysis.

• Avoid the unintended consequences of too-narrow definitions of problems and processes (systems thinking, not simplistic thinking).
• If we engage in systems thinking effectively, we can understand systems well enough to control, manage, or influence them.

2. The study of complex policymaking systems.

• Policy emerges from complex systems in the absence of: (a) central government control and often (b) policymaker awareness.
• We need to acknowledge these limitations properly, to accept our limitations, and avoid the mechanistic language of ‘policy levers’ which exaggerate human or government control.

Complex systems thinking could be the future of policymaking.

But what does it even mean?https://t.co/I5DwY884Vf

— Apolitical (@apoliticalco) March 19, 2019

See also: Systems science and systems thinking for public health: a systematic review of the field

Six meanings of complex systems in policy and policymaking

Let’s begin by trying to clarify many meanings of complex system and relate them to systems thinking storylines.

For example, you will encounter three different meanings of complex system in this series alone, and each meaning presents different implications for systems thinking:

1. A complex policymaking system

Policy outcomes seem to ‘emerge’ from policymaking systems in the absence of central government control. As such, we should rely less on central government driven targets (in favour of local discretion to adapt to environments), encourage trial-and-error learning, and rethink the ways in which we think about government ‘failure’ (see, for example, Hallsworth on ‘system stewardship’, the OECD on ‘Systemic Thinking for Policy Making‘, and this thread)

• Systems thinking is about learning and adapting to the limits to policymaker control.

“Outcomes are emergent properties of complex systems that we simply cannot force through more rigorous measuring” – @JohnBurgoyne07 #CFGCommAcc20 https://t.co/JCCwMxN0nY

— CPI (@CPI_foundation) February 11, 2020

2. Complex policy problems

Dunn (2017:  73) describes the interdependent nature of problems:

“Subjectively experienced problems – crime, poverty, unemployment, inflation, energy, pollution, health, security – cannot be decomposed into independent subsets without running the risk of producing an approximately right solution to the wrong problem. A key characteristic of systems of problems is that the whole is greater – that is, qualitatively different – than the simple sum of its parts” (contrast with Meltzer and Schwartz on creating a ‘boundary’ to make problems seem solveable).

• Systems thinking is about addressing policy problems holistically.

3. Complex policy mixes

What we call ‘policy’ is actually a collection of policy instruments. Their overall effect is ‘non-linear’, difficult to predict, and subject to emergent outcomes, rather than cumulative (compare with Lindblom’s hopes for incrementalist change).

This point is crucial to policy analysis: does it involve a rethink of all instruments, or merely add a new instrument to the pile?

• Systems thinking is about anticipating the disproportionate effect of a new policy instrument.

These three meanings are joined by at least three more (from Munro and Cairney on energy systems):

4. Socio-technical systems (Geels)

Used to explain the transition from unsustainable to sustainable energy systems.

• Systems thinking is about identifying the role of new technologies, protected initially in a ‘niche’, and fostered by a supportive ‘social and political environment’.

5. Socio-ecological systems (Ostrom)

Used to explain how and why policy actors might cooperate to manage finite resources.

• Systems thinking is about identifying the conditions under which actors develop layers of rules to foster trust and cooperation.

6. Performing the metaphor of systems

Governments often use the language of complex systems – rather loosely – to indicate an awareness of the interconnectedness of things. They often perform systems thinking to give the impression that they are thinking and acting differently, but without backing up their words with tangible changes to policy instruments.

• Systems thinking is about projecting the sense that (a) policy and policymaking is complicated, but (b) governments can still look like they are in control.

Four more meanings of systems thinking

Now, let’s compare these storylines with a small sample of wider conceptions of systems thinking:

7. The old way of establishing order from chaos

Based on the (now-diminished) faith in science and rational management techniques to control the natural world for human benefit (compare Hughes and Hughes on energy with Checkland on ‘hard’ v ‘soft’ systems approaches, then see What you need as an analyst versus policymaking reality and Radin on the old faith in rationalist governing systems).

• Systems thinking was about the human ability to turn potential chaos into well-managed systems (such as ‘large technical systems’ to distribute energy)

8. The new way of accepting complexity but seeking to make an impact

Based on the idea that we can identify ‘leverage points’, or the places that help us ‘intervene in a system’ (see Meadows then compare with Arnold and Wade).

• Systems thinking is about the human ability to use a small shift in a system to produce profound changes in that system.

9. A way to rethink cause-and-effect

Based on the idea that current research methods are too narrowly focused on linearity rather than the emergent properties of systems of behaviour (for example, Rutter et al on how to analyse the cumulative effect of public health interventions, and Greenhalgh on responding more effectively to pandemics).

• Systems thinking is about rethinking the ways in which governments, funders, or professions conduct policy-relevant research on social behaviour.

This is a brilliant paper https://t.co/dRnN651jfQ https://t.co/CyqHZs0453

— Professor Paul Cairney (@CairneyPaul) July 1, 2020

10. A way of thinking about ourselves

Embrace the limits to human cognition, and accept that all understandings of complex systems are limited.

• Systems thinking is about developing the ‘wisdom’ and ‘humility’ to accept our limited knowledge of the world.

HT @suzannewTHF … a neat graphic explanation of complexity theory

"we need to let go of our cultural obsession with prediction and control and and develop the wisdom and humility to sit with multiplicity"https://t.co/0glbccWm2j?@harryrutter @KarabiGlobal @tim_hobbs_lab

— Jo Bibby (@JoBibbyTHF) December 19, 2019

How can we clarify systems thinking and use it effectively in policy analysis?

Now, imagine you are in a room of self-styled systems thinkers, and that no-one has yet suggested a brief conversation to establish what you all mean by systems thinking. I reckon you can make a quick visual distinction by seeing who looks optimistic.

I’ll be the morose-looking guy sitting in the corner, waiting to complain about ambiguity, so you would probably be better off sitting next to Luke Craven who still ‘believes in the power of systems thinking’.

If you can imagine some amalgam of these pessimistic/ optimistic positions, perhaps the conversation would go like this:

1. Reasons to expect some useful collaboration.

Some of these 10 discussions seem to complement each other. For example:

• We can use 3 and 9 to reject one narrow idea of ‘evidence-based policymaking’, in which the focus is on (a) using experimental methods to establish cause and effect in relation to one policy instrument, without showing (b) the overall impact on policy and outcomes (e.g. compare FNP with more general ‘families’ policy).
• 1-3 and 10 might be about the need for policy analysts to show humility when seeking to understand and influence complex policy problems, solutions, and policymaking systems.

In other words, you could define systems thinking in relation to the need to rethink the ways in which we understand – and try to address – policy problems. If so, you can stop here and move on to the next post. There is no benefit to completing this post.

2. Reasons to expect the same old frustrating discussions based on no-one defining terms well enough (collectively) to collaborate effectively (beyond using the same buzzwords).

Although all of these approaches use the language of complex systems and systems thinking, note some profound differences:

Holding on versus letting go.

• Some are about intervening to take control of systems or, at least, make a disproportionate difference from a small change.
• Some are about accepting our inability to understand, far less manage, these systems.

Talking about different systems.

• Some are about managing policymaking systems, and others about social systems (or systems of policy problems), without making a clear connection between both endeavours.

For example, if you use approach 9 to rethink societal cause-and-effect, are you then going to pretend that you can use approach 7 to do something about it? Or, will our group have a difficult discussion about the greater likelihood of 6 (metaphorical policymaking) in the context of 1 (the inability of governments to control the policymaking systems we need to solve the problems raised by 9).

In that context, the reason that I am sitting in the corner, looking so morose, is that too much collective effort goes into (a) restating, over and over and over again, the potential benefits of systems thinking, leaving almost no time for (b) clarifying systems thinking well enough to move on to these profound differences in thinking. Systems thinking has not even helped us solve these problems with systems thinking.

See also:

Why systems thinkers and data scientists should work together to solve social challenges

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: how much impact can you expect from your analysis?

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

Throughout this series you may notice three different conceptions about the scope of policy analysis:

1. ‘Ex ante’ (before the event) policy analysis. Focused primarily on defining a problem, and predicting the effect of solutions, to inform current choice (as described by Meltzer and Schwartz and Thissen and Walker).
2. ‘Ex post’ (after the event) policy analysis. Focused primarily on monitoring and evaluating that choice, perhaps to inform future choice (as described famously by Weiss).
3. Some combination of both, to treat policy analysis as a continuous (never-ending) process (as described by Dunn).

As usual, these are not hard-and-fast distinctions, but they help us clarify expectations in relation to different scenarios.

1. The impact of old-school ex ante policy analysis

Radin provides a valuable historical discussion of policymaking with the following elements:

• a small number of analysts, generally inside government (such as senior bureaucrats, scientific experts, and – in particular- economists),
• giving technical or factual advice,
• about policy formulation,
• to policymakers at the heart of government,
• on the assumption that policy problems would be solved via analysis and action.

This kind of image signals an expectation for high impact: policy analysts face low competition, enjoy a clearly defined and powerful audience, and their analysis is expected to feed directly into choice.

Radin goes on to describe a much different, modern policy environment: more competition, more analysts spread across and outside government, with a less obvious audience, and – even if there is a client – high uncertainty about where the analysis fits into the bigger picture.

Yet, the impetus to seek high and direct impact remains.

This combination of shifting conditions but unshifting hopes/ expectations helps explain a lot of the pragmatic forms of policy analysis you will see in this series, including:

• Keep it catchy, gather data efficiently, tailor your solutions to your audience, and tell a good story (Bardach)
• Speak with an audience in mind, highlight a well-defined problem and purpose, project authority, use the right form of communication, and focus on clarity, precision, conciseness, and credibility ( Smith)
• Address your client’s question, by their chosen deadline, in a clear and concise way that they can understand (and communicate to others) quickly (Weimer and Vining)
• Client-oriented advisors identify the beliefs of policymakers and anticipate the options worth researching (Mintrom)
• Identify your client’s resources and motivation, such as how they seek to use your analysis, the format of analysis they favour (make it ‘concise’ and ‘digestible’), their deadline, and their ability to make or influence the policies you might suggest (Meltzer and Schwartz).
• ‘Advise strategically’, to help a policymaker choose an effective solution within their political context (Thissen and Walker).
• Focus on producing ‘policy-relevant knowledge’ by adapting to the evidence-demands of policymakers and rejecting a naïve attachment to ‘facts speaking for themselves’ or ‘knowledge for its own sake’ (Dunn).

2. The impact of research and policy evaluation

Many of these recommendations are familiar to scientists and researchers, but generally in the context of far lower expectations about their likely impact, particularly if those expectations are informed by policy studies (compare Oliver & Cairney with Cairney & Oliver).

In that context, Weiss’ work is a key reference point. It gives us a menu of ways in which policymakers might use policy evaluation (and research evidence more widely):

• to inform solutions to a problem identified by policymakers
• as one of many sources of information used by policymakers, alongside ‘stakeholder’ advice and professional and service user experience
• as a resource used selectively by politicians, with entrenched positions, to bolster their case
• as a tool of government, to show it is acting (by setting up a scientific study), or to measure how well policy is working
• as a source of ‘enlightenment’, shaping how people think over the long term (compare with this discussion of ‘evidence based policy’ versus ‘policy based evidence’).

In other words, researchers may have a role, but they struggle (a) to navigate the politics of policy analysis, (b) find the right time to act, and (c) to secure attention, in competition with many other policy actors.

3. The potential for a form of continuous impact

Dunn suggests that the idea of ‘ex ante’ policy analysis is misleading, since policymaking is continuous, and evaluations of past choices inform current choices. Think of each policy analysis steps as ‘interdependent’, in which new knowledge to inform one step also informs the other four. For example, routine monitoring helps identify compliance with regulations, if resources and services reach ‘target groups’, if money is spent correctly, and if we can make a causal link between the policy solutions and outcomes. Its impact is often better seen as background information with intermittent impact.

Key conclusions to bear in mind

1. The demand for information from policy analysts may be disproportionately high when policymakers pay attention to a problem, and disproportionately low when they feel that they have addressed it.
2. Common advice for policy analysts and researchers often looks very similar: keep it concise, tailor it to your audience, make evidence ‘policy relevant’, and give advice (don’t sit on the fence). However, unless researchers are prepared to act quickly, to gather data efficiently (not comprehensively), to meet a tight brief for a client, they are not really in the impact business described by most policy analysis texts.
3. A lot of routine, continuous, impact tends to occur out of the public spotlight, based on rules and expectations that most policy actors take for granted.

Further reading

See the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview to continue reading on policy analysis.

See the ‘evidence-based policymaking’ page to continue reading on research impact.

Bristol powerpoint: Paul Cairney Bristol EBPM January 2020

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: what you need as an analyst versus policymaking reality

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview. Note for the eagle eyed: you are not about to experience déjà vu. I’m just using the same introduction.

When describing ‘the policy sciences’, Lasswell distinguishes between:

1. ‘knowledge of the policy process’, to foster policy studies (the analysis of policy)
2. ‘knowledge in the process’, to foster policy analysis (analysis for policy)

The lines between each approach are blurry, and each element makes less sense without the other. However, the distinction is crucial to help us overcome the major confusion associated with this question:

Does policymaking proceed through a series of stages?

The short answer is no.

The longer answer is that you can find about 40 blog posts (of 500 and 1000 words) which compare (a) a stage-based model called the policy cycle, and (b) the many, many policy concepts and theories that describe a far messier collection of policy processes.

In a nutshell, most policy theorists reject this image because it oversimplifies a complex policymaking system. The image provides a great way to introduce policy studies, and serves a political purpose, but it does more harm than good:

1. Descriptively, it is profoundly inaccurate (unless you imagine thousands of policy cycles interacting with each other to produce less orderly behaviour and less predictable outputs).
2. Prescriptively, it gives you rotten advice about the nature of your policymaking task (for more on these points, see this chapter, article, article, and series).

Why does the stages/ policy cycle image persist? Two relevant explanations

 

1. It arose from a misunderstanding in policy studies

In another nutshell, Chris Weible and I argue (in a secret paper) that the stages approach represents a good idea gone wrong:

• If you trace it back to its origins, you will find Lasswell’s description of decision functions: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination.
• These functions correspond reasonably well to a policy cycle’s stages: agenda setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and maintenance, succession or termination.
• However, Lasswell was imagining functional requirements, while the cycle seems to describe actual stages.

In other words, if you take Lasswell’s list of what policy analysts/ policymakers need to do, multiple it by the number of actors (spread across many organisations or venues) trying to do it, then you get the multi-centric policy processes described by modern theories. If, instead, you strip all that activity down into a single cycle, you get the wrong idea.

2. It is a functional requirement of policy analysis

This description should seem familiar, because the classic policy analysis texts appear to describe a similar series of required steps, such as:

1. define the problem
2. identify potential solutions
3. choose the criteria to compare them
4. evaluate them in relation to their predicted outcomes
5. recommend a solution
6. monitor its effects
7. evaluate past policy to inform current policy.

However, these texts also provide a heavy dose of caution about your ability to perform these steps (compare Bardach, Dunn, Meltzer and Schwartz, Mintrom, Thissen and Walker, Weimer and Vining)

In addition, studies of policy analysis in action suggest that:

• an individual analyst’s need for simple steps, to turn policymaking complexity into useful heuristics and pragmatic strategies,

should not be confused with

• what actually happens when many policy analysts, influencers, and policymakers interact in policy processes (see Radin, and Brans, Geva-May, and Howlett).

What you need versus what you can expect

Overall, this discussion of policy studies and policy analysis reminds us of a major difference between:

1. Functional requirements. What you need from policymaking systems, to (a) manage your task (the 5-8 step policy analysis) and (b) understand and engage in policy processes (the simple policy cycle).
2. Actual processes and outcomes. What policy concepts and theories tell us about bounded rationality (which limit the comprehensiveness of your analysis) and policymaking complexity (which undermines your understanding and engagement in policy processes).

Of course, I am not about to provide you with a solution to these problems.

Still, this discussion should help you worry a little bit less about the circular arguments you will find in key texts: here are some simple policy analysis steps, but policymaking is not as ‘rational’ as the steps suggest, but (unless you can think of an alternative) there is still value in the steps, and so on.

See also:

The New Policy Sciences

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: Defining policy problems and choosing solutions

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

When describing ‘the policy sciences’, Lasswell distinguishes between:

1. ‘knowledge of the policy process’, to foster policy studies (the analysis of policy)
2. ‘knowledge in the process’, to foster policy analysis (analysis for policy)

The idea is that both elements are analytically separable but mutually informative: policy analysis is crucial to solving real policy problems, policy studies inform the feasibility of analysis, the study of policy analysts informs policy studies, and so on.

Both elements focus on similar questions – such as What is policy? – and explore their descriptive (what do policy actors do?) and prescriptive (what should they do?) implications.

1. What is the policy problem?

Policy studies tend to describe problem definition in relation to framing, narrative, social construction, power, and agenda setting.

Actors exercise power to generate attention for their preferred interpretation, and minimise attention to alternative frames (to help foster or undermine policy change, or translate their beliefs into policy).

Policy studies incorporate insights from psychology to understand (a) how policymakers might combine cognition and emotion to understand problems, and therefore (b) how to communicate effectively when presenting policy analysis.

Policy studies focus on the power to reduce ambiguity rather than simply the provision of information to reduce uncertainty. In other words, the power to decide whose interpretation of policy problems counts, and therefore to decide what information is policy-relevant.

This (unequal) competition takes place within a policy process over which no actor has full knowledge or control.

The classic 5-8 step policy analysis texts focus on how to define policy problems well, but they vary somewhat in their definition of doing it well (see also C.Smith):

• Bardach recommends using rhetoric and eye-catching data to generate attention
• Weimer and Vining and Mintrom recommend beginning with your client’s ‘diagnosis’, placing it in a wider perspective to help analyse it critically, and asking yourself how else you might define it (see also Bacchi, Stone)
• Meltzer and Schwartz and Dunn identify additional ways to contextualise your client’s definition, such as by generating a timeline to help ‘map’ causation or using ‘problem-structuring methods’ to compare definitions and avoid making too many assumptions on a problem’s cause.
• Thissen and Walker compare ‘rational’ and ‘argumentative’ approaches, treating problem definition as something to be measured scientifically or established rhetorically (see also Riker).

These approaches compare with more critical accounts that emphasise the role of power and politics to determine whose knowledge is relevant (L.T.Smith) and whose problem definition counts (Bacchi, Stone). Indeed, Bacchi and Stone provide a crucial bridge between policy analysis and policy studies by reflecting on what policy analysts do and why.

2. What is the policy solution?

In policy studies, it is common to identify counterintuitive or confusing aspects of policy processes, including:

• Few studies suggest that policy responses actually solve problems (and many highlight their potential to exacerbate them). Rather, ‘policy solutions’ is shorthand for proposed or alleged solutions.
• Problem definition often sets the agenda for the production of ‘solutions’, but note the phrase solutions chasing problems (when actors have their ‘pet’ solutions ready, and they seek opportunities to promote them).

Policy studies: problem definition informs the feasibility and success of solutions

Generally speaking, to define the problem is to influence assessments of the feasibility of solutions:

• Technical feasibility. Will they work as intended, given the alleged severity and cause of the problem?
• Political feasibility. Will they receive sufficient support, given the ways in which key policy actors weigh up the costs and benefits of action?

Policy studies highlight the inextricable connection between technical and political feasibility. Put simply, (a) a ‘technocratic’ choice about the ‘optimality’ of a solution is useless without considering who will support its adoption, and (b) some types of solution will always be a hard sell, no matter their alleged effectiveness (Box 2.3 below).

In that context, policy studies ask: what types of policy tools or instruments are actually used, and how does their use contribute to policy change? Measures include the size, substance, speed, and direction of policy change.

In turn, problem definition informs: the ways in which actors will frame any evaluation of policy success, and the policy-relevance of the evidence to evaluate solutions. Simple examples include:

• If you define tobacco in relation to: (a) its economic benefits, or (b) a global public health epidemic, evaluations relate to (a) export and taxation revenues, or (b) reductions in smoking in the population.
• If you define ‘fracking’ in relation to: (a) seeking more benefits than costs, or (b) minimising environmental damage and climate change, evaluations relate to (a) factors such as revenue and effective regulation, or simply (b) how little it takes place.

Policy analysis: recognising and pushing boundaries

Policy analysis texts tend to accommodate these insights when giving advice:

• Bardach recommends identifying solutions that your audience might consider, perhaps providing a range of options on a notional spectrum of acceptability.
• Smith highlights the value of ‘precedent’, or relating potential solutions to previous strategies.
• Weimer and Vining identify the importance of ‘a professional mind-set’ that may be more important than perfecting ‘technical skills’
• Mintrom notes that some solutions are easier to sell than others
• Meltzer and Schwartz describe the benefits of making a preliminary recommendation to inform an iterative process, drawing feedback from clients and stakeholder groups
• Dunn warns against too-narrow forms of ‘evidence based’ analysis which undermine a researcher’s ability to adapt well to the evidence-demands of policymakers
• Thissen and Walker relate solution feasibility to a wide range of policy analysis ‘styles’

Still, note the difference in emphasis.

Policy analysis education/ training may be about developing the technical skills to widen definitions and apply many criteria to compare solutions.

Policy studies suggest that problem definition and a search for solutions takes place in an environment where many actors apply a much narrower lens and are not interested in debates on many possibilities (particularly if they begin with a solution).

I have exaggerated this distinction between each element, but it is worth considering the repeated interaction between them in practice: politics and policymaking provide boundaries for policy analysis, analysis could change those boundaries, and policy studies help us reflect on the impact of analysts.

I’ll take a quick break, then discuss how this conclusion relates to the idea of ‘entrepreneurial’ policy analysis.

Further reading

Understanding Public Policy (2020: 28) describes the difference between governments paying for and actually using the ‘tools of policy formulation’. To explore this point, see ‘The use and non-use of policy appraisal tools in public policy making‘ and The Tools of Policy Formulation.

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: What can you realistically expect policymakers to do?

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

One aim of this series is to combine insights from policy research (1000, 500) and policy analysis texts.

In this case, modern theories of the policy process help you identify your audience and their capacity to follow your advice. This simple insight may have a profound impact on the advice you give.

Policy analysis for an ideal-type world

For our purposes, an ideal-type is an abstract idea, which highlights hypothetical features of the world, to compare with ‘real world’ descriptions. It need not be an ideal to which we aspire. For example, comprehensive rationality describes the ideal type, and bounded rationality describes the ‘real world’ limitations to the ways in which humans and organisations process information.

 

Imagine writing policy analysis in the ideal-type world of a single powerful ‘comprehensively rational’ policymaker at the heart of government, making policy via an orderly policy cycle.

Your audience would be easy to identify, your analysis would be relatively simple, and you would not need to worry about what happens after you make a recommendation for policy change.

You could adopt a simple 5-8 step policy analysis method, use widely-used tools such as cost-benefit analysis to compare solutions, and know where the results would feed into the policy process.

I have perhaps over-egged this ideal-type pudding, but I think a lot of traditional policy analyses tapped into this basic idea and focused more on the science of analysis than the political and policymaking context in which it takes place (see Radin and Brans, Geva-May, and Howlett).

Policy analysis for the real world

Then imagine a far messier and less predictable world in which the nature of the policy issue is highly contested, responsibility for policy is unclear, and no single ‘centre’ has the power to turn a recommendation into an outcome.

This image is a key feature of policy process theories, which describe:

• Many policymakers and influencers spread across many levels and types of government (as the venues in which authoritative choice takes place). Consequently, it is not a straightforward task to identify and know your audience, particularly if the problem you seek to solve requires a combination of policy instruments controlled by different actors.
• Each venue resembles an institution driven by formal and informal rules. Formal rules are written-down or widely-known. Informal rules are unwritten, difficult to understand, and may not even be understood in the same way by participants. Consequently, it is difficult to know if your solution will be a good fit with the standard operating procedures of organisations (and therefore if it is politically feasible or too challenging).
• Policymakers and influencers operate in ‘subsystems’, forming networks built on resources such as trust or coalitions based on shared beliefs. Effective policy analysis may require you to engage with – or become part of – such networks, to allow you to understand the unwritten rules of the game and encourage your audience to trust the messenger. In some cases, the rules relate to your willingness to accept current losses for future gains, to accept the limited impact of your analysis now in the hope of acceptance at the next opportunity.
• Actors relate their analysis to shared understandings of the world – how it is, and how it should be – which are often so well-established as to be taken for granted. Common terms include paradigms, hegemons, core beliefs, and monopolies of understandings. These dominant frames of reference give meaning to your policy solution. They prompt you to couch your solutions in terms of, for example, a strong attachment to evidence-based cases in public health, value for money in treasury departments, or with regard to core principles such as liberalism or socialism in different political systems.
• Your solutions relate to socioeconomic context and the events that seem (a) impossible to ignore and (b) out of the control of policymakers. Such factors range from a political system’s geography, demography, social attitudes, and economy, while events can be routine elections or unexpected crises.

What would you recommend under these conditions? Rethinking 5-step analysis

There is a large gap between policymakers’ (a) formal responsibilities versus (b) actual control of policy processes and outcomes. Even the most sophisticated ‘evidence based’ analysis of a policy problem will fall flat if uninformed by such analyses of the policy process. Further, the terms of your cost-benefit analysis will be highly contested (at least until there is agreement on what the problem is, and how you would measure the success of a solution).

Modern policy analysis texts try to incorporate such insights from policy theories while maintaining a focus on 5-8 steps. For example:

• Meltzer and Schwartz contrast their ‘flexible’ and ‘iterative’ approach with a too- rigid ‘rationalistic approach’.
• Bardachand Dunn emphasise the value of political pragmatism and the ‘art and craft’ of policy analysis.
• Weimer and Vininginvest 200 pages in economic analyses of markets and government, often highlighting a gap between (a) our ability to model and predict economic and social behaviour, and (b) what actually happens when governments intervene.
• Mintrom invites you to see yourself as a policy entrepreneur, to highlight the value of of ‘positive thinking’, creativity, deliberation, and leadership, and perhaps seek ‘windows of opportunity’ to encourage new solutions. Alternatively, a general awareness of the unpredictability of events can prompt you to be modest in your claims, since the policymaking environment may be more important (than your solution) to outcomes.
• Thissen and Walker focus more on a range of possible roles than a rigid 5-step process.

Beyond 5-step policy analysis

1. Compare these pragmatic, client-orientated, and communicative models with the questioning, storytelling, and decolonizing approaches by Bacchi, Stone, and L.T. Smith.

• The latter encourage us to examine more closely the politics of policy processes, including the importance of framing, narrative, and the social construction of target populations to problem definition and policy design.
• Without this wider perspective, we are focusing on policy analysis as a process rather than considering the political context in which analysts use it.

2. Additional posts on entrepreneurs and ‘systems thinking’ [to be added] encourage us to reflect on the limits to policy analysis in multi-centric policymaking systems.

 

 

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: Reflecting on your role as a policy analyst

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

One aim of this series is to combine insights from policy research (1000, 500) and policy analysis texts.

If we take key insights from policy theories seriously, we can use them to identify (a) the constraints to policy analytical capacity, and (b) the ways in which analysts might address them. I use the idea of policy analyst archetypes to compare a variety of possible responses.

Key constraints to policy analytical capacity

Terms like ‘bounded rationality’ highlight major limits on the ability of humans and organisations to process information.

• Humans use heuristics or cognitive shortcuts to process enough information to make choices, and institutions are the rules used by organisations to limit information processing.

Terms like policymaking ‘context’, ‘environments’, and multi-centric policymaking suggest that the policy process is beyond the limits of policymaker understanding and control.

• Policy actors need to find ways to act, with incomplete information about the problem they seek to solve and the likely impact of their ‘solution’.
• They gather information to help reduce uncertainty, but problem definition is really about exercising power to reduce ambiguity: select one way to interpret a problem (at the expense of most others), and limit therefore limit the relevance and feasibility of solutions.
• This context informs how actors might use the tools of policy analysis. Key texts in this series highlight the use of tools to establish technical feasibility (will it work as intended?), but policymakers also select tools for their political feasibility (who will support or oppose this measure?).

How might policy analysts address these constraints ethically?

Most policy analysis texts (in this series) consider the role of professional ethics and values during the production of policy analysis. However, they also point out that there is not a clearly defined profession and associated code of conduct (e.g. see Adachi). In that context, let us begin with some questions about the purpose of policy analysis and your potential role:

1. Is your primary role to serve individual clients or some notion of the ‘public good’?
2. Should you maximise your role as an individual or play your part in a wider profession?
3. What is the balance between the potential benefits of individual ‘entrepreneurship’ and collective ‘co-productive’ processes?
4. Which policy analysis techniques should you prioritise?
5. What forms of knowledge and evidence count in policy analysis?
6. What does it mean to communicate policy analysis responsibly?
7. Should you provide a clear recommendation or encourage reflection?

 

Policy analysis archetypes: pragmatists, entrepreneurs, manipulators, storytellers, and decolonisers

In that context, I have created a story of policy analysis archetypes to identify the elements that each text emphasises.

The pragmatic policy analyst

• Bardach provides the classic simple, workable, 8-step system to present policy analysis to policymakers while subject to time and resource-pressed political conditions.
• Dunn also uses Wildavsky’s famous phrase ‘art and craft’ to suggest that scientific and ‘rational’ methods can only take us so far.

The professional, client–oriented policy analyst

• Weimer and Vining provide a similar 7-step client-focused system, but incorporating a greater focus on professional development and economic techniques (such as cost-benefit-analysis) to emphasise a particular form of professional analyst.
• Meltzer and Schwartz also focus on advice to clients, but with a greater emphasis on a wide variety of methods or techniques (including service design) to encourage the co-design of policy analysis with clients.

The communicative policy analyst

•  C. Smith focuses on how to write and communicate policy analysis to clients in a political context.
• Compare with Spiegelhalter and Gigerenzer on how to communicate responsibly when describing uncertainty, probability, and risk.

The manipulative policy analyst.

• Riker helps us understand the relationship between two aspects of agenda setting: the rules/ procedures to make choice, and the framing of policy problems and solutions.

The entrepreneurial policy analyst

• Mintrom shows how to combine insights from studies of policy entrepreneurship and policy analysis, to emphasise the benefits of collaboration and creativity.

The questioning policy analyst

• Bacchi  analyses the wider context in which people give and use such advice, to identify the emancipatory role of analysis and encourage policy analysts to challenge dominant social constructions of problems and populations.

The storytelling policy analyst

• Stone identifies the ways in which people use storytelling and argumentation techniques to define problems and justify solutions. This process is about politics and power, not objectivity and optimal solutions.

The decolonizing policy analyst.

• L.T. Smith does not describe policy analysis directly, but shows how the ‘decolonization of research methods’ can inform the generation and use of knowledge.
• Compare with Hindess on the ways in which knowledge-based hierarchies rely on an untenable, circular logic.
• Compare with Michener’s thread, discussing Doucet’s new essay on (a) the role of power and knowledge in limiting (b) the ways in which we gather evidence to analyse policy problems.

Incisive essay from @bailabomba on studying the use of research evidence through critical perspectives that center the marginalized. There is so too much good stuff in here to summarize via twitter (you should just read it). But let me point out a few things that resonated (1/n) https://t.co/nIahyIjwBo

— Jamila Michener (@povertyscholar) December 17, 2019

Using archetypes to define the problem of policy analysis

Studies of the field (e.g. Radin plus Brans, Geva-May, and Howlett) suggest that there are many ways to do policy analysis. Further, as Thissen and Walker describe, such roles are not mutually exclusive, your views on their relative value could change throughout the process of analysis, and you could perform many of these roles.

Further, each text describes multiple roles, and some seem clustered together:

• pragmatic, client-orientated, and communicative could sum-up the traditional 5-8 step approaches, while
• questioning, storytelling, and decolonizing could sum up an important (‘critical’) challenge to narrow ways of thinking about policy analysis and the use of information.

Still, the emphasis matters.

Each text is setting an agenda or defining the problem of policy analysis more-or-less in relation to these roles. Put simply, the more you are reading about economic theory and method, the less you are reading about dominance and manipulation.

How can you read further?

Michener’s ‘Policy Feedback in a Racialized Polity’ connects to studies of historical institutionalism, and reminds us to use insights from policy theories to identify the context for policy analysis.

I have co-authored a lot about uncertainty/ ambiguity in relation to ‘evidence based policymaking’, including:

• Fostering Evidence-informed Policy Making: Uncertainty Versus Ambiguity(PDF)
• To Bridge the Divide between Evidence and Policy: Reduce Ambiguity as Much as Uncertainty
• How to communicate effectively with policymakers: combine insights from psychology and policy studies

See also The new policy sciences for a discussion of how these issues inform Lasswell’s original vision for the policy sciences (combining the analysis of and for policy).

Policy Analysis in 750 Words: Who should be involved in the process of policy analysis?

This post forms one part of the Policy Analysis in 750 words series overview.

Think of two visions for policy analysis. It should be primarily:

• ‘evidence based’, or
• ‘co-produced’.

These choices are not mutually exclusive, but there are key tensions between them that should not be ignored, such as when we ask:

• how many people should be involved in policy analysis?
• whose knowledge counts?
• who should control policy design?

Perhaps we can only produce a sensible combination of the two if we clarify their often very different implications for policy analysis. Let’s begin with one story for each and see where they take us.

A story of ‘evidence-based policymaking’

One story of ‘evidence based’ policy analysis is that it should be based on the best available evidence of ‘what works’.

Often, the description of the ‘best’ evidence relates to the idea that there is a notional hierarchy of evidence according to the research methods used.

At the top would be the systematic review of randomised control trials, and nearer the bottom would be expertise, practitioner knowledge, and stakeholder feedback.

This kind of hierarchy has major implications for policy learning and transfer, such as when importing policy interventions from abroad or ‘scaling up’ domestic projects.

Put simply, the experimental method is designed to identify the causal effect of a very narrowly defined policy intervention. Its importation or scaling up would be akin to the description of medicine, in which the evidence suggests the causal effect of a specific active ingredient to be administered with the correct dosage. A very strong commitment to a uniform model precludes the processes we might associate with co-production, in which many voices contribute to a policy design to suit a specific context (see also: the intersection between evidence and policy transfer).

A story of co-production in policymaking

One story of ‘co-produced’ policy analysis is that it should be ‘reflexive’ and based on respectful conversations between a wide range of policymakers and citizens.

Often, the description is of the diversity of valuable policy relevant information, with scientific evidence considered alongside community voices and normative values.

This rejection of a hierarchy of evidence also has major implications for policy learning and transfer. Put simply, a co-production method is designed to identify the positive effect – widespread ‘ownership’ of the problem and commitment to a commonly-agreed solution – of a well-discussed intervention, often in the absence of central government control.

Its use would be akin to a collaborative governance mechanism, in which the causal mechanism is perhaps the process used to foster agreement (including to produce the rules of collective action and the evaluation of success) rather than the intervention itself. A very strong commitment to this process precludes the adoption of a uniform model that we might associate with narrowly-defined stories of evidence based policymaking.

Where can you find these stories in the 750-words series?

1. Texts focusing on policy analysis as evidence-based/ informed practice (albeit subject to limits) include: Weimer and Vining, Meltzer and Schwartz, Brans, Geva-May, and Howlett (compare with Mintrom, Dunn)
2. Texts on being careful while gathering and analysing evidence include: Spiegelhalter
3. Texts that challenge the ‘evidence based’ story include: Bacchi, T. Smith, Hindess, Stone

 

How can you read further?

See the EBPM page and special series ‘The politics of evidence-based policymaking: maximising the use of evidence in policy’

There are 101 approaches to co-production, but let’s see if we can get away with two categories:

4. Co-producing policy (policymakers, analysts, stakeholders). Some key principles can be found in Ostrom’s work and studies of collaborative governance.
5. Co-producing research to help make it more policy-relevant (academics, stakeholders). See the Social Policy and Administration special issue ‘Inside Co-production’ and Oliver et al’s ‘The dark side of coproduction’ to get started.

To compare ‘epistemic’ and ‘reflexive’ forms of learning, see Dunlop and Radaelli’s ‘The lessons of policy learning: types, triggers, hindrances and pathologies’

My interest has been to understand how governments juggle competing demands, such as to (a) centralise and localise policymaking, (b) encourage uniform and tailored solutions, and (c) embrace and reject a hierarchy of evidence. What could possibly go wrong when they entertain contradictory objectives? For example:

• Paul Cairney (2019) “The myth of ‘evidence based policymaking’ in a decentred state”, forthcoming in Public Policy and Administration(Special Issue, The Decentred State) (accepted version)
• Paul Cairney (2019) ‘The UK government’s imaginative use of evidence to make policy’, British Politics, 14, 1, 1-22 Open AccessPDF

• Paul Cairney and Kathryn Oliver (2017) ‘Evidence-based policymaking is not like evidence-based medicine, so how far should you go to bridge the divide between evidence and policy?’ Health Research Policy and Systems (HARPS), DOI: 10.1186/s12961-017-0192-x PDF
• Paul Cairney (2017) “Evidence-based best practice is more political than it looks: a case study of the ‘Scottish Approach’”, Evidence and Policy, 13, 3, 499-515 PDF